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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this research is three-fold. First is to examine the current state of 
military satellite communications and to analyze current trends in the commercial 
satellite communications market that support military Command and Control, as well as 
facilitate network operations. Second is the operational implementation of such private 
satellite networks within the context of Net Centric Operations, as well as within the 
context of a coalition environment. Third, this work will illustrate how the private 
satellite network could be managed, as well as understanding how the network could be 
used in the context of a network management control channel to exercise management of 
numerous dispersed network devices and nodes.   
The focus will be to define, examine, and research the conceptual framework for a 
tactical private satellite network that facilitates Command and Control of geographically 
dispersed tactical units, as well as provides a mechanism for the management of tactical 
networks. After having acquired a clear picture of today’s state and future’s capabilities 
of SATCOM, research will be directed to how a tactical private satellite network would 
be implemented to support Network Centric Operations and how this tactical private 
satellite network could be utilized as a tool for the management of tactical networks. 
During the research, a number of secondary, yet supportive topics, need to be 
examined, such as, how that tactical private satellite network can be implemented to 
facilitate collaboration between Other Government Agencies, Non-Governmental 
Organizations, and Coalition partners from other countries or how it would be managed 
to offer to its subscribers the desired service in terms of quantity (throughput) and overall 
quality. 
To materialize the above, this thesis considers it essential to thoroughly examine a 
commercial base station which is fully capable of managing this satellite network under 
any conditions. The whole concept of this Tactical Private Satellite Network is examined 
based on two innovative approaches. First, the establishment of two different logical 
channels inside the physical one and second, the concept of a private satellite network 
and its implementation is examined as a method for direct delivery of data.  
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 1
I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND  
From the moment that the famous science fiction writer, Arthur C. Clarke, first 
proposed in 1945 that three geostationary satellites could provide global 
telecommunications coverage, mankind has been enthralled by the idea of using space 
technology to provide long-haul communication links. Since that time, use of satellite 
systems has grown rapidly in various areas: Remote Sensing, Imagery, 
Telecommunications (Broadcast, Internet, Fixed or mobile communication services, etc.), 
Navigation, weather, earth observation, scientific, etc. 
Throughout the years, satellite technology expanded. Today it can add truly 
global coverage to even the most remote areas and mobility/access to networks of almost 
infinite size. Constellation of satellites can solve problems for mobile terminals, such as 
fading, blockages, effective elevation angles, etc. In other cases, they can complement 
terrestrial technology, such as fibers. Moreover, satellites, because they are high above 
the surface of the Earth, can receive and transmit signals from huge areas: the higher they 
are, the greater these areas become. Last, but not least, it is often far quicker and less 
expensive to bring broadcasting and communications to areas lacking them using 
satellites than it would be to provide the same services solely by terrestrial means (Iida et 
al., 20). 
The above capabilities highlight the major significance of satellite 
communications in two areas: they can bring multimedia communication services into 
remote areas and they can restore communication lines during major disasters. In the 
latter case, communications cannot rely on any prior terrestrial infrastructure because 
they have been entirely destroyed. Consequently, using satellite communications is 
something that can benefit dispersed military units that operate in hostile environments. 
Further, joint forces, comprised of a great variety of different participants — 
governmental and non-governmental — can also benefit from satellite communications 
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for they can operate in all kinds of emergency and disaster response scenarios. For both 
military and joint forces, terrestrial infrastructure is a luxury that they do not have. 
Moreover, the fact that military bandwidth, through proprietary satellites, is 
already saturated by the routine needs or other operations of military formations, it is 
prudent to say that commercial bandwidth is the best alternative. The great numbers of 
reasons are examined in the subsequent sections of this research. Last but not least, the 
participants will be able to manage this network by allocating bandwidth with respect to 
the different situations and applications. 
Generally speaking, network management is the process of controlling a complex 
data network so as to maximize its efficiency and productivity (qtd. in Chen et al., 1506). 
Managing, in terms of monitoring and controlling the network through the triad 
measurement-comparison-correction of the different networking devices’ variables, such 
a multivariable network without owning the satellite asset, is a challenging task. The 
network manager will have to operate inside the bandwidth boundaries that the 
commercial service provider has assigned. He must also guarantee the robust and high 
quality connectivity for each participating unit. The participants must assume the satellite 
as transparent and must execute their tasks as if they were close to each other on a well- 
linked communication terrestrial chess-board. Security and identity management rules 
need to be implemented to guarantee that the whole network is not compromised. Data, 
information and knowledge need to flow undisturbed and complete to give the power to 
the “Edge” participants of these Net Centric Operations to best accomplish their 
missions. In any case, information superiority, the capability to collect, process, and 
disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information, while exploiting or denying an 
adversary’s ability to do the same, will need to be assured. One of the ingredients is the 
robust networking.   
B. PURPOSE  
The purpose of this thesis is the development of a Tactical Satellite Networking 
concept that would allow small units to control bandwidth and use the provided satellite 
bandwidth for direct delivery of data and for managing the tactical networking resources. 
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For that purpose, this thesis proposes the term “Tactical Private Satellite Network.” The 
overall capability of keeping the management of such a complicated network inside the 
specific community of users, while the satellite services are leased from a commercial 
provider, is what differentiates our research from the nowadays recipes. To guarantee 
secure and high quality communication lines, the proposal is to keep the network 
management of commercial leased satellite bandwidth “in house.” The overall goal is to 
propose “A Conceptual Framework for a Tactical Private Satellite Network.” 
Consequently, the value of this thesis is the proposal of a framework for 
managing a tactical network by allocating the available bandwidth to the different users 
with respect to their needs and the quality of their applications. The means for achieving 
the connectivity is the commercial leased lines — not the potentially saturated proprietary 
military satellite communications whose bandwidth is negotiated by the service level 
agreements between the provider and the consumer (military and governmental 
agencies). The end product will be a tactical network operating inside the overall leased 
bandwidths’ boundaries, but with the capability to manage this network inside them. The 
term that aggregates these capabilities is the Tactical Private Satellite Network. 
The thesis proposes two innovative approaches:  
• The establishment of two different logical channels inside the physical 
one, instead of an aggregated channel, which serves logically and 
physically both requirements. By that a portion of the bandwidth is 
dedicated to management data. This data is kept separate from tactical 
data. This multiplatform control, separation of control and data links — 
for generally reconfiguring the nodes or the whole networking segment of 
self-forming networks — has a fundamental role in tactical networks 
(Bordetsky and Bourakov). The proposed segregation needs to be 
examined, with consideration given to the impact on the operational 
traffic that has to traverse the same channels of the transmission media, 




required, the bandwidth is limited to only the amount needed to conduct 
active network management when it conflicts with the propagation of real 
applications. 
• The examination of the concept of a private satellite network and its 
implementation as a method for direct delivery of data. This private 
network will give security and availability for the provided connectivity 
to its subscribers. This is further enforced by the execution of network 
management by one or more base stations. These will be operated by the 
participants and not by the provider of the satellite channels. 
Research for this project consists of Dr. Alex Bordetsky’s online material (in the 
form of readings and slide presentations), extensive literature review on relative subjects, 
case studies or relevant scenarios (to create a roadmap of thoughts that culminates in 
proving the applicability of a Tactical Private Satellite Network in modern Net Centric 
Operations), and a series of experiments conducted to investigate the feasibility of this 
concept. This thesis intends to provide an overview of the many advantages that 
commercial satellite usage can provide to the military and other governmental operations 
without jeopardizing the security and quality of the communication channels. This 
document also aims to show that the concepts of such network management are already 
available, relevant, and have been used in different forms by different agencies with 
successful results. It is this work’s contention that the primary actor who empowers such 
a self-sufficient network management will be one or more base stations with advanced 
capabilities and increased responsibilities. This primary actor will be able to guarantee 
that all elements of the participating units are robustly-networked. This will achieve 
secure and seamless connectivity and interoperability. One or more of such base stations, 
together with advanced sensors and well-trained users, can further achieve self-
organization of such an ad hoc network. 
C. SCOPE  
This thesis is directed towards users who have had tactical level operational 
experience and have faced the problem of managing an ad hoc dynamically-formed 
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wireless network — or, at least, have relied on intermediary managing entities. It can also 
be directed towards potential candidates who could implement and examine the technical 
implementation of such a network. Lastly, it could be directed towards providers who 
could propose their candidate solutions that match the definition and capabilities of a 
Tactical Private Satellite Network. 
This research focuses primarily on developing an understanding of commercial 
satellite technologies, trends, and how the military sector can benefit from them. 
Definition of the envisioned network, along with doctrinal specifications and case 
studies, are utilized to acquire a complete picture. Because the topic is broad in scope and 
no specific base station has yet been utilized, in-depth technical analysis of the 
framework is not possible; rather, an understanding of why and how needs to be 
investigated and, then, implemented. A series of relevant experiments with parts of that 
network are provided to show the merits of such an implementation. The intent is to 
expose readers to the basic principles and potentials of such a network.  
Overall, if the major advantages of such a network can be thoroughly understood, 
then this conceptual framework can move to the next level. This level could deal with 
protocols and proposed models that will recognize the dynamic nature of such a network. 
This could provide strong motivation for self-forming, self-configuring, and self-healing 
capabilities in the network. Either by proposing the use mobile agents, specific policies or 
aggregated objects, the management of such a network, with complexity emerging from 
the different functionality of its nodes, will be challenging and crucial for the success of 
the operation. 
D. METHODOLOGY OF RESEARCH  
As we move further into the Information Age, more ways to obtain complete and 
secure dissemination of data and information are being introduced. Many of them are still 
experimental and more are conceptual. The bottom line is that information technologies 
(IT), with their rapidly improving capacity, quality, and cost/performance ratios, are 
positioned as unique resources that can enable automation, monitoring, analysis, and 
coordination to support the flowing of data and information from central communication 
 6
hubs to the most remote edge participants. For the purpose of this research, relevant 
topics that support the idea of a Tactical Private Satellite Network are identified and 
specific-oriented scenarios are used to prove value. Moreover, a specific series of 
experiments was conducted at the Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity 
(MCTSSA), Camp Pendleton, California to confirm management feasibility of such a 
network. These are discussed below in more details.  
1. Literature Review: Doctrinal Publications, Satellite Communications-
Oriented Books and Articles 
There are a great number of books and articles that support the use of satellite in 
creating robust and secure communication lines. Satellite technology is recognized as 
evolving very fast and as the only means of connecting places seamlessly where 
terrestrial infrastructure does not exist or is not available. Many military and civilian 
organizations have already converted their communication capabilities to include satellite 
connectivity. Many of these authors recognize that military bandwidth is becoming over-
saturated; also that the only feasible, cost-effective, and practical solution is to turn to the 
commercial sector which already has the means (satellites) and the services (air-time) to 
be leased. The network management of these newly-formed communication lines is 
something that everybody agrees to be crucial for the viability of these networks. A query 
of all these academic materials was most helpful in identifying and conforming resource 
materials to begin building this thesis concept.  
2. Case Studies and Scenarios 
Different case studies are examined – with either too few or too many attributes of 
a tactical private satellite network in the military or in the commercial world — to 
illustrate their basic strengths, differences, and their compatibilities with the proposed 
Tactical Private Satellite Network. The network’s management always remains on the 
side of the entity that provides the services, i.e., the military in proprietary military 
networks and the service provider in commercial applications. 
Further, different scenarios are employed to prove how such a network 
management capability can help military operations (independent, joint, or international) 
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and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief scenarios. Each would employ Emergency 
Response Networks (ERNs). Common points, individual constraints, and need for 
effective communications are emphasized to ascertain the benefits of managing inside the 
total allocated bandwidth. They are formed dynamically, are mostly ad hoc and wireless 
networks, set their own priorities, and supervise their own desirable Quality of Service 
(QoS). 
3. Implementation and Network Management Experiments  
One of the key principles of Tactical Private Satellite Network is how the 
network, consisting of network devices that connect end users and satellite terminals that 
provide the actual transmission path, is managed as a single entity with the ultimate goal 
of providing robust services. It is suggested that the network, in this holistic form, can be 
managed from a single point within the network — specifically, that the implementation 
of the base station concept will facilitate the agent function in network management. 
Therefore, the base station would serve as the centralized agent for managing the 
network. The concept of remotely managing the network will be tested to provide proof 
that remote management is feasible and that it serves as a basis for further research and 
experimentation within this realm. Additionally, this work could also aid in the 
determination of the utilization of low-density personnel who possess critical network 
management and engineering skills. 
To this end, an experiment is designed to test the feasibility and functionality of 
remote network management within the context of the Tactical Private Satellite Network. 
The experiment consists of a representative network consisting of network devices 
(switches and routers) and hosts that are connected via a commercial satellite terminal 
device. They are closely, yet not exactly, replicating the proposed conceptual architecture 
of the Tactical Private Satellite Network. Data is collected using commercially available 
network management software tools, utilizing the Simple Network Management Protocol 
(SNMP), Internet Control Management Protocol (ICMP), and a proprietary software 
system that is used to manage/monitor the commercial satellite terminal. The data 
collected aids in the development of a management concept for the Tactical Private 
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Satellite Network. Data of interest includes response times of networking components, 
the affect on the throughput of the communications link due to the introduction of 
management data, and the actual amount of available bandwidth consumed by the said 
data. Finally, a concept is proposed for managing the holistic aspects of the Tactical 
Private Satellite Network. 
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION  
Chapter I provides a broad idea of what will follow in the subsequent chapters. Its 
purpose is to stimulate interest — experienced or inexperienced — and to provide a 
baseline to specific situations that are familiar to and can benefit from the proposed 
network. The purpose of this chapter highlights the new concepts that are proposed for 
further examination and potential implementation. A roadmap is described to help the 
reader acquire why building a framework for a Tactical Private Satellite Network will be 
beneficiary for conducting modern — military or not — operations. 
Chapter II is devoted to a literature review that supports the conceptual 
framework of implementing such a network and to further conduct network management. 
This is accomplished by the examination of the current state of military and commercial 
satellite communications and their feasibility to the application to a private satellite 
network. It begins with a brief illustration of Military Satellite Communications, their 
current capabilities, and their future capabilities. These examples will illustrate their 
promising future. It also speaks to their problem of oversaturated bandwidth which means 
that it does not completely cover military needs — routine or not. Further, commercial 
satellite systems’ advantages are stressed to show that they are the best solution for the 
problem mentioned previously. A detailed subsection also examines the challenges of 
using commercial satellite systems for military or other non-profit and multivariable 
operations. Further, to make the reader familiar, or at least to remind of, the processes 
and the agencies responsible for the acquisition of commercial satellite services, at the 
behest of the military, with their strong points are shown and potential 
weaknesses/limitations are presented to spark discussion. The chapter provides a detailed 
reference to the major future trends in commercial satellite services and major leading 
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technologies. This further supports the claim of needing reliance on commercial 
satellites’ services to keep up with and take advantage of the new capabilities. 
Chapter III deals with the Definition and Conceptual Requirements of Private 
Satellite Networks. The need to introduce the theoretical capabilities is covered by a 
thorough definition of this network and its desirable attributes. The rationale behind the 
use of private tactical satellite networks is demonstrated by describing current civilian 
and military examples; also, the capability that is provided to users. Leaving for a little 
the conceptual level, Private Tactical Satellite Network design considerations are 
examined in terms of ultimate goals of the network designers, the logical network design, 
and the applicable protocols/standards relative to these networks that utilize satellites as 
their primary transmission means. The rest of the chapter attempts to show the 
significance of the Tactical Network Entry Point of this network. Either in the form of a 
communication gateway or a control base station, its general capabilities are stressed to 
highlight its significance inside the framework of managing such a challenging network. 
Last, a brief comparison of the existing military gateway type systems in different 
branches is investigated to show that even in a proprietary environment, a gateway 
system is the most vital piece of the terrestrial segment of a satellite network. 
Chapter IV moves to the operational implementation of the Private Tactical 
Satellite Network in specific operational domains. It starts with the experimental domain 
of the Naval Postgraduate School’s (NPS) Center for Network Experimentation and 
Innovation/Tactical Network Testbed (CENETIX/TNT) architecture and its recent 
implementation during Marine Interdiction Operations (MIO) 08-2. The Swe-Dish 
services example is used to stress the significance of a less self-dependent application and 
the potentials that it may have if it is fully implemented under the scope of a complete 
Tactical Private Satellite Network for support of future experimentation. Different 
scenarios of the operational implementation are built to show how this network can fit. 
The maritime domain, Marine Corps Security Cooperation Marine Air/Ground Task 
Force (SCMAGTF) case, and the coalition for military or humanitarian 
assistance/disaster relief operations’ environments are used as “testbeds” to demonstrate 
the applicability of a Tactical Private Satellite Network. It is shown that proper network 
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management of it by participants can facilitate and optimize the results of relative 
operations. To summarize this chapter, a specific reference to Net Centric Warfare, or 
Net Centric Operations, where no force is used, show that all the modern scenarios 
mentioned previously belong to these broad terms. Thus, a Private Tactical Satellite 
Network can be a major enabling force to Net Centric Warfare. 
Chapter V illustrates the testing performed on a live network and the feasibility 
and practicality of remote network management. A detailed treatment of the test network 
architecture is provided. A summary of the stated goals of testing and the rationale 
behind the choice of specific metrics use to collect data is included. This chapter 
illustrates results of testing and provides a detailed analysis pertaining to the remote 
management of network devices and the satellite network. Finally, specific 
recommendations are made to provide a conceptual model for remote network 
management. 
Chapter VI provides a summary of the work that has been conducted and 
conclusions from the thesis research listed above. This final chapter provides suggestions 
for areas of general study and more detailed and, potentially, technical study dealing with 
the Tactical Private Satellite Network. 
In conclusion, a specific roadmap has been built to move from definitions to 
operational implementations and experimental records. By that, it is believed that the 
reader will be able to acquire a clear picture of what a Tactical Private Satellite Network 
is and what challenges addresses in supporting edge operations that, more or less, include 
all the modern communication scenarios — military or not. It is important to understand 
both the challenges and the significant benefits of managing such a network to optimize 
the results of different operations. Before recommending how and where to implement a 
Tactical Private Satellite Network, feasibility and further technical implementation in 
different operational environments, in terms of participants and type of the operations, are 




II. MILITARY AND COMMERCIAL SATELLITE 
COMMUNICATIONS AND THEIR APPLICATION TO A PRIVATE 
SATELLITE NETWORK 
The main role of the communication system is to ensure positive connectivity 
through the battlespace. This provides the ground or sea commander with the capability 
to effectively plan, conduct, and sustain joint military operations (U.S. Dept of Defense, 
Joint Publication 6-0, vii). The communications system consists of wired and wireless 
communications systems working in concert to provide the required capability. Satellite 
communications have become a necessity on the modern battlefield to provide access to 
modern information systems to deployed users. Even though wired and terrestrial radio 
systems provide greater bandwidth and overall capability, satellite systems can reach 
users and provide access to critical information that would support Command, Control, 
Communications, Computers, Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) 
functionality that wired and terrestrial radio systems cannot support due to geographic 
limitations. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the operational capabilities of present 
military satellite communications constellations that are used to extend the Global 
Information Grid (GIG) to deployed users. This chapter also examines future military 
satellite capabilities and the capabilities of the Defense Information Systems Agency 
(DISA) Teleport program. An examination of commercial satellite systems in general, 
their economic impact, availability, and associated challenges with using them is made. 
The acquisition of commercial services is examined — specifically who is responsible for 
the acquisition of commercial satellite services and how commercial satellite services are 
acquired for use by the military and the Department of Defense (DoD). Finally, this 
chapter discusses current trends in commercial satellite systems (this can affect military 
use of the commercial segment) and underscores the need for the military (especially 
small units using their own terminals) to utilize commercially available satellite 
communications services to provide access to the GIG. 
 12
A. MILITARY SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS 
Military operations can occur virtually anywhere on the globe. Thus, the military 
must have reliable means of communication to effectively exercise command and control 
(C2). Due to geographically diverse and dispersed geographical areas and because 
military commanders are likely to operate in such areas that are lacking in mature 
survivable communications infrastructure, satellite communications are often the only 
means available of enabling beyond Line of Site (LOS) C2 (U.S. Dept of Defense, Joint 
Publication 3-14, D-1). Furthermore, satellite communications provide a valued point of 
entry into the GIG, which, in turn, provides access to information critical to the military 
effort. Military forces that require access to the GIG can achieve that access by two 
primary means. First, the military can access the GIG via terrestrial or wired 
communications and, second, they can access the GIG via satellite communications — 
either military owned and operated or via the commercial frequency bands. With both the 
increasing requirements for information transfer on the modern battlefield and to smaller 
units that have not had access to satellite services in the past, information requirements 
can only be addressed by the implementation of broadband communications circuits. If 
the communications infrastructure is not mature in the theater of operations, then military 
forces must rely on satellite communications systems to achieve the desired connectivity. 
This illustrates the importance of satellite communications in extending the GIG to 
tactical users. Access to the GIG via wired or terrestrial means is outside the scope of this 
work and will not be addressed. 
1. Current Military Satellite Communications Systems and Capabilities 
Because of the nature of military operations (not having direct access to the 
terrestrial communications infrastructure), satellite systems can be used to bridge the 
distance and connect forward-deployed units. These satellite systems can provide 
improved bandwidth capacity not normally provided by other traditional Beyond Line of 
Sight (BLOS) systems, such as High Frequency radio. Furthermore, satellite 
communications provides a valued point of entry into the Global Information Grid (GIG), 
which, in turn, provides access to information critical to the military effort. Bandwidth of 
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systems providing connectivity in the GIG environment can range from small 
communications pipes (a few kilobits per second (kbps)) to associated fiber networks 
(speeds of 10 Gigabits per second (Gbps)) (DeSimone and Tarr 2). To be more specific, 
according to U.S. military doctrine, the GIG includes all communications and computing 
systems and services, software (including applications), data, security services, and other 
associated services that are necessary to achieve Information Superiority that are owned 
and leased by the government (U.S. Dept of Defense, Joint Publication 6-0, II-1). 
Considered a “network of networks” the GIG is comprised of different components that 
are managed by different agencies, different transport mediums (fiber optic cable, 
satellite links, etc.), and, most importantly, requires a connection to the Internet (De 
Simone and Tarr 3). The GIG provides interfaces to multination and non-Department of 
Defense users and systems and, thus, facilitates information exchange between coalition 
partners and other government agencies (OGAs) and non-government agencies (NGOs) 
(U.S. Dept of Defense, Joint Publication 6-0, viii). To exercise successful C2 of military 
forces, especially those forces that are geographically dispersed, access to the GIG is a 
necessity and satellite communications are often the only means available to connect 
those units. Even though satellite communications are necessary, they do not provide the 
same capability as terrestrial radio or cable systems.   
To provide GIG access, the military has a robust satellite communications system 
that takes advantage of the different characteristics provided by different segments of the 
frequency spectrum. Additionally, the military has procured and fielded user terminal 
equipment that corresponds to the portions of the frequency spectrum for satellite 
communications. Military satellite communications (MILSATCOM) operates 
predominately over three frequency bands: Ultra High Frequency (UHF), Super High 
Frequency (SHF), and Extremely High Frequency (EHF) (U.S. Dept of Defense, Joint 
Publication 3-14, D-2). The following table describes the operating frequency and the 
associated band designation for satellite communications systems. 
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Table 1.   Operating Frequencies and Associated Band Designations for Satellite 
Communications (from http://www.ietf.org/rfc/html). 
 
The bandwidth offered by these three segments of the frequency spectrum is 
directly proportional to the increase in operating frequency and, thus, provides different 
capabilities with different operational trade-offs for the battlefield user.  
Tactical satellite systems operating in the UHF portion of the Radio Frequency 
(RF) spectrum support relatively low data rate secure voice and data transmission through 
a single dedicated channel or an on-demand assigned multiple access method to tactical 
users. The UHF constellation provides channels at either 5 KHz or 25 KHz and one 500 
KHz channel per satellite. Due to the characteristics of the UHF satellites, the required 
terminals are generally small, man pack portable radios and shipboard systems, which 
can both be fixed or mobile, and require smaller antennas (U.S. Dept of Defense, Joint 
Publication 3-14, D-2). The greater beam width that characterizes the UHF narrowband 
satellites does not constrain the mobile users to have the pointing accuracy necessary to 
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make higher frequency systems work. UHF systems, due to the reduced complexity of 
their radio equipment, are less expensive to build and less sensitive to vibrations — 
conditions under which they will operate in a mobile/tactical situation. Also, satellite 
coverage from a single antenna is broad, meaning that the space-segment antenna does 
not need to precisely point at users. This increases mobility and flexibility. Earth 
coverage, for the UHF satellites, is achieved by multiple geostationary satellites 
positioned around the Earth and is depicted in Figure 1: 
 
 
Figure 1.   UHF MILSATCOM Constellation Coverage Area  
(from Satellite Pointing Guide). 
 
In addition to the UHF communications satellites, the military also operates a 
SHF constellation. The Defense Satellite Communication System (DSCS) is the 
military’s SHF system. It provides wideband communications support. Wideband 
connectivity, according to Joint Publication 3-14, is provided by a multi-channel 
transmission that supports secure voice and high data rate communications for C2, 
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intelligence data transfer, crisis management, and high-level communications between 
the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the geographic 
combatant commanders (D-2). The DSCS satellites provide channels that range from 50 
MHz to 85 MHz in bandwidth. Generally, access to Defense Information Systems 
Network (DISN) services, such as the Secure Internet Routing Protocol Network 
(SIPRNET), the Non-Secure Internet Protocol Routing Network (NIPRNET), and the 
Defense Switched Network (DSN) voice services, is achieved via the SHF satellites and 
terminals. SHF has a larger spectrum than UHF and allows for a greater throughput and, 
consequently, there are plenty of high-bandwidth channels available. Thus, SHF’s larger 
bandwidth gives it higher capacity. This means it can accommodate a greater number of 
users on that same band. As previously noted, the characteristics of the satellite 
transmission directly correspond to the size of the user terminal and antenna. Thus, the 
fielded SHF terminals are large vehicle transportable systems with antennas that range in 
size from 8 meters to 16 meters for ground mobile forces. Figure 2 depicts global 




Figure 2.   DSCS MILSATCOM Constellation Coverage Area  
(from Satellite Pointing Guide). 
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As noted previously, the UHF constellation supports low data rate 
communications and the SHF constellation supports high data rate communications. The 
EHF (Milstar) constellation supports low and medium data rate protected 
communications – survivable voice and data transmission not normally found on other 
systems (U.S. Dept of Defense, Joint Publication 3-14, D-2). The EHF systems allow 
utilizing significant bandwidth without sacrificing usable data rates for frequency 
hopping/anti-jam due to the very directional narrow beam that it uses. The cross link 
capability that these satellites have eliminates the need for ground stations, which can be 
a potential valuable target for adversaries’ forces, and enhances the “bulletproof” 
significance of EHF communications. Also, equipment in the EHF range is very 
expensive, making it hard to exploit by other countries and, thus, decreases the number of 
potential adversaries. The Milstar satellites are configured to provide either a Low Data 
Rate (LDR) or Medium Data Rate (MDR) service. The EHF terminals are similar in size 
to the fielded SHF terminals and antennas. Global coverage, as with the UHF and SHF 
constellations, is achieved through EHF satellites and payloads that are resident on other 
satellites. Figure 3 depicts Earth coverage by the Milstar: 
 
 
Figure 3.   Milstar Constellation Coverage Area (from Satellite Pointing Guide). 
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2. Future Military Satellite Communications Capabilities 
The existing MILSATCOM capabilities are not adequate to handle the increasing 
demand for wideband communications to disparate locations throughout the globe. As far 
back as 1997, communications planners projected that the growing demand within the 
military for satellite communications would exceed available military systems on a 
consistent basis (Rayermann 55). The only way for the military to make up the lack of 
capacity in military systems is to use commercial satellite communications systems. 
Further, there is no decrease in demand for satellite services; rather, there is a continued 
increase in demand. The rate of increase in the future is uncertain (Rayermann 56). DoD 
has realized that the current fielded MILSATCOM systems cannot handle the demand for 
service and access. Because of this, the DISA has transformed the Standard Tactical 
Entry Point (STEP) from an entry point to access DISN services via the SHF 
constellation (a military-only constellation) to a Teleport that provides additional 
capability by also taking advantage of commercial satellite bands. The commercial L-
Band (500 MHz to 1500 MHz) and S-Band (2 GHz to 4 GHz) are incorporated for 
narrowband communications, C Band (3600 MHz to 7025 MHz), X Band (8 GHz to 12 
GHz), Ku Band (10.7 GHz to 14.5 GHz), and Ka Band (17.3 GHz to 31.0 GHz). The 
DoD has incorporated wideband communications, too (U.S. Dept of Defense, Joint 
Publication 3-14, D-2). The critical feature of DISA’s teleport plan is the incorporation of 
the additional capability (transceivers equipment and antennas) to allow commercial 
satellite communications to extend the GIG to military units deployed throughout the 
world (Rayermann 59). There are some additional advantages to allowing the military to 
use commercial satellite capability (these are explored in more detail in the subsequent 
section). The bottom line is that DoD does not have to build a great deal of infrastructure 
to maintain or access the commercial systems. This has advantages: reduced acquisition, 
operations, and maintenance costs (U.S. Dept of Defense, Joint Publication 6-0, II-10). 
The addition of the commercial segment to the Teleport system serves to expand the 
capability to connect the war fighter with critical infrastructure and information exchange 
capability of the GIG.  
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There is a demonstrated need for satellites to provide greater capability. Planners 
within the Department of Defense estimate that the bandwidth need to support a large 
joint service operation will exceed 16 Gigabits per second (Gbps) by the year 2010 (AIR 
WAR COLL MAXWELL AFB AL and McKinney 1). The combination of legacy 
MILSATCOM and commercial systems address that requirement. With the assumption 
that bandwidth requirements will continue to increase over time, DoD understands the 
need for systems that provide additional capability to support operations across the 
spectrum of conflict. Future MILSATCOM systems are generally classified into the 
following three different programs: the Mobile User Objective System (MUOS), the 
Wideband Gap-filler System (WGS), and the Advanced EHF (AEHF) (AIR WAR COLL 
MAXWELL AFB AL and McKinney 2). Each of these new systems provides additional 
capability over the legacy MILSATCOM systems that they are augmenting or replacing.  
The MUOS system, like its UHF legacy counterpart, is aimed at the small mobile 
and/or man pack portable terminal with the objective of providing a higher data rate than 
the current UHF system (AIR WAR COLL MAXWELL AFB AL and McKinney 8). In 
addition to MUOS replacing the legacy UHF constellation, the legacy DSCS 
constellation will be replaced with the WGS constellation. The WGS constellation will 
supplement the current DSCS constellation with the military X-band (roughly 7–8 
gigahertz), and the military Ka-band capability of the Global Broadcast Service (GBS). 
Moreover, the Wideband Gap-filler Satellite program will include a high-capacity two-
way Ka-band capability to support mobile and tactical personnel (Elfers, Miller). The last 
of the legacy systems would be the EHF, replaced with the Advanced EHF (AEHF) 
system. The AEHF system, like the legacy EHF system will provide protected 
communications with about 12 times the total throughput of its legacy counterpart (AIR 
WAR COLL MAXWELL AFB AL and McKinney 8).  Although the legacy 
MILSATCOM systems are very capable, the increased bandwidth requirements facilitate 
the need for additional systems to support military operations. These new systems, in 
concert with DISA’s teleport program, will provide enhanced communications capability 
to units operating in geographically dispersed areas. 
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In conclusion, because connectivity to the GIG is crucial to the success of military 
operations, especially those in remote and undeveloped parts of the world, satellite 
communications plays an increasingly important role. The military has a robust satellite 
communications system that runs on the UHF, SHF, and the EHF frequency bands. Each 
of the particular bands of the MILSATCOM system provides a different and unique 
capability based on the bandwidth requirements of the battlefield commanders. The 
current demand for satellite services in the military has grown and the alternative is to 
address the deficiency with commercial systems. The military’s bandwidth requirements 
will be addressed by the fielding of future systems. The use of military owned and 
operated constellations, in concert with commercially owned and operated systems, have 
increased both the ease of connecting to the GIG and the collective use for global 
coverage (U.S. Dept of Defense, Joint Publication 3-14, D-3). 
B. COMMERCIAL SATELLITE SYSTEMS 
A strategic mix of mostly private sector telecommunications technologies 
and systems (leased or bought) combined with a smaller subset of DoD-
unique systems integrated into a common-user DoD-wide Intranet must be 
the goal of the future (qtd. in AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLL 
MAXWELL AFB AL and Hutchens 18). 
As easily derived from the above statement of Dr. Michael S. Frankel in his 
February 2000 “Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Tactical Battlefield 
Communications,” the concept of using commercial telecommunication systems is not 
new in the military environment. It is a question that has been raised after accepting that 
the military satellite systems cannot meet the continuously rising communication 
demands — especially in terms of band width, intolerable cost of research, development, 
deployment, and maintenance of proprietary satellite systems. This is particularly true, 
due to natural disasters or insufficient capabilities, where terrestrial infrastructure does 
not exist or is inadequate to cover the current communication needs. It is roughly 
estimated that the total military wideband satellite communications capacity is, 
optimistically, expected to grow to a maximum of 4 Gbps for the year 2010; while a very 
conservative estimation for the need of conducting routine and surge operations will be 
over 13 Gbps. This leaves a great shortfall. In predicting the additional needs for potential 
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Major Threat War, that shortfall in throughput climbs to more than 20 Gbps (MTW) 
(AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLL MAXWELL AFB AL and Hutchens 11). Figure 
4 graphically depicts projected DoD wideband requirements compared to U.S. 
MILSATCOM wideband capacity:  
 
Figure 4.   “Wideband DoD MILSATCOM Capacity vs. Projected Demand”  
(from NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY  
OPERATIONS DEPT and DeMello 16). 
 
The predicted support of commercial systems to DoD, in such a highly 
demanding communications environment, is depicted at Figure 5. 
According to Howard Chambers, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
of Boeing Satellite Systems, Inc:  
Another recent statistic showed that the U.S. Department of Defense currently 
uses 3 gigabytes per second of worldwide satellite communications (SATCOM) 
capacity and 80 percent of that is being provided by commercial satellites — at a 
cost in excess of $500 million annually. It is further predicted that the military 
will require 50 gigabytes per second by 2019. 
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Figure 5.   Commercial SATCOM Support to DoD (from NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT 
RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT and DeMello 6). 
 
Given that, it is derived that military wideband satellite communications systems 
cannot meet current or planned DoD requirements. It is important to note that there is 
sufficient commercial capacity available to meet all DoD requirements not currently 
serviced by organic DoD systems. Of course, the employment of commercial satellites 
comes with both advantages and challenges that the modern decision maker must take 
into account to decide if, when, and to what extent these assets can be recruited to cover 
MILSATCOM needs. 
1. Advantages of Commercial Satellite Systems 
Advantages come in both tangible and intangible beneficiary forms for the 
modern military environment. As in any enterprise, the tangible benefits can be 
measured. For the military, this includes cost effectiveness by leasing time and 
throughput on the commercial satellites instead of having to build or buy them. On the 
other hand, because military is an organization that does not measure revenues in money, 
it is easily recognized that the efficiency of the military operations can possibly benefit 
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by the use of the highly available worldwide high-capacity commercial satellites. These 
benefits are in communications, weather imaging, and remote sensing. 
  Starting from the monetary perspective, using commercial SATCOM can greatly 
benefit DoD in terms of economics. The costs can be reduced because no money needs to 
be devoted to pay for Research and Development (R&D) of new SATCOM systems. This 
is a major cost factor because R&D needs expensive labs with highly-skilled people to 
develop the systems. Also, R&D implies a significant amount of time needed for the 
different project phases (requirements, development, and design). DoD may not have the 
luxury to spare this time or money until these assets are fully operational. In addition, 
launching is a high-risk and expensive phase, yet the military will not have to deal with 
this if it will rely on commercial assets. To save all the worries that come with the pre-
activation phases, the contractor will have to deliver a fully operational system to DoD. 
Costs of operating and maintaining the systems do not directly affect DoD. The 
military has the option to pay on an “as needed” basis for the functionality and the time 
used. This, theoretically, saves money in the short term on paying or operating for the full 
functionality and time of a system. Moreover, it reduces the overhead of maintaining and 
upgrading a system to keep it from becoming obsolete. The latter is a constant problem 
nowadays with technology’s fast-paced changes, but for someone who leases — not 
owns — a system, it is far simpler. The “customer” will only need to upgrade the contract 
or simply delegate the contractors to keep pace with new technology. DoD will only have 
to buy the needed new end-users equipment and not to maintain or upgrade the systems. 
Also, terminating a satellite is a responsibility of the owner. This frees military from 
handling this and also from the potential recovery of the satellite. 
The other major, less measurable, benefit of leasing commercial systems is the 
time availability. Military operations can translate this availability into efficiency. The 
capacity that the military needs is already there: the satellites are already in orbit and the 
whole “hooking” can take only hours to days. Developing and launching only one 
satellite takes years. Satellite connections can almost be established ad hoc and on 
demand at every spot of the globe. This enables and facilitates military operations when 
time is crucial. 
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Lastly, the major, practical, and realistic driver for turning to Commercial 
SATCOM is that current and future military satellites’ capacities do not suffice for the 
communications demands in twenty-first century. On the other hand, today‘s commercial 
satellite communications systems supply almost 1,000 Gbps of wideband capacity to 
commercial and governmental users worldwide. Even more growth is expected. 
Consequently, the need for military operations capacity is already there. Further, 
commercial capacity is available now to be leased and used for specific or general needs.
 
  
DoD recognizes the above advantages of commercial SATCOM. Because of 
SATCOM’s flexibility in increasing/decreasing the level of use (measured in number of 
channels, transponders, or bandwidth) and in changing the distribution of resources (shift 
communications assets within or across geographic regions), DoD has already started to 
deploy them. That flexibility, in accordance with the specific leasing agreements, 
provides the ability to support a range of military operations across various 
locations/environments. Because of that, the military has come to use SATCOM in many 
cases as a “Gap-filler.” This is leasing commercial SATCOM programs to allow DoD to 
keep up with its ever-expanding communications and information sharing requirements 
(the demand for bandwidth) more than to fill the (time) gap between fielding of 
successive U.S. MILSATCOM systems. In addition, when demand surges beyond day-to-
day (routine) operations and operational support activities, commercial SATCOM 





Figure 6.   Commercial vs. MILSATCOM Use During Contingency Operations  
(from NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY  
OPERATIONS DEPT and DeMello 14). 
 
2. Challenges of Using Commercial Satellite Systems 
Advantages do not come without challenges. The fact that commercial SATCOM 
is publicly available and wide-purposed — not military specific and proprietary — needs 
to be considered before planning an operation because it can jeopardize many military 
aspects. 
At first there is no control over the requirements phase of a commercial satellite 
project. The military’s potential specific requirements cannot be taken into account and 
be implemented into the design and development phase of the satellite system. 
Consequently, military will be treated as any other common user and will not have the 
ability to acquire any additional services that it may need. Further, military personnel will 
not be allowed direct control of the satellite. As any other customer, DoD will not have 
the freedom to reposition the satellite or steer its transponders to its area of interest. This 
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is because it will affect the usage of other customers. Hence, DoD, in general, needs to 
assume that it will be treated as any other customer no matter how specific or crucial its 
needs may be. 
Security, in terms of protection of assets and data, is also a major consideration 
when employing commercials assets for military operations. Starting from the basic 
physical security of both space and terrestrial infrastructure, it can be debatable whether 
the contractor can provide efficient security for assets. Civilian contractors can guarantee 
security and redundant infrastructure for up to a level of natural disasters by deploying 
alternative assets, but when it comes to military operations no defensive weapons can be 
deployed by the company. Thus, the military may also need to provide protection for an 
asset which is not entirely used by troops. Further, in terms of security against soft kill 
mechanisms, anti-jamming defense is something entirely new for the private sector and, 
in many cases, does not exist to protect the quality of service that it provides. 
But when it comes to authorized or sensitive data, physical security is not the only 
“headache” for the network administrator. As in any communication case, confidentiality, 
integrity, availability (CIA), and authenticity need to be guaranteed for safe and complete 
communication lines. This is also a major subject for commercial satellites. 
Confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity can be assured by the military participants by 
securing the data itself up to a level that NGO can be active players when needed. 
Availability may be doubtful because it can be guaranteed during peace time, but no one 
can predict how the company and its shareholders will react during a crisis period or, 
even worse, a war scenario. Further, the ground segments of commercial satellite 
networks, control stations, are run by civilian personnel who allocate the bandwidth and 
coordinate the efficient usage of the satellites. This raises one more question: how 
trustworthy and available can this network be if it is run by non-military and not certified 
personnel? Non-military making decisions about the operation of the satellite could affect 
indirectly, or directly, military or governmental communication lines. 
Another characteristic of leasing assets from the free market is that DoD cannot 
claim a competitive advantage over its enemies. Since anyone can pay to acquire these 
services, it must be expected that competitors will have the same capabilities and will 
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know each others vulnerabilities. Under this assumption, leasing a commercial satellite 
system must be perceived more than a competitive response or an operational need and 
not as a competitive advantage that will give privileges to the military over its potential 
adversaries. 
The major issue of interoperability must not be neglected: using commercial 
assets bears the danger of not being compatible with existing military or other used 
commercial systems. This may affect the specific parts, or even the whole operation, of 
the total infrastructure. Internet integration is also a major aspect of that interoperability 
and needs to be specifically handled to use the satellite connections up to their full 
potential. When the military uses Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS), compatibility and 
interoperability are major concerns and, thus, it is crucial when using commercial satellite 
networks which can be paralleled as major scaled COTS 
In conclusion, commercial satellite systems comes with advantages that can be 
exploited, yet also challenges. If the challenges can be faced effectively, these systems 
could be valuable assets for the success of any military operation. It is the scheduler’s 
responsibility to properly evaluate and mitigate the risks of using — and up to what level 
— commercial satellite systems in the military environment for proper, continuous, and 
secure military communications. 
C. ACQUISITION OF COMMERCIAL SATELLITE SERVICES AND 
CAPACITY 
Realizing that military owned and operated MILSATCOM systems do not have 
the requisite capability to cover the growing demand for communications services, there 
is a growing need to utilize commercial satellite capacity to support military operations. 
Commercial satellite services currently provide somewhere between 250 and 300 Gbps of 
wideband communications capacity to both the civilian and military markets (Mattock 1). 
Additionally, because the commercial satellite communications market is relatively 
mature, there is generally a large amount of money spent on commercial systems. For 
instance, in 2005, over $300 million was spent on commercial satellite communications 
services (U.S. Dept of Defense, Commercial Satellite Spend Analysis, 2). A critical part 
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of effectively leasing commercial satellite capacity is determining exactly how much 
commercial capacity to lease. Given the level of uncertainty for future demand, the onus 
is on military communications planners to determine and choose the amount of satellite 
communications capacity to lease that is appropriate for the mission (Mattock 1). 
Because there is a genuine need for commercial satellite services, the DoD set up a 
mechanism for the acquisition and management of contracts for commercial satellite 
communications services. 
1. Commercial Service Acquisition 
The DISA is the lead agency within DoD for the acquisition of commercial 
satellite bandwidth. This acquisition is done primarily through the Defense Information 
Technology Contracting Office (DITCO) (U.S. Government Accounting Office 4). DISA 
and DITCO serve as the central clearinghouse for the collection of commercial satellite 
requirements and the allocation of acquired resources. Generally, the process for 
procuring commercial communications services is fairly simple. First, users identify a 
need for communications services. Then, DISA technical experts aid in engineering a 
solution for the customer. Next, DISA contracting experts aid in the actual service 
procurement, determine the appropriate contract structure for the particular action, and, 
eventually, award the task or delivery order to the service provider (U.S. Government 
Accounting Office 5). Again, the issue — especially when dealing with commercial 
satellite services — is determining how much to acquire. It must be remembered that the 
U.S. military is in direct competition with other governments, civilian businesses, and 
organizations for the finite capacity of civilian systems. The military requires a certain 
amount of bandwidth on a regular basis. That is easy to predict, but what is difficult is 
planning for commercial services in support of established Operation Plans (OPLANS). 
More difficult is planning and acquiring commercial services for contingency operations. 
DISA, however, has an answer to this particular issue: to enable the planning for DoD’s 
use of commercial bandwidth, recognizing that the consistency of DoD’s actual 
requirements cannot be accurately predicted, DISA has established a layered approach to 
the procurement of commercial capacity (U.S. Dept of Defense, Commercial Satellite 
Procurement, 7). This layered approach provides an increased amount of flexibility to the 
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user and to the contracting agent to provide the requisite amount of commercial 
bandwidth to support operations. The layers, according to DoD’s answer to a published 
GAO report, are outlined in the following table: 
 
Layer Required Service 
Level 
Support 
1 Long term, well 
defined requirements 
Most stable requirements, easiest to predict, and less 





Requirements directly tied and related to strategic 
planning and oriented toward geographic theaters 
3 Surge Capacity Capacity over and above what has already been 
acquired and is needed to support contingency 
operations or other unplanned crises 
Table 2.   Commercial Satellite Acquisition Layered Approach  
(from U.S. Dept of Defense, Commercial Satellite Procurement, 7). 
 
Through this layered approach, DISA has emplaced a robust and flexible system 
for procuring commercial communications services — especially commercial satellite 
capacity in support of planned military operations, geographic theater requirements, and 
capacity required to support contingencies.   
2.   Issues with Commercial Satellite Services 
The method DISA uses to acquire commercial communications services consists 
of both benefits and challenges. DISA, when acquiring commercial bandwidth, does not 
acquire the bandwidth directly from the satellite service providers, but procures it through 
several competitively selected vendors. These vendors hold their own competitions 
between individual bandwidth service providers (U.S. Government Accounting Office 5). 
Therefore, through DISA’s process, the government gets the most economic benefit from 
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the contracting effort without having to manage a competition for each contract. The 
ideal is to purchase/lease commercial capacity in multi-year contracts. Multi-year 
contracts have an added benefit of enhancing the stability and financial standing of the 
commercial satellite communications industry (U.S. Dept of Defense, Commercial 
Satellite Spend Analysis, 38). Financially viable providers will be able to continue to 
make their services available not only to the civilian market, but to the government and 
DoD as well. This continued access is also a benefit of the multi-year contracts. 
Generally, there are economies of scale when leasing services. Some of challenges have 
to do with economies of scale and long lease times. Long term leases are not at all 
flexible with regard to the amount of capacity that is being leased – an issue covered by 
DISA’s layered approach discussed previously. Longer leases procured well in advance 
tend to be less expensive. That depends, however, on the accuracy of demand 
requirements. Any capacity over and above that which was procured within the confines 
of the long term lease must be procured through short term. This is generally more 
expensive (Mattock 1). 
To summarize, because there is a capacity deficiency in current MILSATCOM 
systems, commercial satellite systems are a recognized viable alternative to augment 
military capability. DISA is the executive agency for the procurement and management 
of contracts for the procurement of commercial satellite services. The challenge 
associated with procuring commercial systems is in the accurate prediction of required 
capacity. DISA has established a layered approach to contract for commercial services 
based on daily operational need. This three-layer approach allows provisions for daily 
operational need, capacity needs oriented to capacity in reserve, and surge capacity that 
would be required to address the needs associated with contingency operations. This 
layered approach is flexible and can quickly respond to warfighter needs. Finally, there 
are benefits and challenges. Multi-year contracting for leased services is relatively 
inexpensive, but any excess capacity required can be expensive to procure and, generally, 
inflexible. Multi-year contracting, however, is good for the overall health and well being 
of the commercial satellite industry. This could ultimately ensure continued access to 
these commercial services.  
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D. FUTURE TRENDS IN COMMERCIAL SATELLITE SERVICES 
Satellite technology is a relatively new area of business and has much room to 
evolve. Different people envision different capabilities and a vast number of new services 
for the satellite systems. Many of them would have seemed unrealistic a few years ago, 
but they have already been implemented today. It is common sense that with the 
exponential rate of technology’s evolution, many more things will be achieved in the near 
future. Not all of them are related to military operations and, thus, will be omitted from 
the following paragraphs. Focus will be on those give direct or indirect benefit to the 
military. For example, the proposal of building stratospheric platforms (20 km altitude), 
which promises to fill an importance coverage gap (50–400 km diameter footprint at 5°-
40° elevation angle), is ideal for the metropolitan footprint, but it cannot satisfy the needs 
of dispersed operations over a wide area. Here only the footprint of one or more satellites 
above Low Earth Orbit (LEO) would be covered. Therefore, in that section, this thesis 
refers to trends that can be exploited by the military and can be used as driving factors for 
the success of a military operation. 
The driving force for the continuous growth of satellite capabilities is the even 
more growing customers’ needs to use them in everyday life. While during the 
emergence of the satellite technologies, people were reluctant to use them either because 
of their high costs or the “fear” of the unknown. As the years passed, because legacy 
technologies could not suffice, more and more people turned to satellite technologies to 
achieve specific goals. These people, either as executive individual customers or as big 
enterprises, began to construct a robust “customer” base which, soon, took a big share of 
profit in significant areas of business (e.g., satellite TV). With the help of new 
technologies and more affordable prices, that robust customer base for satellite-delivered 
services has been doubling every year. It is predicted that soon everyone — at least in 
Western countries — will have a number of appliances with built-in satellite terminals, 
such as radio, TV, telephone, position location, computer, pager, PDA, etc. Figure 7 




Figure 7.   The Earth Terminal as Consumer Appliance  
(from Hoeber, NPS Space Systems Seminar, 2000). 
 
That growth, which is mainly driven by the high quality products and almost 
global coverage of satellites, gives a strong boost to the satellite R&D industry to create 
modern systems that meet customers’ demands. To be more specific, more customers 
drive the need for more bandwidth availability and capacity on satellites. Satellite 
industry is constantly raising the bar of bandwidth and capacity to fulfill those needs. It is 
trying to expand this capability to every spot on the globe to achieve true global 
coverage. This has major advantages over terrestrial systems. Though it is too early for 
safe predictions, it is envisioned that the capacities of SATCOM will quickly out-pace 
terrestrial legacy systems. 
Especially for the capacity trend, Figure 8 shows the power trend which is a crude 
measure of the capacity of a satellite. This figure shows how capacity has grown growing 
since 1976 (the same exponential growth can be traced back to 1960) and projects the 
trend a few years into the future. This growth may have been slow, but it is steady 
compared to Moore’s Law for integrated circuits: “Chip performance/price ratio doubles 
every 18 months.” 
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Figure 8.   Satellite Power Trends (from Hoeber, NPS Space Systems Seminar, 2000). 
 
Digging into more technical fields, the satellite companies are continuously trying 
to develop higher-gain and larger-aperture antennas to improve the quality of 
communications. Larger apertures ‘pull’ other satellite technologies/designs, such as 
flexible bodies, low thrust, energy storage, mechanisms, distributed apertures, inter-
satellite Local Area Network/Wide Area Network’s (LAN/WAN), and timing. Satellite 
companies also explore their abilities to expand available frequencies for satellite 
communications. This is either through spatial or other reuse techniques and/or the 
allocation of new and typically higher frequencies bands to avoid interferences between 
Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO) satellites to face the problem of “overpopulation” in 
that orbital area. They are also developing patterns for building more flexible satellite 
antennas which are more adaptable than the previous generation. This is being 
accomplished using technologies that allow beam patterns to be changed on-orbit.  
In terms of processing the information in orbit, the trend is to enable on board 
processing. This ability promises to solve significant problems of satellite 
communications, such as latency, waste of valuable frequency spectrum, and 
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improvement of overall throughput of the satellite. That overall processing is also 
enhanced by the arrival of multibeam satellites which enable digital processing and 
phased array technologies. Thus, the satellite will be able to reuse the frequency spectrum 
multiple times by generating many smaller circular spot beams which make possible the 
use of the same frequency spectrum in more than one beam.  
To improve the ability of processing, two new technologies are evolving: 
• Cross-Strapping allows a satellite to receive a signal up-linked in one 
frequency (such as the Ku-band) and retransmit it to the earth on another frequency (such 
as the C-band) and 
• Split Up-Links enable a satellite to receive more than one up-linked signal at 
one time allowing multiple satellite newsgathering teams to up-link to the same satellite.  
The basic space technological trends are shown in the following Figure 9: 
 
 
Figure 9.   Basic Space Technological Trends (from Stuart). 
 
In terms of life expectancy, the satellites’ companies’ main aim is to develop 
higher-performance, longer-lived, and larger power systems. This correlates with the 
target of developing products that are expected to operate for 15 years on-orbit without 
direct maintenance. Also, business planning for a satellite, which defines how it will be 
 35
used, is also determined for that 15-year life. This is a remarkable feat when someone 
considers that Long Range Business Planning seldom goes beyond 10 years and the real 
predictive capability is most likely 3 to 5 years — at best. 
Further, to efficiently respond to the variety of demands for satellite systems and 
to reduce risk, satellite companies are now procuring fungible assets that can be used, 
sold, or leased to other business applications and customers. A decade ago satellites in 
orbit could perform just one specific mission. Today they can now be reprogrammed on-
orbit in a matter of days. This results in increased service and capability — not to 
mention the profits possible with multiple-use characteristics. This is also an area that 
specifically involves military operations because it enables commercial satellite services 
to be leased for government applications by hosting specific payloads for military 
services. The latter is the concept of the "hosted payload." This means that commercial 
providers can host a payload on their satellites that can, then, be leased to the military to 
augment their telecommunications requirements. This is a successful technique which has 
already gained the attention of the satellite companies who understand the potential 
revenue of military leasing. Concerning the above, Chambers stated:  
This deserves attention, for today the demand for routine communications 
within the military — and I am referring to those that do not require 
encryption or other security measures — far exceeds the supply available. 
A recent statistic showed that the U.S. Department of Defense currently 
uses 3 gigabytes per second of worldwide SATCOM capacity, and 80 
percent of that is being provided by commercial satellites — at a cost in 
excess of $500 million annually. And — it is predicted that the military 
will require 50 gigabytes per second by 2019.  
For the space segment of satellite systems, the problem of overpopulation of 
specific orbits is envisioned to be handled with the development of new orbital 
configurations. This will combine GEO with LEO satellites as a ring constellation to 
purify the available orbital patterns and take advantage of the strengths of these orbital 
categories. 
In terms of the terrestrial component of a satellite system, major improvements 
have entirely altered the concept of ground terminals. More and more terminals are 
available at reduced prices and in significantly smaller sizes. This enables installation 
 36
without — almost — space limitations. These terminals are easy to use. Depending on 
the purpose of deploying the system, they can be operated by average trained personnel. 
Overall, the increase of power combined with ease of operation, affordable prices, and 
other technology improvements, have allowed earth terminal size to come down much 
faster. They shrink by a factor of two every two to three years and the targeted customer 
group includes almost every household. Figure 10 depicts how the customer base has 
changed: In 1976, the only customers that could afford to use a satellite were a few 
governments. Ten years ago, large businesses could afford satellite usage. Today every 
household can afford some kind of satellite application. 
 
             
Figure 10.   Earth Terminal Trends (from Hoeber, NPS Space Systems Seminar, 
2000). 
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Table 3 summarizes some of the converging push/pull forces in the commercial 
space industry: 
Converging Push/Pull Forces 
Business Pulls Technology Pushes 
- Higher bandwidths - Power generation and storage 
- Higher capacities - Multi-beam and large antennas 
- Smaller, more affordable terminals - Deployment mechanisms  
-Lower bit error rates (BERs) - Autonomous satellite operations and 
operating system software  
-More efficient frequency reuse and 
sharing 
- Smart and multi-functional composite 
structures, flexible payloads 
- Higher frequencies and powers - Low-thrust electric propulsion 
- Higher energy storage demands Digital data processing electronics 
- Larger antennas, smaller steerable beams - Thin film electronics, batteries, etc. 
- Tighter pointing (on more flexible 
satellites) 
-Precision pointing, attitude control, 
timing, and navigation 
- More precise station keeping  - Optical LANs and inter-satellite links 
- Inter satellite links - New frequency sharing schemes 
Table 3.   Converging Push/Pull Forces in the Commercial Space Industry (from Stuart). 
 
A new but very promising concept emerging is distributed virtual satellites. The 
goal of this effort is to develop the technologies needed to replace a single monolithic 
satellite with a free-flying cluster of small satellites — each to provide a specific 
subsystem: communications, power, sensors, etc. The benefits from such a distribution 
are numerous: 
• Autonomous self-forming networks. 
• Wireless power systems. 
• Ultra-secure intra-system wireless data communications. 
• Cluster operations, such as electromagnetic formation flying systems and 
remote attitude determination systems. 
• Distributed spacecraft computing systems. 
• Structureless optical and Radio Frequency (RF) arrays. 
• Reliable, robust, rapidly relocatable ground systems. 
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The motivation forces of distributed virtual satellites are shown in Figure 11: 
 
Figure 11.   Motivation Forces for Distributed Virtual Satellites (from Stuart). 
 
With regard to ground segments, we need to briefly mention that the base stations, 
which constitute the major focus of this research, are being continuously decreasing in 
size. Consequently, they no longer need to be fixed. They can be easily transported and 
deployed where needed. This last capability is especially valuable for the military sector 
when conducting operations under adverse condition; also for the government sector 
when executing relief operations for humanitarian purposes during or after major natural 
disasters. In situations that lack the luxury of time or large available sites, flexible and 
volatile systems, which can be easily and quickly established, are needed to achieve 
successful mission. 
The commercial satellite industries have begun to recognize the need to protect 
their assets to guarantee the availability and quality of services for their customers. This 
aspect is specifically interesting for the military operations: the need is for high levels of 
assurance. This trend deals with anti-jamming techniques. These are increasingly 
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discussed among commercial operators as incidences of signal piracy and signal jamming 
— and lost revenues associated with them — rise. That also did not escape the attention 
of Howard Chambers’ keynote speech during the Boeing luncheon in France, Paris, on 
2007. “In this highly competitive industry where continuous communications — 24/7 — 
is an imperative — satellite providers must be able to rely on not only the quality of their 
signal, but the integrity of their signal.” 
Concerning the satellite industry, no matter how many new domestic and regional 
entities have emerged, the dominant trend is a move toward global integration or, at least, 
strategic partnerships. This globalization tendency intends to add flexibility because, as in 
any industrial sector, merging companies accumulate more capital investments and 
enhance their overall capabilities. Conversely, rather than the military dealing with a 
single company of trusted nationality, but with a board of different investors of different 
countries — friendly or not. This could potentially jeopardize the security and success of 
military operations. For example, the company Sea-Launch has its homeport in Long 
Beach, California, but it is a partnership of five companies from three different countries 
(USA, Norway, and Russia).   
In conclusion, the overall trends of satellite industry aim not only to compete with 
the terrestrial communication, but to integrate with them to complete each other to 
achieve the best communication coverage around the globe. In most cases, this 
interoperability is a necessity. Thus, mobile satellite services can work together with the 
ancillary terrestrial components of the same network. By continuously improving the 
performance of the satellite systems, the trend is not to completely replace the existing 
terrestrial infrastructure, but to further improve the total level of communication among 
human beings. This is particularly true if we begin to think about the potentials that 
satellite systems can provide in the case of long-term habitation in space (Iida et al., 195-
96). 
E. CONCLUSION 
In the early 21st century, two levels of satellite telecommunications appear 
to be emerging. A limited capacity, owned and operated by the military, 
will continue to service the need for highly protected and assured 
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connectivity. The continued evolution and possible integration of legacy 
systems should fill this need. However, an increasing percentage of 
operational throughput and secure telecommunications needs will likely be 
provided by commercial or commercial-based USG owned or leased 
systems. As the commercial marketplace is increasingly driven to provide 
secure, tamper-resistant and interoperable capacity to meet the demands of 
the national and international marketplace, the military will soon 
recognize the opportunity to conduct information exchange with 
significantly fewer and less complex organic resources (qtd. in AIR WAR 
COLL MAXWELL AFB AL and Hook 38). 
By reading these words of Major General (USAF, Ret.), William G. Jones in his 
“White Paper on Space in the USAF,” it is easily understood that the military has already 
perceived the value of commercial satellite systems and relied on many of the capabilities 
provided by the commercial space sector to achieve mission success. Based on future 
projections, the military will never have the resources or the requirement to provide the 
most robust capabilities available in MILSATCOM systems to its numerous users. Thus, 
DoD will always require commercial SATCOM systems to augment capacity. 
Commercial SATCOM can be expected to meet, at least, military “gap-filler” 
requirements in terms of availability, but with extra care in flexibility, access, and control 
factors. The best approach is to view commercial space and military space as 
complementary in a mutual partnership for the common interest. Whether the military’s 
growing dependence on these commercial SATCOM systems is strength or vulnerability 
will be determined by how well the “right mix” is achieved. Determining that right mix is 
a function of clearly understanding both DoD’s requirements and the vulnerabilities and 
risks associated with a dependence on commercial systems. Basically, it would appear 
that commercial capabilities can help satisfy quantitative requirements, but at a “cost” in 
many cases of accepting risk with respect to the qualitative requirements. The decision 
maker will need to determine the most efficient and effective employment of commercial 
SATCOM — whether it be for routine day-to-day communications or leveraged to meet 
contingency operations requirements. 
Concerning the specific feasibility of a private satellite network, satellite 
companies have been using them in small and large scales since the beginning of 
SATCOM. The use of such a network for military operations comes almost with the same 
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advantages and difficulties as leasing an individual satellite capability. The strong point 
of such an implementation is that the military will be able to operate the critical ground 
control station without having to rely on civilian unauthorized personnel. The only 
commercial owned assets will be the space ones, the satellites, for which the contractor 
will have to guarantee their proper operation. 
By closely examining the above, it is almost indisputable that any military policy 
needs to facilitate further dependence on commercial SATCOM and more Commercial 
Geospatial Information and Data Services (GI&DS) capabilities wherever practical to 
meet military operational and national intelligence requirements. Commercial GI&DS are 
continuously improving timeliness and availability. This enhances operational utility to 
the combatant commander. When next-generation higher capacity and earth imaging 
systems come on-line and with an improved ability to deliver its products to the 
battlespace, commercial SATCOM and GI&DS can be expected to fill an even larger 
operational niche throughout the period. 
Consequently, space force enhancement will continue to benefit from the growing 
field of commercial space applications. It is paramount that the military identify space 
system requirements to properly decide on the correct qualitative and quantitative use of 
commercial SATCOM. This will provide the combatant commander with a robust 
“operational toolbox” from which to obtain and maintain information superiority across 
the battlespace. Furthermore, combatant commanders must identify their space force 
enhancement requirements to ensure that the decision makers accurately assess nation’s 
future need for commercial space capability. 
To conclude, after the above brief examination of the current state of military and 
commercial satellite communications, it is reasonable to articulate that they have a lot in 
common. With both their strengths, the military’s concern with security and the 
commercial’s rapid adoption of new technologies to become more competitive than other 
providers, there is much benefit for both parties. The main thing that makes commercial 
systems more attractive is their capability of providing all the bandwidth that the military 
needs in any type of operation that cannot be covered by military’s proprietary systems. 
This obvious availability of commercial “state of the art” satellite technology justifies 
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their feasibility for application to a Tactical Private satellite network for the military and 
other governmental purposes. This is not a new concept. Rather, DoD already employs it 
via its MILSATCOM systems. It can be further expanded, however, in areas and cases 
which exceed the capacity and flexibility of the military private networks. Consequently, 
those private systems are freed to be used for other types of operations which demand 
specialty. 
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III. CONCEPTUAL CAPABILITIES AND 
DESIRED REQUIREMENTS FOR THE  
TACTICAL NETWORK ENTRY POINT 
A. TECHNICAL DEFINITION OF TACTICAL PRIVATE SATELLITE 
NETWORK 
To examine the concept of a Tactical Private Satellite Network requires clearly 
defining what that network will be, determining what the functions will demonstrate, and 
identifying who will participate. The initial approach to determine what this network 
should cover originated from trying to recognize and incorporate into a network these 
specific attributes. Thus, this thesis attempts to dissociate the sub-definitions of such a 
network (Private, Tactical, and Satellite) and, then, to integrate their characteristics in an 
accumulative network entity:  
• Private Network: A private network should provide routable Internet 
services to a specific and authorized set of users (different from a public 
network which provides services to the general public). Its subscribers do 
not need to login or subscribe, but they are automatically “embodied” into 
the network as soon as they are connected to it. This network must be 
“open” to allow for various users (Joint and Coalition partners, Non-
Governmental Organizations, and Other Governmental Organizations) to 
join the network and to create an ad hoc joint/coalition network. Proper 
Identity Management rules should apply to allow such a variety of 
participants. There should be no neglect of the use of secrecy mechanisms 
(confidentiality) in specific parts of it or isolate “identity management 
silos” without strong justification. Operating via private hubs and 
deployable military owned and operated ground (base) control stations 
gives the administrator full authority over the network. This allows access 




functions using bandwidth provided by the satellite network. Overall, the 
administrator should not have to rely on shared public networks prone to 
malfunction and operating failure.  
• Tactical Network: Such a network must serve tactical needs and it will be 
primarily utilized for the duration of the specific mission (tactical span). 
Tactical networks include not only networks used for Command and 
Control of military operations, but also for ERNs. The latter are utilized 
during relief operations and are rapidly assembled to respond to ad hoc 
crises. This is where delays translate directly into death, disease, and 
other significant lost opportunities. To cover the needs of military, or 
other significant missions, the network needs to be a mobile ad hoc 
network. Due to the way of forming and operating, the suggested 
topology would be a point-to-point or a mesh. It should not prohibit a 
flexible star topology. This is where many nodes are directly 
interconnected to provide multiple routes for data to follow between two 
points. This achieves high fault-tolerance which essentially provides a 
broadcast, unicast, or multicast capability. Due the tactical nature of such 
a network, user type ranges from individual operators, and their sensors, 
to whole military formations or divisions. 
• Satellite Network: This is the broad term for a network using radio 
frequencies relayed by satellite. It contains space segments (satellites) on 
which it relies for the propagation of radio frequencies and, in many cases 
for the processing of the transmitted data. There are also terrestrial 
segments which involve transmitters, receivers, and base stations which 
manage the communication lines. It can be integrated with other 
terrestrial (wired and wireless) means of communication for redundancy 
or smooth migration, but the main transmission operation is accomplished 
through satellite assets. The desired goal is the true global coverage. This 
can be accomplished by the integration of the satellite segment with 
mobile and flexible ground stations for the terrestrial segment. The 
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network requires an entry point, or gateway, that acts as the controlling 
entity for access to Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol 
(TCP/IP) Internet services. The entry point will have two logical entry 
points: one for traffic related to Command and Control and one entry 
point for network management functionality. Further, satellite 
communication aims to provide greater security and higher reliability than 
radio systems, public networks, and Internet solutions. So far satellite 
networks have demonstrated that they are less prone to unauthorized 
access (hacking), virus infections, and disruption in service due to public 
works. 
In conclusion, rather than being framed by a simple definition, a Tactical Private 
satellite network must incorporate all the above attributes to guarantee safe and reliable 
ways of communication for its users. The type of expected missions are highly 
demanding and, possibly, under unpredictable environmental conditions and without the 
luxury of relying on the traditional terrestrial infrastructure. Consequently, that network 
must be structured to be the undisputable solution for highly-reliable communication 
worldwide. It should also be independent of any needed prior built terrestrial 
infrastructure for any of its sub-operations, such as transmission, reception, or 
management. 
1. Rationale behind the Use of Tactical Private Satellite Networks 
In both civilian and military applications, there is an increasing number of 
emerging private satellite networks. A number of them tend to be longer lasting to cover 
routine and permanent needs of the responsible organization for a specific area. They 
have the luxury of proper scheduling and project management. Others tend to be more 
“tactical” and are formed for specific missions and time duration due to the nature of the 
assigned tasks. The latter finds more paradigms in civilian non-profit organizations and 
military commands where the benefits are less tangible and are based on how fast the 
network will be formed — not on its pre-existence. 
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For example, civilian profitable companies have private satellite networks for 
telephone or TV services which depend on the robustness and permanency of their 
operation. Such networks are not expected to deal with situations other than the 
designated ones and cover specific pre-decided areas. Governmental organizations also 
work with such networks to assist in the dissemination of information for various 
agencies, such as air traffic controllers or connections with public buildings which lack 
the proper terrestrial infrastructure.  
On the other hand, there are many cases where Tactical Private satellite networks 
need to be formed to deal with unexpected situations in non-scheduled areas and under 
adverse conditions. Such networks can be deployed by governmental organizations to 
assist various civil agencies (Highway Patrol, Fire Departments, Department of 
Transportation, Relief Agencies, Police, and various other law enforcement agencies) in 
case of crises. Special cases of the above are the humanitarian relief operations where the 
participants cannot be easily predefined. They can contain governmental organizations, 
NGO, and military units which all work together for the common good. They must 
cooperate and coordinate their actions to accomplish their common targets. This kind of 
Tactical Private Satellite Network needs to be flexible enough so even small units will 
have the ability to deploy and administer it.  
Typical examples of Tactical Private satellite networks can be found in the 
military environment for the sake of “pure” military missions. The deployed units operate 
in hostile territories far enough from their bases and without the proper terrestrial 
communication infrastructure. These units need to be real-time connected with their 
headquarters to be recipients and senders of all the available information. They must form 
a clear tactical picture for their area of operations. This is particularly true today, that we 
live in the era of Net Centric Operations and we advocate terms as “Power to Edge” 
where continuous and uninterrupted communication is needed so as these operations to 
be executed and “Power” to be handed to the “Edge.”  
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In the next subsections, a number of civilian and military Tactical Private satellite 
networks will be briefly described to show the rationale behind the use of those networks 
and the fundamental benefits that their proper implementation brings to their 
“subscribers.” 
a. Civilian Examples 
As mentioned above, there is a great variety of private satellite networks 
in the civilian world. They can either be categorized as tactical, capable of responding in 
crises’ situations, or as “permanent” on which enterprises base their business continuity 
strategies. They can be further identified as independent networks which operate on main 
roles or as redundant networks ready to take over in case of major disaster in the primary 
terrestrial network. The latter constitutes the concept of the hybrid network which can be 
seen as an overlay of a satellite network layer and a terrestrial network layer. In these 
hybrid networks, satellite networks complement the primary terrestrial solutions by 
providing back up capabilities and making the whole network “fail safe.” This keeps the 
most important — if not all — customer applications alive in a failure situation. 
A good example of the diversity and ongoing potential of the private 
satellite networks is the pilot program of the “HALO Network” (Colella, Martin, and 




Figure 12.   The System Architecture of the HALO Network. 
“HALO Network” differs from the well-known “traditional” TV and 
phone satellite networks because it is not based on LEO or higher constellations. The 
High Altitude Long Operation Network (HALO) is a broadband wireless metropolitan 
area network with star topology. Its solitary hub is located in the atmosphere above the 
service area at an altitude higher than commercial airline traffic. That hub is the 
HALO/Proteus airplane which is the central node of this network.  
That concept of HALO Network envisions combining the advantages and 
minimizing the disadvantages of both the satellite and terrestrial wireless networks. Such 
a stratospheric network, while it will offer quasi free-space channels due to clear line-of-
sight signal paths offered by high look angles, will not have the “satellite overhead” of 
expensive high-power user terminals, long propagation delays, and stagnant performance 
growth. Also, system capacity will be practically fixed and can be increased 
incrementally only by adding satellites. It will offer the advantages of a terrestrial 
network, such as low-cost, low-power user terminals, short propagation delays, and good 
scalability of system capacity. It will be free of “terrestrial problems,” such as low look 
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angles, multipath channels with Rayleigh fading, complex infrastructures, base stations 
that must be interlinked over cables or microwave links to backhaul aggregated traffic, 
and the often required significant reengineering to increase capacity when using cell-
splitting technique. The signal footprint of the network, its “Cone of Commerce,” will 
have a diameter on the scale of 100 km which covers a typical large city and its 
neighboring towns. The initial capacity of the network will be on the scale of 10 Gbps 
with growth beyond 100 Gbps. The network will serve the communications needs of each 
subscriber with bit rates in the multimegabit per second range. 
That kind of network will require four types of network elements to be 
connected directly to the onboard switch for the proper operation and connectivity in the 
covered area:  
• The Customer premises equipments (CPE) which are low-rate user 
terminals and they will satisfy the needs of individual users, 
• The Business premises equipment (BPE) which are high-rate user 
terminals and they will satisfy the needs of specific group of users with, 
normally, additional included local networks,   
• The HALO gateway/interworking unit (HG/IWU) which will be the 
equipment that provides the portal and interfaces between HALO and 
non-HALO networks, such as Internet and frame relay services which 
must be connected to the public ATM networks before they are connected 
to the HG/IWU, and 
• The Network control station which is responsible for the maintenance, 
operation, and administration of HALO Networks.  
Overall, there a great number of accommodated designed objectives of 
such a private satellite network which will provide wireless broadband communication 
services. Some of them deal directly with the aspects of a Tactical Private Satellite 
Network while others deal with the aspect of having a permanent satellite network over a 
subscriber’s area. Among them, the most significant ones that make it a good civilian 
paradigm are: 
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• Seamless ubiquitous multimedia services. 
• Adaptation to end user environments. 
• Rapidly deployable to sites of opportunity. 
• Bandwidth on demand for efficient use of available spectrum. 
• Network Control Station with full “authority” over the management of the 
network. 
A drawback of HALO Network, which does not diminish its value, is the 
relatively small area, which makes it inappropriate for disbursed military operations. This 
is due to the low flight altitude of the satellite asset, in this example, the HALO/Proteus 
airplane. It guarantees all the above mentioned advantages, but restricts the coverage area 
in the footprint of a metropolitan area. Nevertheless, by having the ability to manage the 
HALO Network as needed, the potential of the benefited enterprises are maximized —
especially in regions where the existing infrastructure is not amenable to an upgrade or 
retrofit. 
Another good example of a private satellite network is the “HughesNet 
Access Continuity” service which is an automatic failover network that eliminates 
downtime and results in considerable savings for the regional car dealership 
(“HUGHESNET ACCESS CONTINUITY BRINGS ROUNTREE AUTOMOTIVE’S IT 
STAFF PEACE OF MIND,” 34-35). Figure 13 depicts the T1 circuit with satellite 
failover HughesNet Access Continuity: 
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Figure 13.   T1 Circuit with Satellite Failover HughesNet Access Continuity. 
 
The whole concept behind the above private satellite network is that it 
provides Rountree Automotive with automatic failover to a broadband satellite 
connection. In the event of primary landline failure, it is delivered over their entire multi-
location landline network. That network bases its function on the easy-to-use HughesNet 
Customer Gateway portal. With this business owners can monitor and “manage” their 
sites in real-time from anywhere they have an Internet connection — anywhere in the 
world. That gateway is the part of the overall service that monitors the customer’s 
primary landline Internet connection (DSL, cable, or T1) and automatically switches over 
to a backup broadband satellite Internet connection in the event of failure. In addition to 
satellite backup, the appliance enables the small business to take advantage of a 
comprehensive list of much needed security services, such as site-to-site Virtual Private 
Networks (VPNs). This translates into securely connecting distributed offices over the 
Internet, industrial strength firewall, and potent gateway antivirus security to keep 
unwanted traffic and malware from corrupting their networks. Another advantage is that 
 52
the HughesNet service can be installed in a new store even if terrestrial broadband is not 
available in that geographic area. When a T1 solution becomes available, the store 
switches to that as its link with satellite as a backup. 
The overall management of that network is executed mainly by a 
designated Hughes support team. This team acts as a helpdesk and desktop field services’ 
team. They manage the network for the best of their customer needs and provide secure 
remote access and content filtering to ensure customers’ employees are not wasting 
valuable business time on personal usage. The basic management function that is left to 
the business owners (customer) is the freedom to add more stores to the network. This 
was something businesses once considered a costly undertaking because, to add more 
stores, they had to add more costly phone lines to support the terrestrial network. As 
already mentioned, that it is not the case anymore. The whole management function is 
completed with the Automotive automatic failover.  
The above network falls under the category of hybrid networks which can 
be seen as an overlay of a satellite network layer and a terrestrial network layer. They can 
operate on main roles or as redundant networks ready to take over in case of disaster in 
the primary terrestrial network that prohibits it from properly operating. Those networks 
are a major trend and match the concept of the satellite industry. This aims not only to 
compete with the terrestrial communication means, but to also integrate with them to 
complete each other to achieve the best communication coverage around the globe. It is a 
private satellite network, but the user has limited management authority. There is also a 
“tactical” aspect to such private satellite networks, such as the Hughes where new 
subscribers (new stores) can be added on demand. This eliminates the drawback of not 
having legacy infrastructure and the delay of constructing one. 
Finally, an excellent representative paradigm of a Tactical Private Satellite 
network is considered to be the Kromos-Anacom network. It has been chosen by the 
State of California Office of Emergency Services (OES) to assist the various civil 




landslides, flash flooding, contamination due to hazardous materials, forest fires, and 
emergencies due to terrorism (Chandran, 17-18). The system configuration of Kromos-




Figure 14.   System Configuration of Kromos-Anacom Network. 
 
The concept behind the choice of the above configuration-solution was 
that OES was looking for a modern communication network for emergency responses. It 
was clear that, under those adverse conditions for any kind of terrestrial infrastructure, a 
satellite-based solution was the only alternative to provide first responders with:  
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• Quick deployment of system at the sites of incident. 
• Restoration of communication (voice, data, and video) anywhere in the 
state. 
• Interoperability with the existing Infrastructure. 
• Easy installation, operation, and maintenance. 
• Cost competitive. 
In addition to meeting its mentioned basic requirements, the final choice 
was also based on flexibility, scalability, bandwidth efficiency, advanced Voice over IP 
(VoIP), and sophisticated Network Management System (NMS) that the above network 
provides the users. 
The above network is comprised of the following three basic elements that 
contribute to its flexibility and quick implementation under the crises conditions: 
i. The Hub is the “heart and mind” of that network and deployed at 
the OES Headquarters. For managing the network and connecting with the different sites, 
the hub has an NMS platform, a VoIP Gateway, IP private branch exchange (PBX), and 
connection to the phone company (PSTN) through a T1 line. For communicating with the 
satellite, it uses a high power Anacom Transceiver and a large dish. The whole facility 
also has generators for back-up power. A significant factor of that configuration, ensuring 
uninterrupted operation of the network in case of an emergency, is that there is a 
redundant Hub installed at a separate location. This redundant Hub will assume the role 
of the primary Hub in case the primary fails or is rendered ineffective due to an act of 
terrorism or other crises. Further, the above configuration does not require the redundant 
Hub to be connected to the primary Hub using a terrestrial link.  
ii. The Fixed Earth Stations are the majority of remotes. Each of these 
sites has a Kromos Satellite IP Gateway, a VoIP Gateway, and PCs connected using an 
Ethernet switch. Some of them have a video conferencing facility. Their outdoor 
equipment consists of an Anacom transceiver and a small dish. To gain flexibility and 
reduce delays, most of the remotes talk to each other through the Hub (STAR Topology); 
some of the “high-priority” remotes are enabled to connect to each other directly in a 
single hop (Mesh Topology). 
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iii. The Transportable Stations are the dynamically deployed stations 
of this Tactical Private Satellite network. These stations are typically mounted on trailers 
that can be towed using a truck or SUV to any site that requires immediate 
voice/video/data connectivity. Some of these stations are also vehicle mounted. Each 
transportable consists of a Kromos Satellite IP Gateway, a VoIP Gateway, an IP video 
camera, an Anacom Transceiver, and a satellite dish. Some of these stations are equipped 
with auto acquire antennas that can be pointed to the satellite accurately without manual 
adjustment for quick deployment.  
The basic network is configured to use satellite bandwidth (a precious 
commodity) only when needed. OES network does not oversee the existing legacy 
infrastructure. It integrates smoothly both satellite and terrestrial communications to 
maximize its efficiency. Consequently, a handful of the high priority locations have been 
assigned dedicated links for continuous dissemination of information. 
The entire network is being managed using Kromos NMS, Web, etc. from 
the Hub location with full authority over the different aspects of such a dynamically 
formed network. What is more advantageous is that the network administrator also has 
the ability to manage the network from any other location with connectivity to the 
network. This raises more the levels of redundancy and survivability of the network. 
In conclusion, the Kromos-Anacom network demonstrates the majority of 
the capabilities that define a Tactical Private Satellite network. It operates with 
commercial satellites which make it an excellent civilian paradigm. Its proper 
configuration and successful implementation are said to be proven during a number of 
recent emergencies involving catastrophic fires, landslides, flooding, and on, where the 
OES network claims it has been able to respond faster and more reliably with fewer 
personnel. The State of California Emergency response network, along with many other 
similar satellite networks, constitutes fine examples of that kind of architecture. They 
have been used as case studies by more and more organizations which migrates from the 
public based terrestrial communication infrastructures to their own managed and operated 
Tactical Private Satellite networks. 
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b. Military Examples 
In addition to the civilian examples of private networks mentioned above, 
it is worthy to note that there are examples of this type of network within the military 
domain. Military networks can always be considered tactical due to the fact that the 
networks directly support military operations. In recent years, the military has sought to 
utilize satellite communications to enable military units to pass information through the 
command structure. Even though distances between units are increasing, satellite 
communications has facilitated this operational flexibility. Each of the networks outlined 
can stand independently and will, however, most often be employed as a part of a larger 
network that provides access to DISN services (SIPRNET, NIPRNET, and Defense 
Switched Network voice traffic) to participating military units. These networks will be 
examined in the context of their ability to stand alone and to meet the definition of a 
tactical Private Satellite Network. 
The first such network utilizes the currently fielded military owned and 
operated Milstar EHF satellite constellation and utilizes the AN/TSC-154 Secure Mobile 
Anti-jam Reliable Tactical Terminal (SMART-T) as the ground terminal. The SMART-T 
is mounted on a High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) and will 
operate in the LDR (756 bps – 2.4 kbps) or MDR (9.6 kbps – 1544 kbps) mode that is 
supported by the Milstar constellation. The SMART-T will also be compatible with the 
Advanced EHF constellation. A typical application is to provide range extension of DISN 
services to units that are beyond the range of line-of-sight transmission systems. Thus, 
this provides crucial connectivity to widely dispersed forces. The conceptual network 
diagram in Figure 15 illustrates a SMART-T network as it would be employed by the 
United States Marine Corps. 
By way of description, the outer circles on the diagram represent 
headquarters or command elements. This diagram does not illustrate the hierarchical 
foundation of the military organization used to illustrate the SMART-T network in 
context of a higher level military organization. The rectangle shapes adjacent to the 
circles represent the SMART-T’s that are employed. It is important to note that in the 
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upper right hand corner, there is a circle labeled “L-Class ship.” This circle represents 
amphibious ships that have EHF-compatible terminals installed — not the SMART-T. 
 
 
Figure 15.   SMART-T Network Diagram (Marine Corps Systems Command). 
 
Tracing the lines that connect the rectangles throughout the diagram 
illustrates a satellite based private network with all of the participants able to 
communicate with one another with no connectivity outside of the organization. This 
network does not have any outside entity exercising control over the network 
performance and configuration. Therefore, the network participants are able to pass data. 
This data is limited by the bandwidth provided by the transmission system and the 
Milstar satellites within their organization or enclave without any outside connectivity. 
Security for this network is provided by the bulk encryption devices on the SMART-T. 
Like a commercial private network, the actual space segment is controlled by an outside 
agency. For a commercial system, the entity controlling the space segment would be the 
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owner/operator of the space segment, but, in the case of the Milstar constellation, access 
is ultimately controlled by DISA. The obvious flaw in this particular network is that each 
SMART-T is single threaded. Thus, if a terminal should fail, the unit relying on the 
SMART-T for connectivity will have to find other means to access broadband 
communications networks. Should outside connectivity be desired, users can add an 
additional satellite transmission system that would provide DISN access and inject that 
connectivity into the network at any given point. In summary, the SMART-T network is 
one example of a Tactical Private Satellite Network presently utilized by the military and 
fits the definition outlined in the beginning of this chapter. 
The second military example is the satellite based Support Wide Area 
Network (SWAN) that has been fielded by the U.S. Marine Corps. The purpose of 
SWAN is to push broadband communications down to echelons of command that have 
traditionally not had access to such connectivity. Allowing access to broadband 
communications allows smaller units to have access to critical information not previously 
available. An example is live video from Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). SWAN 
utilizes a commercial space segment for transmission and commercially procured ground 
terminals that have been fielded to military units that, until the recent past, had limited or 
no access to broadband communications connectivity. The diagram in Figure 16 
illustrates the SWAN network for a Marine Division, a subordinate command of the 
Marine Expeditionary Force: 
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Figure 16.   SWAN Network Diagram (Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps). 
 
Considering only the SWAN terminals in the context of the diagram (the 
rectangular shapes with a “V” designation in them), the connectivity between the 
terminals constitutes a tactical Private Satellite Network. Like the examples of civilian 
networks that were discussed in the previous section, the space segment is owned and 
operated by a civilian entity with the requisite bandwidth contracted by DISA. As 
illustrated, DISN services can be injected into the network, as with the SMART-T 
network, but that is not a requirement for the network to function. SWAN can operate as 
a stand alone network with each of the users able to communication via a broadband 
connection laterally as well as up and down the military command structure. The 
limitations on what kind of information can be passed over this network are constrained 
by the capacity of the communications link between terminals. There are similarities 
between SWAN and the SMART-T network in that they are stand alone networks that 
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provide broadband connectivity to a dispersed user community. The main difference 
between them is that the space segment for the SMART-T network is managed by the 
government. Like the SMART-T network, SWAN is a pertinent example of the 
deployment and use of tactical Private Satellite Networks within the military domain. 
2. Capabilities Provided to the User 
From the above brief description of both the civilian and military examples, it is 
easily derived that a Tactical Private Satellite network provides its user with a number of 
capabilities that go beyond the potentials of the traditional terrestrial, wired, and wireless 
communication networks or the Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) shared satellite 
communication solutions. Some of them derived from the “Satellite” aspect of the 
network which gives true global coverage for the network without the restrictions 
imposed by the existence — or the lack — of the terrestrial infrastructure; some derived 
from its “Private” aspect which gives the administrator full authority over the 
management of the network for the best interest of the owner organization. 
The following are some of the most significant features of a Tactical Private 
Satellite Network that have already been mentioned in the examples above. This 
accumulative list, which analyzes in further depth the terms flexibility, speed, and 
redundancy, helps the reader understand why the deployment of such a network is crucial 
for the organizations who deal with human lives. This also applies to other more 
profitable ones which cannot afford losses from disrupted communication lines (Business 
Continuity issues): 
• Rapid deployment of the system to sites of incident or opportunity due to 
the size of the transportable stations and the independence on existing 
infrastructure. 
• Adaptation to the end user environments, no matter how adverse and 
unfriendly the weather and terrestrial conditions. 
• Seamless ubiquitous multimedia services which aims at the true global 
coverage of the network. 
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• Network Control Stations with full “authority” over the management of 
the network. They are proprietary and dedicated to the network without 
being shared with other organizations which have different targets. These 
stations manage the network in terms of QoS and allocate the bandwidth 
on demand for efficient use of available spectrum. Proprietary “hubs” free 
the whole system from having to rely on shared public networks prone to 
malfunction and operating failure. 
• Restoration of communication (voice, data, and video) anywhere in the 
network and, many times, from any other location with connectivity to the 
network. To be more specific, the capability of acting as redundant and 
sharing load control stations (hubs) by remote terminals empowers them to 
be used as secondary hubs if the primary one is not available 
• Interoperability with the existing terrestrial infra-structure which helps the 
smooth migration from the emergency to the regular business situation and 
vice-versa. 
• Greater security demonstrated, so far, and higher reliability than radio 
systems, public networks, and Internet solutions. These networks claim to 
be less prone to unauthorized access (hacking), virus infections, and 
disruption in service due to public works.  
• Easy installation, operation, and maintenance. As far as the network is 
“Private,” it is tailor-made to the organization’s specific needs. The ease to 
operate these networks makes them easy to manage. Since the whole 
system is simple and uncomplicated to learn, it reduces the time and cost 
of training the staff on the operation of the network. 
• Cost effectiveness and competitiveness with PSTN, radio links, and VSAT 
shared satellite solutions. This is further justified if the cost, in lives or 
money, until and for the restoration of communication with the presented 
solutions is taken under consideration. 
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Table 4 gives a comparison of the above desirable features with different 
examples: 
 
DESIRABLE FEATURES  SYSTEM EXAMPLE 
Rapid deployment of the system to sites of incident or 
opportunity 
HALO, HughesNet Access 
Continuity, Kromos-Anacom, 
SMART-T, SWAN 
Adaptation to the end user environments HALO, HughesNet Access 
Continuity, Kromos-Anacom, 
SMART-T, SWAN 
Seamless ubiquitous multimedia services HALO, Kromos-Anacom, 
SMART-T, SWAN 
Network Control Stations with full “authority” over 
the management of the network 
HALO, HughesNet Access 
Continuity, Kromos-Anacom, 
SWAN 
Restoration of communication (voice, data, and video) 
anywhere in the network and, many times, from any 
other location with connectivity to the network 
Kromos-Anacom, SWAN 
Interoperability with the existing terrestrial infra-
structure 
HughesNet Access Continuity, 
Kromos-Anacom, SMART-T, 
SWAN 
Greater security HughesNet Access Continuity, 
Kromos-Anacom, SMART-T, 
SWAN 
Easy installation, operation, and maintenance HALO, HughesNet Access 
Continuity, Kromos-Anacom, 
SMART-T, SWAN 
Cost effectiveness and competitiveness with PSTN, 
radio links, and VSAT shared satellite solutions. 
HughesNet Access Continuity, 
Kromos-Anacom, SMART-T, 
SWAN 
Table 4.   Comparison of the Different Satellite Networks. 
 
The above list is by no means exhaustive, but it helps highlight the undisputable 
and invaluable benefits of the proper deployment of a Tactical Private Satellite network 
in areas where, for some reasons, the so far “conventional” networks’ architectures do not 
suffice — or they lack. What is left for the owner organization is to clearly define its 
specific needs and the details of the architecture that will best suit its users and potential 
missions. 
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B. DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS FOR A TACTICAL PRIVATE SATELLITE 
NETWORK   
There are three primary design considerations that need to be evaluated and 
considered when formulating the conceptual design of a tactical Private Satellite 
Network. The considerations that are addressed in this section relate to the inner 
workings of the network and, in some cases, are completely transparent to the network 
planner and designer. The considerations that are examined in this section are network 
availability and data security, a brief comparison between the two most prevalent satellite 
orbits used for telecommunications and, finally, an examination of protocols and 
standards associated with the design and implementation of data networks. This section is 
by no means prescriptive, but it does contain a treatment of relevant issues for the design 
and implementation of a Tactical Private Satellite Network. 
1. Network Availability and Security 
There are two major aspects of the Tactical Private Satellite Network that must be 
addressed by network planners and designers. The first concept is network availability. 
Availability, with regards to data and information systems, can be generally defined as 
the accessibility and reliability of data and, in this particular instance, the network and its 
associated resources and services to authorized individuals in a timely manner (Harris 
954). Availability means that the network and the associated services are there when the 
operator needs it. Obviously, the information that the network is providing and 
distributing is of a critical nature. Availability is especially critical when considering that 
timely information flow in a military or ERN operation can have an impact on successful 
mission accomplishment. There are several means by which to achieve network 
availability and those are explained as three principles of high availability networking. 
First, all single points of failure should be eliminated. Single-threaded systems are 
vulnerable and, by adding redundancy, common cause failures can be reduced. Second, 
when failures do occur, the network must be provisioned to provide reliable transition 




provided to promptly detect failures upon occurrence. This will allow network managers 
to work more proactively instead of reacting to each issue that occurs on the network 
(Buddenberg). 
The second important aspect with regard to the design and implementation of a 
Tactical Private Satellite Network is security (confidentiality). Confidentiality, with 
regards to data and information systems, ensures that the necessary level of secrecy is 
enforced at each junction of data processing and prevents unauthorized disclosure (Harris 
57). Security is absolutely crucial for information in the military domain. Additional 
security issues become apparent with different types of operations, such as those 
operations conducted in a coalition environment and operations that are in response to a 
humanitarian crisis where the military will operate along the side of civil government 
agencies or non-governmental organizations. Regardless of the situation, security is a 
crucial element of the network. In this context, the focus is on the security of the data that 
is being transmitted across the network traversing publicly accessible means. The 
predominant method for securing data (it will be briefly examined) is end-to-end security. 
An application of end-to-end security is the establishment of VPNs. Security will be 
considered within the context of a satellite transmission medium. End-to-end security 
focuses on the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data. It is generally media 
dependent and is achieved by using devices, such as link and packet encryptors 
augmented by end-to-end security devices that focus on the security of the data itself 
(Buddenberg). This solution seems optimal when dealing with security because there are 
adverse issues with regard to link encryption — especially over satellite links that are 
owned and operated by civilian owned private entities. Link encryption, unlike end-to-
end encryption, requires trust relationships between the various users on the network: the 
end user, the end server, and the satellite gateway. This is not acceptable for data must 
remain encrypted from the user through the satellite link to the end user. Because there 
must be a trust relationship to a third party (i.e., the civilian owned and operated satellite 
gateway), this type of encryption does not seem adequate for transmitting classified or 
confidential traffic over public resources (Olechma, Feighery, and Hryckiewicz 789). A 
practical application of end-to-end security is the establishment of a VPN across the 
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satellite transmission medium. A VPN is essentially a network that appears and functions 
like a private network to the network end points (i.e., hosts on the network). It uses public 
resources, such as commercial communications infrastructure to include satellite as the 
channel between two secure sources (Olechma, Feighery, and Hryckiewicz 785). The 
value of the VPN over commercial telecommunications infrastructure to the military user 
is the encryption of all of the traffic from end-to-end. The VPN encrypts all IP data 
without regard to the application (Olechma, Feighery, and Hryckiewicz 785). Therefore, 
the VPN provides greater flexibility than other types of encryption that may be applicable 
to only certain types of applications. The VPN does not discriminate IP data and provides 
an umbrella of coverage with regard to data. The resulting benefit is that through a VPN, 
data is encrypted and secure from end-to-end. This is because the resulting VPN 
architecture places the burden for encryption and decryption on the end user rather than 
on some sort of gateway that is dedicated to the task of encrypting and decrypting the 
data (Olechma, Feighery, and Hryckiewicz 785). Due to the utilization of commercial 
telecommunications infrastructure for this tactical Private Satellite Network, data security 
is crucial to the successful operation of the network. The establishment of end-to-end 
security — more specifically the establishment of a VPN — proves to be a viable action 
to secure sensitive data that would be traversing otherwise unsecured public 
infrastructure. 
2. Examination of Satellite Orbital Characteristics 
Having examined the commercial satellite communications capabilities in the 
previous chapter and, also, having examined the requirements for securing sensitive data 
over the tactical Private Satellite Network that will traverse commercially owned and 
operated telecommunications infrastructure, it seems prudent to briefly explain the two 
prevalent orbital patterns for commercial communications satellites and illuminate the 
advantages and disadvantages of both types of constellations. The two most common 
orbital configurations for communications satellites are LEO and GEO. These are 
certainly not the only two types of orbits for spacecraft, but for the purposes of this 
research the LEO and GEO orbits are the areas of interest and will be briefly examined. 
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The following table briefly outlines the advantages and disadvantages of 
communications satellites that utilize the LEO and GEO orbits: 
 
Orbit Characteristics Advantage Disadvantage 
Low Earth 
Orbit (LEO) 
-Low altitude (500 
to 200 km) 
-Orbital period of 
only a couple of 
hours 
-Uses Inter-Satellite 









-Delay time is 
roughly .02 seconds 
-100% of Earth can 
be provided with 
coverage 
-Fast moving satellite 
requires multiple 
satellites or tracking 
antennas on ground 
segment 
-Numerous satellites 




variation in signal 






the Earth and rotates 
in the same direction 
-Satellite does not 
move with respect to 
a point on the 
Earth’s surface 
-Altitude is about 
35,786 km 
-Satellite is constant 
in location 
-Satellite beams to 
Earth are motionless 
-Simplified design for 




high power due to high 
altitude of satellite 
-Larger antennas are 
required at ground 
segment 
-Limited to no 
coverage at high 
latitudes 
-Round Trip Time 
delay of .5 seconds 
Table 5.   Comparison of LEO and GEO for Communications Satellites  
(from Gordon and Walker, Principles of Communications Satellites). 
 
Essentially, both types of orbits have advantages and disadvantages relative to 
their effectiveness of providing communications support to users throughout the globe. In 
short, the LEO constellations require a large number of satellites for global coverage. For 
example, Motorola’s Iridium constellation has 66 satellites in orbit, but such a 
constellation can provide true global coverage even in latitudes where GEO satellites 
cannot “see.” Because satellites in LEO are moving rather rapidly, thus equating to a 
short orbital period (the time required for the satellite to orbit the Earth), LEO 
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communications satellites must utilize an Inter-Satellite Link (ISL) for continuity of 
communications. Subsequently, satellites at LEO are more complex because they have to 
conduct this hand-over the communications signals (Chotikapong, Cruickshank, and Sun 
28). Satellites in GEO also have unique advantages and disadvantages with regard to 
providing communications support. Unlike LEO a satellite, the position of GEO satellites 
with respect to a particular spot on the Earth does not change. Therefore, fewer satellites 
are required for Earth coverage, but only at the middle section of the Earth — not at high 
latitudes. Because GEO satellites do not move and do not require the use of ISLs, their 
design is much simpler than LEO satellites. In summary, both types of communications 
satellite constellations, LEO and GEO, provide distinct advantages and disadvantages 
with regard to providing communications services.  
Having differentiated the ways of operating through these two types of orbital 
configurations, it is worth noting again that one of the strongest new trends in the satellite 
industry, which also envisions dealing with the problem of overpopulation of specific 
orbits, is the development of new orbital configurations. This will combine GEO with 
LEO satellites as a ring constellation to purify the available orbital patterns and take 
advantage of the strengths of these orbital categories. The commercial space segment that 
would facilitate the employment of a tactical Private Satellite Network should ultimately 
be transparent to the organization deploying the network, that is, as long as the bandwidth 
that is required is available and the VSAT equipment employed is compatible. 
3. Networking Protocols and Standards 
To complete this section on items and issues for consideration, an examination 
will be conducted on two prevalent networking protocols and standards and their 
application for networks — specifically using satellite links for transmission. The two 
networking standards of interest are Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) and the 
TCP/IP. Finally, because of its applicability to satellite communications, a hybrid method 
(combining TCP and ATM protocols) will be examined as well. 
The first protocol to be examined is the ATM protocol. ATM is mostly employed 
on terrestrial networks, but because of the popularity of the protocol, due consideration 
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must be made within the context of the tactical Private Satellite Network. ATM is 
intended to transfer many different types of traffic simultaneously. This includes real-
time voice, video, and TCP flows of the Internet (Jamalipour 90). Because ATM can 
handle various types of traffic, it is an attractive method for employment in military-
related networks. Here it is common to find various types of data that require transfer 
from unit to unit over various transmission means. Basically, ATM reduces network 
overhead by employing fixed size packets. These are called cells. They have a fixed size 
of 53 bytes and error detection and correction are left to the higher layers of the network 
protocol stack. ATM has the ability to multiplex and switch data from various sources 
with varying rates (Jamalipour 90). This multiplexing capability makes ATM attractive 
for employment in the tactical Private Satellite Network. This is because a single link 
from unit to unit must be used to pass various types of traffic. Also, a portion of the 
bandwidth for network management and control functions (this will be examined in 
greater detail in subsequent chapters) must be reserved. ATM accomplishes the 
multiplexing by establishing logical connections called Virtual Channel Connection 
(VCC). All VCCs with a common end point are bundled into a Virtual Path Connection 
(VPC). This is a series of concatenated Virtual Paths (VPs) and switched along the same 
route. This creates efficiencies by sharing common paths within the network (Jamalipour 
90). Available network bandwidth, however, must be allocated among the VPCs that are 
running the network. Within an ATM network, bandwidth is logically assigned to a VPC 
by reserving a portion of the bandwidth on each transmission link for exclusive use of the 
VPC. This facilitates the rapid establishment of these connections along pre-defined 
routes (Arvidsson, Berezner, and Krzesinski 1). Finally, a mention of the VP is required 
to complete the examination of ATM. The important aspects of the VP are that the 
distinct identity of a traffic strain between tow communicating nodes is recognized and 
that the endpoint if the VP is not necessarily a computer, but can be another networking 
device (Arvidsson, Berezner, and Krzesinski 1, Kuehne 7). Because ATM is used on 
terrestrial networks, it seems logical to take advantage of ATM’s characteristics and 
capabilities over satellite links as well. There are, however, some disadvantages 
associated with using ATM over satellite links. Generally those disadvantages deal with 
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the Round Trip Time (RTT) for satellite transmission, the associated latency, and 
feedback mechanisms for congestion control that will lead to increased probability that 
ATM cells will be discarded (Hart). 
The other networking protocol is the TCP/IP suite. Though there are differences 
between TCP and IP, they will be addressed as a suite — not individual protocols. 
TCP/IP is ubiquitous with regard to the Internet. Essentially, data that is processed on a 
host should end up traversing all of the layers of the TCP/IP protocol stack until it can be 
transmitted through the physical media and all of the required routing and switching 
required for Internet access (Jamalipour 92). As noted previously, ATM lets higher layers 
deal with error detection and correction, but those functions are uniquely a part of the 
TCP/IP suite. Flow control in TCP/IP is done as an organic function of the protocol stack. 
TCP/IP performs flow control by dynamic control of windows which allow packets to be 
transmitted. This is assisted by a feedback mechanism of TCP acknowledgement packets 
(ACK) packets (Karaliopoulos, Tafazolli, and Evans 334). These ACK packets 
essentially let the host know that packets sent out were received by the distant end. The 
value or size of the window mentioned above is a function of the RTT experienced by the 
particular connection (Karaliopoulos, Tafazolli, and Evans 334). Therefore, an optimal 
transmitting widow size is directly dependent on the quality and speed of the connection 
on which the host sits. As with ATM, TCP/IP can be used over satellite links. The 
performance of TCP/IP, however, is subject to varying conditions relating the physical 
link itself. As previously mentioned, the two prevalent types of communications satellites 
are either in LEO or GEO orbits. Also noted previously is the long delay associated with 
GEO satellites and the potential for variance in the delay of LEO satellites. Weaknesses 
in the TCP/IP suite are revealed with regard to the use of satellite links. For GEO 
satellites, the long propagation delay and the variable delay associated with LEO 
satellites causes the ACK and time-out based congestion control mechanisms of TCP/IP 
to perform weakly (Jamalipour 101). The bottom line with TCP/IP over satellite is that 
there are numerous problems associated with the physical link — in this case, the satellite 
link — that adversely affect the congestion control mechanisms associated with TCP/IP. 
To mitigate the affects of long propagation delay transmission medium on TCP/IP, 
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considerable research effort has been devoted to enhancing the performance of TCP/IP in 
this environment (Karaliopoulos, Tafazolli, and Evans 334). The Internet Engineering 
Task Force (IETF) has issued Requests for Comment (RFC) relating to congestion 
control and performance of TCP/IP over satellite. The following table briefly outlines the 
efforts of the IETF with regard to this issue. 
 
Date Issued RFC Title  Description 
May 1992 1323 TCP Extensions for 
High Performance 
Presents a set of TCP extensions to 
improve performance over large 
bandwidth delay product paths and 
reliable operation over high-speed 
paths  




Inclusion of IETF standardized 
mechanisms that enable TCP to more 
effectively utilize available network 
capacity 
April 1999 2581 TCP Congestion 
Control 
Defines TCP’s four intertwined 
congestion control algorithms 
February 
2000 
2760 Ongoing TCP 
Research Related to 
Satellites 
Outline of possible TCP 
enhancements that may allow TCP to 
better utilize the available bandwidth 




2914  Congestion Control 
Principles 
Explains the need for congestion 
control on the Internet 
December 
2002 




Description of TCP problems that 
arise because of asymmetric effects of 
bandwidth asymmetric networks and 
packet radio sub-networks 
June 2005 4057 IPV6 Enterprise 
Network Scenarios 
 
This document describes the scenarios 
for IPv6 deployment within enterprise 
networks. It defines a small set of 
basic enterprise scenarios and 
includes pertinent questions to allow 
enterprise administrators to further 
refine their deployment scenarios. 
Table 6.   List of Applicable Request for Comments (from http://www.ietf.org/rfc.html). 
 71
After briefly examining the apparent strengths and weaknesses regarding ATM 
and TCP/IP, and their use over satellite networks, it would be useful to consider the 
hybrid protocol of using TCP/IP over ATM and satellite links. The best of both protocols 
can be used to create an efficient and effective means for the transmission of various 
types of traffic (real-time voice and video included) over a satellite link where 
propagation delay is either excessive or unpredictable. The goal of the Tactical Private 
Satellite Network is to get broadband network capability to deployed users where there is 
no mature wired infrastructure by utilizing commercial satellite communications. To 
achieve the goal of broadband satellite networks, the integration of TCP/IP and ATM 
needs to be seriously considered (Jamalipour 95). The issue is how to integrate TCP/IP 
datagrams into the ATM cell structure. For the proper integration of the protocols, 
TCP/IP traffic must be transmitted with the fixed size of the ATM cell and transmitted 
through the Virtual Channel (VC) that is set up by the ATM network for data 
transmission. An inherent problem is that there can be a limited number of VCs and that 
number is ultimately controlled by Quality of Service (QoS) manager on the ATM 
network (Jamalipour 95). For TCP/IP traffic to be packed into ATM cells, a mechanism 
within ATM must somehow pack the TCP/IP datagrams at the sender and unpack them at 
the receiving host to fit TCP/IP. That is done by the ATM Application Layer (AAL) and, 
with the case of TCP/IP traffic, AAL 5 (Kuehne 12). There are total of five AALs — 
each with a different function. Specifically, AAL 5 is the primary AAL that supports 
connection-oriented and connectionless data (Cisco 27-10). TCP is connection-oriented 
and IP is connectionless. Therefore, this AAL is applicable to the packing of TCP/IP into 
ATM cells. The confluence of TCP/IP and ATM provides a mechanism for taking 
advantage of the best of each protocol for transmitting data over less than ideal satellite 
links. 
After an examination of desired attributes of the network; availability, and 
security, as well as an examination of the advantages and disadvantages afforded by the 
two predominant orbital configurations for communications satellites — LEO and GEO 
—, and a treatment of the prevalent networking protocols, the portion of this chapter will 
be devoted to defining the desired physical attributes for a Tactical Network Entry Point. 
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This is the deployable base station that acts as the hub for the Tactical Private Satellite 
Network. There will be a comparison to similar systems and the operational 
implementation of the tactical Private Satellite Network in the context of common 
military missions. 
C. TACTICAL NETWORK ENTRY POINT 
1. General Capabilities of the Conceptual Network Entry Point 
a. Physical vs. Logical Entry Points – Design 
The key operational consideration for the Tactical Network Entry Point 
that will be examined in this section is the concept that this base station will have two 
distinctly different network entry points: a physical and a logical entry point. The logical 
entry point, however, is broken down into two separate and distinct entry points for the 
purposes of data transfer and network management. The differentiation between these 
two types of entry points is significant to this work in that the physical apparatus 
represents the hub of the Tactical Private Satellite Network. The data traversing the 
network is further segregated to separate network management and control functions 
from the majority of the other data that the network is transferring between network 
members. 
The first type of entry point that will be examined is the physical entry 
point. The physical entry point functions as the hub of the network and as the Network 
Control Station (NECOS) for the Tactical Private Satellite Network. With regard to the 
physical entry point of the NECOS, the base station controls the physical connection 
between the base station and subordinate terminals and lateral communications between 
each of the subordinate terminals. Noting that this network utilizes satellites to achieve 
the desired connectivity, it is implied that the base station will be able to control the 
ability of the subordinate terminals to access the space segment and join the network by 
utilizing permissions similar to those required by DISA to join and operate on the 
MILSATCOM network. Therefore, some level of authentication would be required by 
both the base station and subordinate terminals. The physical topology of the network 
that resides behind the base station and subordinate terminals is somewhat generic from 
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the perspective that no special networking devices, not readily available in the 
commercial marketplace, are required for the network to be extended to users from the 
satellite terminal. The only exception to this would be any mandated encryption devices, 
such as those required by DISA. Figure 17 illustrates a sample physical topology for the 
Tactical Private Satellite Network: 
 
 
Figure 17.   Sample Physical Topology for the Tactical Private Satellite Network.  
 
In this illustration, basic networking components (switches, routers, 
wireless access points, Virtual Private Network concentrators, and user hosts) could all be 
connected to the satellite terminal (including the base station) in any combination to 
extend the network to the required user community. The actual physical architecture 
would ultimately be decided by the unit operating the network based on the mission, the 
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information exchange requirements, and the equipment available for use. The key is that  
the user maintains some flexibility with regard to the physical topology of the network 
based on determined information exchange requirements and the aggregate bandwidth 
provided by the satellite link. 
In addition to providing the physical access or entry into the Tactical 
Private Satellite Network, the base station also maintains functionality above that of the 
subordinate terminals. The other functionality is in the form of the logical entry points for 
the network. The logical entry points function in a similar fashion to the physical entry 
point in that the NECOS can exercise control over the performance and operation of the 
network.  
To that direction, there are two logical entry points. The first logical entry 
point is to control the physical connection between the base station and subordinate 
terminals and the satellite as well as provide a network management control channel 
through which the network devices can be remotely managed. This logical entry point 
addresses the desired functionality in this model of the NECOS to allocate satellite 
bandwidth between terminals. There are instances where some terminals will be required 
to send and/or receive large amounts of data relative to the other terminals on the 
network. Ideally, the NECOS should be able, when the situation arises, to either allocate 
bandwidth between both the base station and a subordinate terminal, or between 
subordinate terminals manual, or set some parameters for the dynamic allocation of 
satellite bandwidth. In addition to managing the satellite bandwidth within the network, 
the network management control channel would be utilized to remotely manage network 
devices that were deployed and connected physically to subordinate satellite terminals. 
Conceptually, the NECOS could dictate QoS requirements for the network and utilize 
SNMP to maintain the overall health of the network. The concept of remote network 
management will be examined in greater detail in Chapter V. The second logical entry 
point is for all of the other data to travel to and from the terminals and network devices 
that are deployed. Simply, it is the logical path for connecting clients to servers of the 
application and data services that are operating on this particular network.  
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Because there is a need for two separate logical entry points (network 
control and general data), each can be considered a separate channel and, therefore, some 
method must be used to separate the two. Again, this study is not prescriptive but merely 
providing information on how the logical entry points may be kept separate. There are 
two ways in which the logical entry points can be established within the single 
transmission aggregate. One way is to introduce a multiplexing device between the 
satellite terminal and network router. The other way is by taking advantage of the Virtual 
Circuits that are operating characteristic of ATM. Either way, the data channel and the 
network management control channel can be established and kept separate from each 
other. Figure 18 depicts the logical entry points for the Tactical Private Satellite Network. 
This multiplatform control, separation of control and data links, for generally 
reconfiguring the nodes or the whole networking segment of self-forming networks, has a 
fundamental role in cases of tactical networks (Bordetsky and Bourakov). 
 
 
Figure 18.   Depiction of the Two Logical Entry Points. 
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Ideally, as the illustration depicts, the aggregate satellite bandwidth would 
be apportioned between the two logical entry points. Considering that the data channel 
must contain the majority of the bandwidth — most of the traffic traversing the network 
will do so via this data channel —, the network management control channel can be 
smaller relative to the data channel. As mentioned above, a more in-depth treatment of 
the data channel will be done in Chapter V. 
In summary, the Tactical Network Entry Point provides functionality not 
present in other satellite terminals on the network. The physical entry point is the 
gateway to the network and provides physical access to the space segment. In addition to 
the physical entry point, the base station also provides, through the implementation of 
specific network protocols or hardware, two logical entry points. One logical entry point 
is considered a network management control channel that is used to control satellite 
bandwidth and manage deployed network devices remotely. The second logical entry 
point is a channel specifically reserved for the transfer of data from one part of the 
network to another. This separation of the aggregate satellite bandwidth is crucial to the 
user by providing a greater amount of operational flexibility in terms of network 
deployment, operation, and management. 
Further research needs to be done on the data forms of the different 
categories. Data to be transferred will need, in many cases, to be encrypted. This may be 
an additional and almost useless overhead for the management data. On the other hand, 
all data, including management data, needs some kind of “need to see” configuration. 
This will be implemented by the identity management device which will govern the 
network in terms of who is eligible to participate and who is not. In any case, additional 
devices need to be added to the above simple infrastructure to complete the 
communication scheme of the Tactical Private Satellite Network. 
b. Requirements and Characteristics for a Conceptual Tactical 
Network Entry Point 
After the above descriptions of Network Entry Points and the separation 
between physical and logical ones, it is well understood that this research shows that the 
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Tactical Network Entry Point is the base station of the Tactical Private Satellite Network 
that serves the function of NECOS for the network. The conceptual capabilities of such a 
“hub” should be in accordance with the functions and performance that users should 
expect. Conceptually and very concisely, NECOS will control the network by providing 
monitoring and control of the widely dispersed earth stations. At this point, it needs to be 
repeated that the satellite bandwidth is allocated by the service provider. Nevertheless, 
the gateway device will be capable to apportion the allocated bandwidth within the 
network to facilitate information exchange. Basically, the concept is that once the 
bandwidth is acquired, there is no requirement for civilian owned/operated IP services. 
This, in concert with the employment of the gateway device which allows for the control 
of the bandwidth, is a fundamental benefit of the Tactical Private Satellite Network. 
To be more detailed, at first — and from the nature of the operations for 
which this research designed the network –, it is expected that the base station will be 
easily deployable for vehicular, shipboard, and man-portable configurations. This is 
because the Tactical Private Satellite Network can be implemented in a variety of 
operational scenarios. Flexibility of where and how the base station can be operated is 
essential. Depending on the operational application, this also includes an On-the-Move 
(OTM) capability (potentially). 
The functions that the base station is expected to perform are elaborate. 
This is because it would deal with the management of a significant and crucial, in terms 
of human lives, network. For that reason, it will require knowledgeable operators to 
conduct those operations. Yet, and for the sake of operational flexibility and ease of 
deployment, it should not require enhanced skills to install and conduct basic functions of 
the system. 
The base station should be able to have large enough bandwidth to serve 
as a broadband communications pipe between subordinate stations. This will ensure that 
the network can be used for C2 purposes and allow for the establishment of a control 
channel that would be used for remote management of network devices. As it has been 
discussed in the above paragraphs, through its performance as network management and 
a gateway access, it will give the communication architecture the ability to act as a 
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broadband, on-demand global Internet based on IP. This will incorporate key emerging 
network technologies, such as QoS provisioning and bandwidth guarantees. Thus, it will 
allow warfighters access to the GIG anywhere at anytime. 
From the scope of technology, the base station should be generic in nature 
(technology agnostic) so that different types of VSAT users can connect to the network. 
In other words, the base station should be compatible by frequency band and Media 
Access Control scheme instead of some proprietary means that would only limit its 
interoperability with others. 
The overall functionality of the base station provides the capability to use 
multiple different satellite frequency bands, ideally simultaneously, to enhance 
operational flexibility. For that reason, it should be designed with dual antenna systems 
so it can support two simultaneous separate satellites to terminate deployed terminals and 
be capable of operation on multiple bands simultaneously. This can serve also another 
cause: the base station can on the same time relay everything to existing permanent 
stations which are positioned in different satellite footprint than the VSATs.  
Moving to the “pure” management side of its functionality, the base 
station should be ideally able to control the modems on the subordinate VSAT terminals. 
This is to dynamically allocate bandwidth between the terminals within the network and 
to set QoS parameters to get efficient use out of the bandwidth allocated for the entire 
network. Generally speaking, bandwidth, throughput, timeliness (including jitter), 
reliability, perceived quality, and cost are considered as QoS metrics in 
telecommunication networks (qtd. in Jamalipour 99). In addition, latency, interactivity, 
prioritization, and high availability are considered QoS attributes. Of course, this does not 
literally mean to control the transponders on the satellite; rather, this means to adjust the 
parameters of the modem. For example, bandwidth allocation and congestion control are 
few of the critical factors in effectively providing management service. Furthermore, the 
management allocated bandwidth must also incorporate a way of communication (voice 
or text in the form of collaborative communication, such as “chatting”) between the users 
and the administrator into the base station. This is so the latter can inform the local users 
of the problems so they can fix them or so they can conduct helpdesk services. 
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Following the trend of the modern communication protocols, it shall be 
designed with a pure Everything over IP (EOIP) architecture such that deployed tactical 
users achieve “IP mobility” without system reconfiguration — no matter when and where 
they enter the area of interest. 
In terms of the overall topology in which the base control station 
contributes by managing the network, clarification of the basic principles of hierarchy of 
this whole system and the addition of a multipurpose asset as the base station must be 
stated. Generally, a group of satellite terminals may be regarded as constituting a 
Network and arrangement of their communication links as the Network Architecture or 
configuration (Celic, 177). The architecture, however, of a satellite communication 
network is different from most terrestrial networks: all links pass through a satellite 
transponder that will see all earth terminals within its coverage area. A single satellite 
network may, therefore, be regarded as a star topology with the satellite transponder as 
the central node. The transponder, however, is generally transparent and it is the logical 
connectivity and topology of the users which is of interest. This will generally be either a 
Star configuration — with a large hub station — or a Mesh configuration where there is 
effective equality between all terminals. Figure 19 shows the architecture distinction: 
 
Figure 19.   Hub and Mesh Architectures. 
 
As well as the user links, there will be distinct Network Management 
functions handled from NECOS (base station). This is usually based upon a start 
configuration. Because NECOS functions as Gateway (hub in sociological terms) 
between satellite ground terminals and other satellite ground terminals and terrestrial 
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telecom networks, there can be no equality between it and the other VSATs. 
Consequently, for the earth components of the Tactical Private Satellite network, there is 
a Mesh configuration among the VSATs for point to point communication and a Star 
configuration for the communication with the base station which acts as their gateway to 
DISN GIG (NIPRENET, SIPRENET, and World Wide Web). It also manages each of 
them so it can guarantee the quality of communication. 
Another characteristics/capability for the network entry point warrants 
examination. The ability for the base station to control access to the satellite medium is 
critical to the implementation of the Tactical Private Satellite Network. Conceptually, the 
base station will provide access to the space segment and the associated bandwidth. It 
will, thus, perform a gateway function. There are several models for Media Access 
Control (MAC) that could be applied to the gateway system, but the model that is deemed 
as the most appropriate for implementation is a MAC similar to the one utilized by the 
802.16 standard. 
There are several reasons why the implementation of 802.16 MAC is an 
attractive candidate for incorporation into a conceptual gateway device. The first reason 
is that the 802.16 MAC is designed to support broadband wireless point-to-multipoint 
access (multicast) applications and a variety of services, such as bursty and continuous 
traffic (Eklund, et al., 99). The multicast access described is the same access that will be 
required of the Tactical Private Satellite Network. This is where multiple stations will be 
connected to the base station/gateway and to each other via the satellite (wireless) link 
and will be required to pass various types of traffic through the routable network. Second, 
802.16 MAC supports a variety of backhaul mechanisms. This includes ATM and IP 
traffic (Eklund, et al., 99). Depending on the operational implementation of the Tactical 
Private Satellite Network, there may be different options for backhaul as well. This is 
why this particular issue is of interest. The third issue deals with transport efficiency. 
Transport efficiency is critical — especially in satellite communications networks — 
because here there is a finite amount of bandwidth available to users within the network. 
An efficient method is, therefore, required to allocate bandwidth within the network user 
terminals. Because the modulation and coding schemes are specified for a burst profile 
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(this may be adjusted adaptively), the 802.16 MAC can make use of more efficient burst 
profiles during favorable link conditions. It may also reduce efficiency to increase 
reliability when less than favorable link conditions occur (Eklund, et al., 99). Here is 
another example where the properties of the 802.16 MAC are attractive for 
implementation in the conceptual network framework. The ability to manage the actual 
communications link (in the case of this work, the satellite link) is critical to the 
implementation of the Tactical Private Satellite Network. Therefore, the final issue that 
will be examined is the management capability provided by the 802.16 MAC. To discuss 
the management capability provided by the 802.16 MAC, it is necessary to briefly look at 
the 802.16 MAC Protocol Data Unit (PDU). The PDU for the 802.16 MAC consists of a 
MAC header of fixed length (a generic header and a bandwidth request header), variable 
payload, and a cyclic redundancy check (CRC). Management PDUs do not contain any 
payload; rather, they do contain MAC management messages (Eklund, et al., 102). 
Because there are management-related messages incorporated in the MAC PDU, this 
would eliminate any additional overhead caused by having to use some other method to 
conduct Media Access Control as well as centralize the management of a point-to-
multipoint link. This is similar to the topology suggested for the Tactical Private Satellite 
Network. 
In summary, the base station device that functions as the gateway for the 
Tactical Private Satellite Network must be able to perform, in addition to the other tasks, 
Media Access Control to control access to the commercial satellite link. This 
functionality is critical because the finite resource of the satellite bandwidth must be 
apportioned to all stations on the network. It must provide security at the physical layer. 
Because 802.16 MAC can take advantage of fragmentation and bandwidth allocation 
processes, it can serve to maximize the overall link efficiency, effectiveness, and 
flexibility (Eklund, et al., 103). Due to the characteristics of the 802.16 MAC, a similar 
control mechanism would be a desirable quality to incorporate into the Tactical Private 
Satellite Network. 
In terms of power and judging by mission, it will not only have to utilize a 
self-sustained power generator, due to existing conditions in the deployment area, such as 
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lack of or damaged terrestrial infrastructure, but also the capability to migrate to 
commercial power source when the power lines in the area can be found or restored. 
It is also prudent to recognize that such an empowered base station 
(Network, Management, and Control) forms a Single point of failure. Therefore, use of a 
Standby Hub Earth Station is necessary. It must be developed to have reduced capacity to 
take over in the event of a main control station failure. The main and stand by control 
stations will be connected to each other to maintain replication of pertinent database 
information at each site. 
As clearly perceived by the above requirements, NECOS will be responsible for 
the management of the total Tactical Private Satellite Network as a system. It will 
manage and control the system resources and provides overall system administrative 
functions. Overall and beyond the role of transmission and relay of communication (data 
channel function), as a communication gateway it will provide services, such as 
addressing and routing, information assurance, end-to-end QoS, and general network 
services to and across the Tactical Private Satellite Network as a type of Edge network.  
There is great value associated with the operation of such a multitasking and 
complete ground control station. Consequentially, a great number of attempts have been 
made to that direction by different military branches to guarantee the communication 
lines through satellite connections during their dispersed type of missions. The next few 
paragraphs will be a brief review of how two of the most relevant (to the type of missions 
examined here) commands intend to deal with the use of Tactical Satellite Networks in 
terms of establishing and managing them with the use of the proper gateways, or 
NECOS, for the purpose of this research. 
2. Comparison with Other Gateway Type Systems 
To build the C2 node on the battlefield, four things are needed: a network path, 
network services and capabilities, applications that write and provide those functions, and 
a number of sensors. Those four pieces must be sized or provisioned to any platform — 
whether a command post, an HMMWV, or a ship. This summarizes more or less the 
concept of a Communication Gateway (CGW) which is not new, but also not something 
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trivial to build and implement. Different military branches have evolved different CGW 
approaches to provide flexible communications networks for transition between 
stationary and maneuver operations. The use, however, of a CGW that includes satellite 
assets gives to the flexibility dimension a different and more powerful meaning. It 
supplies the mobile capability and, at the same time, provides an over-the-horizon 
capability to bring in a common operational picture to all units on the battlefield — no 
matter distance or different obstacles which interrupt or even forbid communication 
through the direct conventional communication lines. It provides the very last deployed 
unit with real-time information and, at the same time, enriches the holistic tactical picture 
of the stationary command posts which may be positioned hundreds of miles away from 
the area of current operations. The ultimate goal is the building of a Common Operational 
Picture (COP) and Situational Awareness (SA) access among geographically separated 
maneuvering forces and stationary C2 nodes. The goal is to empower the edges, but 
without depriving the command posts of real-time tactical picture of the deployed units. 
To that direction, the next paragraphs give a brief description of a few CGW 
systems with satellite connectivity that not only give to the warfighter real-time tactical 
information, but also provide access to DISN services (SIPRNET, NIPRNET, and 
Defense Switched Network voice traffic). The different aspects of each of them will be 
emphasized to form a clear picture of the individual advantages and disadvantages of 
those systems that facilitate and enhance dispersed tactical operations. 
a. Command and Control On-the-Move Network Digital Over-the-
Horizon Relay (CONDOR) – United States Marine Corps 
(USMC) 
CONDOR system is a bridge strategy that USMC has developed to get 
around C2 problems. To be more specific, the recent operations showed that there is a 
major problem with the dissemination of information around the battlefield using the 
tactical data radios, Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS), which 
limits the communication to line-of-sight distances. That proved to be a significant issue 
in operations, such as Iraqi Freedom where the units expanded 60 or 70 kilometers a day 
and, thus, broke that line of sight. Also, into a mountainous region, such as Korea, that 
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line of sight is constantly, due to terrain masses, being broken. As Col. Wilson stated, 
from the above needs, CONDOR emerged to bridge these EPLRS communities over a 
distance and fix the specific problem in the Marine Corps (qtd. in Lawlor). Simply put, 
CONDOR uses commercial off-the-shelf equipment to link existing Marine Corps radio 
systems and data networks and provides the over-the-horizon communications capability 
necessary to link EPLRS users. A great portion of the CONDOR system involves 
deploying mobile platforms that can use satellite links when terrestrial radio networks are 
out of range. This maintains situational awareness and connectivity to tactical data 
networks and applications. 
CONDOR was initially developed as a digital communications relay for 
On-the-Move/Over-the-Horizon (OTM/OTH) data communication, but it is more than 
that: it creates an in-theater commercial satellite intra-network to connect Below 
Regiment “On the pause” C2 Nodes and provides sustained SIPRNET connectivity 
throughout displacement (Wilson). More specifically, the requirements for building such 
a CGW system were: 
• Digital data transfer – Stationary to Maneuver C2: While Stationary 
Command Post locations (Brigade and Above) enjoy broadband digital transfer (up to 
Megabits per second (Mbps)), the maneuvering units (Brigade and Below) are reduced 
to less than 10% of this with tactical radios or L-band transceivers. 
• No New Radio Capabilities until JTRS: Joint Tactical Radio 
System (JTRS) will add the Wideband Networking Waveform (WNW) line of sight 
(LOS) radio capability but the estimated fielding of sufficient JTRS quantities is no 
earlier than 2015-2020. 
• OTM/OTH Issue: Users demand reliable COP and SA access 
between geographically separated Maneuvering forces that are similar in scope to 
Stationary C2 Nodes. 
• Platform Integration: C2 Nodes require integration for network 
services on multiple platforms. 
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• Military Satellite Bandwidth Saturated: The system can work with 
dedicated military satellites, but it needs to be able to route communications from 
existing EPLRS line-of-sight radio networks to available bandwidth from commercial 
satellites. 
The above requirements composed the ultimate goal of CONDOR which 
is to enhance SA for maneuvering elements while they are OTM and to provide a 
communications path to higher headquarters that is not constrained by LOS limitations 
and operates OTM. CONDOR capability sets include a Gateway which is a tactical 
vehicle providing OTH and on-the-move OTM digital communications to a maneuvering 
EPLRS data community; a CONDOR Point of Presence Vehicle (PoP-V) which is a 
tactical “Point of Presence” Vehicle providing OTH and OTM digital communications 
with Turbo Diesel Registers (TDR) and a CONDOR Jump C2 Variant (JC2-V). More 
specifically, the components of CONDOR system are: 
• CONDOR Gateway which connects Mobile C2 Networks OTH/OTM: 
It fits into a single transport box and allows Marines to take the information on an EPLRS 
radio off of the network in one location, move it through a router as an IP datagram, and 
pour it over a satellite link into another geographically separated EPLRS network. The 
prototype comprises an EPLRS radio, a router, and a command and control personal 
computer (C2PC) gateway tied into an Inmarsat radio that has an on-the-move antenna on 
top of the vehicle. At this point, this thesis needs to emphasize that CONDOR is 
technology agnostic and can rely on Inmarsat, Ku-band, Ka-band, Iridium, or any other 
technology for connectivity. 
• CONDOR Point of Presence (PoP-V) which enables the use of all 
Tactical Radios to enter C2 Mobile Networks for CONDOR access: The above gateway 
technique works for units that carry EPLRS radios, but not for the ones that do not have 
this equipment. In general, because these units are outfitted with legacy equipment, such 
as the Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS), HaveQuicks, 
high frequency automatic link establishment or tactical satellite Demand Access Multiple 
Access (DAMA) systems, a CONDOR point of presence was created to solve this 
problem. Its main function can be described as, in one hop, information from the sensor 
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or the shooter is taken to the CONDOR point of presence and from there to the regiment. 
The latter breaks it up and puts it into the major subordinate command so units have lots 
of bandwidth to move. With that, units are offloading the bandwidth-limited maneuver 
element command and putting all the information into the major subordinate command 
until it needs to come down and move to its recipient. More or less, “it’s a bandwidth 
multiplier on the battlefield,” as Colonel Wilson explains and, because the four legacy 
radios use the same waveforms that will be placed in the JTRS, the CONDOR point of 
presence is nothing more than the JTRS when it is available.  
• CONDOR Jump C2 Vehicle, which provides sustained SIPRNET 
connectivity throughout displacement: The final portion of the CONDOR effort envisions 
solving the communication problem that commanders face when they change locations. 
Nowadays, a commander must rely on single-channel radios or small satellite systems to 
maintain the common operational picture and command and control while in transit. To 
solve this problem, the CONDOR team developed the Jump C2 Vehicle concept. Secret 
Internet protocol router network and non-secure Internet protocol router network servers 
would be incorporated into the vehicle. When a commander must change locations, 
communications personnel would turn on these servers and synchronize them with the 
servers in the current command post. As a result, commanders would be able to continue 
to see databases and receive current information. 
As already mentioned, one of the biggest advantages of CONDOR is that 
it is technology agnostic and does not rely on a particular satellite technology for OTH 
communications. Any technology for connectivity is good either comes from military 
dedicated Ku- and Ka-band satellites or from commercial assets (Iridium, Inmarsat, and 
on). Thus, it deals even more effectively when military satellite bandwidth is not enough 
to cover every single military need. For the sake of military commanders, it also brings 
the benefits of using already existing commercial bandwidth. 
There are other benefits related to CONDOR. With the evolution of JTRS 
and CONDOR, JTRS would blend technologies in a hierarchical access fashion for both 
scalability and redundancy. This is similar to the design of a mesh network with multiple 
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communication hubs at multiple levels able to communicate with each other and to end 
nodes. If one or more hubs are lost, redundant paths are available to continue to carry 
traffic. CONDOR is designed to eliminate the single-point-of-failure problem by 
providing three different communications paths. This includes satellite bandwidth, 
UAVs, and ground relays (Mohney). 
It also demonstrates the potential option of using UAVs, such as the 
Predator, flying as an overhead relay. This is because, from an integration standpoint, 
CONDOR can be plugged into any vehicle the Marines operate — ranging from the 
simple Jeep to its next-generation high-speed amphibious fighting vehicle. 
In terms of network management, CONDOR uses the allocated 
commercial bandwidth, but without having the ability to interfere with management 
functions. The only efforts that have been made so far are to improve the quality of 
transmissions by removing the effects of disruption generated by the constant 
maneuvering of the units. To that direction, Disruption Tolerant Networking (DTN) is 
evolving to help maintain reliable communication across periods of unreliable 
connectivity through in-network store-and-forward. Its main strategy will be to 
incrementally move messages closer to the destination, with a technique called custody 
transfer, in a store-and-forward manner using local storage at intermediate nodes — 
instead of relying upon an end-to-end stable path — to ultimately deliver messages with 
reduced latency and higher throughput (Parikh and Durst, 1). Its main advantage is fully 
exploited for data transfers where the time-value of the information exceeds the durations 
of disruption. For the purpose of network management, DTN will be an automatic feature 
in the form of a gateway into the CONDOR units without leaving flexibility for other 
management functions. Figure 20 gives a brief picture of the CONDOR’s architecture 
and its main weaknesses. 
To summarize, CONDOR system demonstrates CGW capabilities that are 
desirable not only for the dispersed MSSC units operating under adverse conditions far 
away from their headquarters, but also for any kind of Tactical — military or not — 
situation where the need for high quality and constant communication lines cannot rely 
on existing terrestrial infrastructure. What makes it highly relevant to the subject of this 
 88
research is that it can use commercial satellite technologies without jeopardizing the 
security of the mission. From the network management perspective, the downside of 
CONDOR, as it appears so far, is that it does not give any management capabilities to its 
users when using commercial bandwidth and only works with the allocated portion. 
 
 
Figure 20.   CONDOR Architecture (from Durst et al., 2). 
 
b. Mobile SOCOM Strategic Entry Point (M-SSEP) – United States 
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) 
USSOCOM is one of the agencies that have understood the significance of 
having true global and uninterrupted communication coverage to expand the area of 
operations beyond the reach of one of the current six regional SSEP around the globe. For 
that reason, a new project has been initiated to evolve the M-SSEP (USSOCOM).  
 89
From a very first approach of the requirements specification document, the 
general description of the M-SSEP is a communications terminal that will support Special 
Operations Forces (SOF) that are unable to draw services (voice, video, and data) from 
one of six Regional SSEPs, or support surge operations, when an existing 
Gateway/Teleport or SSEP cannot support SOF assets deployed in theater. It will provide 
seamless access to government and commercial satellites operation in X, C, Ka, and Ku 
bands simultaneously. It envisions to provide SOF Commanders the ability to consolidate 
C4I transmission systems and services (Black/Red/Grey Voice, VTC, and Data) required 
by SOF through a theater SSEP during surge operations or when an existing gateway 
cannot support termination.  
More specifically, the M-SSEP can be deployed anywhere in the satellite 
footprint of the region requiring support. It shall support operations in a stand-alone 
configuration or co-located with a SSEP to provide SOF Information Enterprise (SIE) 
services to tactically deployed SOF. It will be developed with an EoIP (voice, video, and 
data). The M-SSEP will provide multiple interfaces for connectivity via commercial 
Circuits or DISN GIG. 
The following figure gives a rough picture of the architecture of a gateway 
such as M-SSEP. As it can be seen by the figure, M-SSEP shall be capable of terminating 
multiple satellites — a minimum of two per M-SSEP and a minimum of six networks per 
type of terminal. With that configuration, it will be able either to support surge operations 
and keep services locally in theater or to augment existing SSEP operations, but without 
providing services to local users. In either case, it shall interface with DISN GIG or 




Figure 21.   M-SSEP. 
 
In the first case, the new M-SSEP will be designed to provide services 
locally for M-SSEP management. The gateway shall have full LAN (management of M-
SSEP) and WAN system accreditations mirroring the existing SSEP. The operators will 
be able to manage the whole network in the area of operations without having to rely on 
the SSEP services. Thus, the Tactical Private Satellite Network that will be created for 
the purpose of a specific operation outside of the responsibility area of the existing SSEP 
will be entirely managed and integrated by the M-SSEP. For that reason, M-SSEP shall 
be designed so that deployed tactical users achieve “IP mobility” without system re-
configuration — no matter where they enter the SIE. 
For the second case, M-SSEPs shall be architected to provide connectivity 
to SSEPs and draw connectivity to services. It will augment the existing SSEP 
operations, but without providing services to local users apart from support of Red, 
Black, and Grey services for management and switching purposes only. Everything will 
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point to the SSEP. This is because the M-SSEP will bridge the different satellite 
footprints between the area of operations and the existing gateway with its two satellite 
dishes that will cover the two different spots. Figure 22 gives a picture of the above 
notion: 
 
Figure 22.   Notional MSSEP Deployment. 
 
The whole M-SSEP configuration is complemented by the easy 
deployable size of the gateway which can be lifted by six persons maximum. In lieu of 
local power, when or where required, the power generation capability is capable of self 
sustained power generation. 
The objectives need to be achieved without neglecting the risks —
especially where human lives are involved. Given that the potential successful 
implementation of that mobile gateway can cause saturation of the available satellite 
bandwidth in specific areas, M-SSEP may absorb the satellite bandwidth and leave other 
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users in the area (who have not subscribed but who have equally importance missions) 
without communications and connections to command posts. 
Another risk may involve the opposite result: over subscription of services 
at the SSEPs. Users may subscribe without having primary importance mission or they 
may ask for management services that may disorient the whole operation of the gateway. 
Due to the absence of a process for ordering, this may cause delays in responding to 
significant communication needs. 
Last, apart from the need for clear specifications that exist, such as time 
schedules, funding, and training, so far there is a lack of defined services to support the 
operators who will maintain the M-SSEP when deployment is necessary. 
As it can be easily perceived, the notion of M-SSEP project reflects and 
incorporates most of the attributes of a Tactical Private Satellite Network. It will be able 
to be deployed and to cover areas where the terrestrial infrastructure will be incompetent 
to cover the mission communication needs. It will act as the primary base station with full 
management capabilities without having the need to be physically in the imminent area of 
operations. This is because the collaborative satellite terminals will be there to re-
establish communication. It must be in the same satellite footprint with one of its dishes. 
Further, by acting as a relay station with advanced capabilities and with the help of the 
other dishes which will be in the same satellite footprint with the permanent gateway, it 
will have the ability to pass the whole control to the existing permanent gateways.  
The previously mentioned risks constitute areas of additional needed 
research for the correct implementation of M-SSEP. There is a potential “grey” area in 
cases where, in such a Tactical Private Satellite Network, non-military users need to 
subscribe to accomplish the mission. For M-SSEP, this is not the case. This is because its 
mission is clearly military-oriented, but, for the purpose of this research, a more flexible 
scheme with various level of confidentiality may need to be adopted. It is paramount to 
mention that M-SSEP will take under consideration the differentiations among different 
confidentialities (Black, Red, and Grey) so it may have the ability to be implemented 
when other governmental or NGOs participate in the operation. The final phase of 
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implementation of M-SSEP project, and its actual participation in the different 
operations, will reveal whether or not it is fully capable of forming and supporting 
Tactical Private Satellite Networks. 
From the above two paradigms, it is shown that the notion of a Tactical 
Private Satellite Network, and how can be managed without the need of any terrestrial 
infrastructure, has been in a field of experiments for many years. The products of these 
experiments are at the point of accreditation and implementation in the operational fields. 
Connecting the dispersed units through satellite assets is no longer enough for conducting 
the operations. The capability to manage these communication lines is also paramount to 
guarantee complete and acceptable connections among the units and between them and 
the GIG. 
Moving from the area of the conceptual requirements and design of a 
Tactical Private Satellite Network, the next chapter will examine the operational 
implementation of such a network in different situations, as relevant to its Tactical nature, 
and the contribution to the success of Net Centric Warfare operations. Different scenarios 
will be addressed and data of already conducted experiments will be cited to give 
understanding to  its significance as an enabler of reliable and complete communication 
lines — either in dispersed military operations or in non-military missions where they are 
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IV. ANALYSIS FOR OPERATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION OF 
THE TACTICAL PRIVATE SATELLITE NETWORK 
A. ANALYSIS FOR OPERATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
PRIVATE TACTICAL SATELLITE NETWORK IN SPECIFIC 
OPERATIONAL DOMAINS 
Up to this point, the concept of a Tactical Private Satellite Network has been 
defined, examples of networks have been provided from both the civilian and military 
domain, and the desired attributes for this type of network was examined as well. The 
continuation of this study will include an examination of the operational application and 
implementation of a Tactical Private Satellite Network in four different domains. First, 
employment of a Tactical Private Satellite Network within the context of an experimental 
environment, specifically in the CENETIX at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School and 
within the context of a MIO experiment, will be examined. Second, a conceptual 
application of the Tactical Private Satellite Network within the framework of 
maritime/naval operations will be examined. Third, an implementation in support of a 
ground combat application involving an evolutionary concept outlined the United States 
Marine Corps. Finally, an application of the Tactical Private Satellite network within the 
context of a Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HADR) scenario where the 
military will operate with OGAs, NGOs, Coalition partners, and Private Volunteer 
Organizations (PVOs) will be considered. 
1. Application of the Conceptual Framework of a Tactical Private 
Satellite Network in an Experimental Environment  
The U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, sponsors a 
CENETIX laboratory that focuses on the integration and networking of communications 
devices and sensors to create a shared network environment. A sub-set of the CENETIX 
functionality is the TNT, which is the physical network that CENETIX uses to conduct 
their experimentation. One of the major events run by CENETIX is the MIO experiments 
that test new operational concepts and devices (sensors and communications equipment) 
within the context of the MIO environment. Specifically, for the purpose of this section, 
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the MIO experiment conducted in March of 2008 will be the operational scenario that 
serves as the backdrop for the implementation and application of the Tactical Private 
Satellite Network in an experimental environment. The integration of the Tactical Private 
Satellite Network into the CENETIX lab and the TNT network will be examined in 
further detail later in this chapter. 
According to the final report issued by the CENETIX lab, the MIO 08-2 
experiment continues to build upon previous experiments to evaluate the use of networks, 
advanced sensors, and collaborative technology for rapid execution of MIO. Specifics 
include the ability for a Boarding Party to rapidly set up communications that facilitate 
the search for contraband — namely explosive or radiological material — as well as 
physical characteristics of target vessel crew members. Additionally, the maintenance of 
network connectivity with C2 organizations and collaborating with remotely located 
sensor experts, with the specific goal of exploring new sensor, networking, and 
situational awareness solutions for tagging, monitoring, and interdicting small craft, 
threatening the security of the coastal metropolitan areas (MIO 08-2 Final Report 16) are 
included.  
In general, the goal of the TNT network is to maximize information sharing 
between Boarding Parties and the Tactical Operations Centers (TOC) which serve as the 
major C2 nodes. The TNT network topology, depicted in Figure 23, consists of varied 
communications technologies that facilitate the information sharing between C2 nodes 
required by the operators conducting operations. The primary long haul means is done by 
numerous 802.16 WiMax Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM) links 
that connect the major C2 nodes, and serves as a transport for the smaller bandwidth 




Figure 23.   Overview of MIO 08-2 Communications Architecture  
(from MIO 0802 Final Report). 
 
In addition to the physical communications architecture, the TNT network that 
supports the MIO consists of a VPN that connects various entities within a secure 
environment by providing end to end encryption. This allows the TNT network to utilize 




Figure 24.   MIO Domestic and International Reach-Back Network Topology. 
 
Beyond the existing OFDM network, a satellite link was established for the 
purposes of experimentation and integration to take advantage of VSAT equipment that 
was procured by the CENETIX lab for said purposes. The equipment that was procured 
was the Swe-Dish IPT suitcase VSAT terminal. It is, hence, referenced as IPT. Initially, 
the operational configuration, as seen in Figure 25, was the initial plan for the experiment 
and was designed to provide access to Internet resources via commercial satellites as a 
redundant link to OFDM network. Support was received by the Swe-Dish IPT 
manufacturer for training of personnel on the operation of the terminal as well as the 
acquisition of satellite air time for the duration of the experiment. 
 99
 
Figure 25.   Original Swe-Dish Architecture. 
 
Because of the geographic dispersion of the satellite terminals during the 
experiment (one in Europe and two in the U.S.), a commercial ground station was 
planned to act as an intermediary between Internet services and the satellite terminals. 
For the two terminals in the San Francisco bay area, no ground station was needed 
because both were planned to work with the same satellite. The satellite that was used as 
the connection between the two nodes in California was the Galaxy 10R satellite. The 
Galaxy 10R satellite, launched in January 2000, is a telecommunications satellite located 
at 123 degrees west in geostationary orbit and operates in the C and Ku Frequency bands 
that provide coverage to North America (Satellite Fact Sheet; Galaxy 10R). Figure 26 
provides a graphic representation of the location of the Galaxy 10R satellite with relation 





Figure 26.   Location of Galaxy 10R Satellite (from http://www.n2yo.com/ ?s=26056). 
 
This backbone was designed to provide Internet access and reach-back capability 
for the various elements participating — either in the U.S. or abroad. Since the terminals 
could have provided reach-back on the TNT network, via a VPN connection, it was 
expected that the participating terminals could be monitored from a remote location, such 
as the NPS Network Operations Center (NOC). 
Since the IPTs had not been deployed within the context of this experimental 
environment previous to this, the particular management capabilities of the resident 
modem could not have been ascertained due to limited information on the new hardware. 
Discussions with the vendor were conducted to ascertain user management capability and 
rights. The critical factor pertaining to the IPT was the performance of the modem across 
the satellite link – remembering that there are several hops involved (through the ground 
station and into the public Internet) before reaching the other terminal. Within the context 
of system performance, it was desired to determine the amount of packets transmitted, 
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packets received, and packets lost across the length of the link (from terminal to terminal) 
since no more information, due to its proprietary nature, has been obtained about the 
capabilities of the embedded modem. The injection of this new system into the TNT 
network warranted study and consideration of performance on an active network with 
various types of traffic being transmitted. Until the beginning of the experiment, limited 
information had been received concerning the capabilities of the embedded modem and 
its compatibility with the current solution of SolarWinds (the primary network 
management tool utilized by the NPS NOC). This test had been conducted in a hospitable 
environment under optimal conditions. No matter how good the system performance 
matched the capability claimed, it is still recommended that further testing be conducted 
in other more realistic operational scenarios and under adverse environmental conditions. 




Figure 27.   Final IPT Satellite Communications Architecture in Support of MIO 08-2 
(from MIO 08-2 Final Report). 
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The connection with the Yerba Buena Island (YBI) IPT and the NOC were 
completed to observe the whole operation remotely from the CENETIX lab. Figure 28 




Figure 28.   Initial iSite Set up between NPS and YBI. 
 
From that specific software application, the ability was provided to monitor the 
performance of every node on the network by soliciting information by IP address of the 
modem. 
A fortunate mishap changed the initial scenario: the primary OFDM backbone 
failed during the height of the experiment. Therefore, the communications fell back to the 
designated backup link established between the IPTs. Figure 29 illustrates the restoration 
of transmission through the IPTs from the SolarWinds management console: 
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Figure 29.   Swe-Dish Takes over the Transmissions.  
 
Though the proprietary software, iSite monitoring of the throughput from both 
nodes (YBI and NPS), in terms of transmitting and receiving for a number of different 
packets (UDP, TCP, ICMP, IGMP, and HTTP) and the total one, was possible. Figures 
30 and 31 illustrate different time instances of monitoring the performance of IPT 
through the proprietary software. The upper node depicts YBI which is the one that was 
continually monitored as it was the only one that kept sending packets. The other node is 
the NPS NOC. The upper right screen illustrates what was being transmitted and the 
lower right one what was being received. As is easily shown, the vertical axis illustrates 
the speed of transmission/reception and the horizontal one shows the respective time 
instance. The different color lines illustrate the different packets that were traveling 
across the network at any given time. From the satellite provider, it was known that for 
the specific service a three MB pipe had been available. During the whole participation of 




Figure 30.   Web pages, GOOGLE Earth File and Groove are Going over. 
 
Figure 31.   Observations of Swe-Dish Performance. 
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Moreover, QoS for each type was also monitored. Figures 32 and 33 illustrate the 
QoS for each packet for the modem 192.168.99.18 (YBI) and 192.168.72.6 (NPS): 
 
Figure 32.   QoS for YBI Modem. 
 
 
Figure 33.   QoS for NPS Modem. 
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The above QoS parameters that are displayed on the iSite software are defined in 
accordance with the software developer’s use parameters, which were kept proprietary by 
the manufacturer. Figure 34 illustrates that transmission over the IPTs had been shut 
down. The overall performance of the two IPTs was commented as satisfactory and no 
problem in transmission was reported: 
 
 
Figure 34.   Shutting down of Transmissions: 14:29 (12 March 2008). 
 
The above experiment utilized only two VSATs and the services provided by the 
IPT manufacturer. Still, it demonstrated the major benefits that satellite communications 
can bring to the experimentation field. It had less specific measurements than a complete 
experiment because experiments additionally involve establishing some level of control 
and also manipulating one or more factors of interest to establish or track cause and effect 
(Alberts and Hayes, Codes of Best Practice experimentation, 19). Even acting as a 
“sidekick” of the OFDM backbone and with the constrained abilities to only monitor 
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(measure) the overall operation of the network, the two VSATs managed to undertake 
successfully the whole volume of the communications. They dynamically formed an ad 
hoc network which consisted of these two terminals and, at the same time, with their 
proprietary software, provide the operators at both ends with a clear picture of that 
network’s properties. SolarWinds completed the picture for the rest of the nodes which 
participated as if nothing has happened to the primarily OFDM backbone. By moving 
few steps ahead, the complete implementation of the Tactical Private Satellite Network 
would facilitate further experimentation in two important ways. First, the Tactical Private 
Satellite Network will provide an alternate communications path that can be used to 
connect different experimentation sites and serve, as seen in the MIO case study 
presented previously, as a redundant communications link. Additionally, if 
experimentation sites are located within the same satellite footprint, such as locations 
within same continent (i.e., New York and California), then the satellite network can 
expand the overall reach of the test network and allow for the inclusion of more sites in 
different locations. The Tactical Private Satellite Network can also expand the ability to 
incorporate different types of platforms into the test network. For instance, the proper 
implementation and integration of this satellite network aboard surface naval vessels and 
other watercraft that would normally operate out of range of traditional LOS transmission 
means would serve to enable a variety of different types of experiments that would 
ultimately provide a more robust test and experimentation network. 
The second way in which the implementation of the Tactical Private Satellite 
Network would benefit the experimental community is that, due to the ever-increasing 
amount of satellite communications that is being utilized by the military and other 
governmental agencies, the satellite network would provide a ready network for users 
with a “plug and play” capability. This would happen in much the same way that the 
OFDM network already employed by the CENETIX/TNT lab provides to 
experimentation today. Therefore, specific applications and information exchange 
requirements that are identified to be met by satellite communications can be tested on a 
real-time satellite network. Other issues relating to the satellite-based networks — 
network management, performance of networking protocols, specific hardware and  
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software applications, and associated issues — can be tested in an environment that 
would provide more accurate information. Test results could then be obtained by 
simulation alone. 
During the events associated with the CENETIX MIO 08-2 experiment, it was 
proven that commercially available VSATs are capable of handling the amount and types 
of traffic that would be found on the modern battlefield. The IPTs that were employed 
during the MIO successfully transmitted a variety of TCP/IP-related traffic through a 
commercial communication satellite in geostationary orbit with little to no degradation in 
service noticed by the users. The proprietary software that was included with the 
terminals allowed network managers to view the performance characteristics of modems 
embedded in the other terminals on the network. Managers, however, are limited to 
viewing performance and are left with no ability to remotely conduct troubleshooting or 
remote manipulation of the operating parameters of the modems. The network managers 
were able to use a commercial product, SolarWinds, to view the types of traffic traversing 
the network and use those statistics to make informed decisions with regard to the health 
of the satellite link. Ultimately, a desired quality of the Tactical Private Satellite Network 
is for the NECOS that is operating the network base station to have the ability to remotely 
manage and view the performance of the embedded modems. It is also desirable that the 
network managers and operators have the ability to remotely manage the network devices 
that are located off of subordinate terminals within the same domain/network. This 
remote management will be explored in greater detail in Chapter V. 
In summary, the implementation of the satellite communications network during 
MIO 08-2 utilizing the Swe-Dish IPT VSAT proved that the basic concept of the Tactical 
Private Satellite Network is viable — not only from an operational perspective, but also 
from the perspective of an experimentation and test environment. The employment of this 
network has illustrated advantages and limitations of such system, but the overall result 
has been positive. There are presently some issues relating to the management of the 
actual iDirect modem that is embedded within the terminal, but other methods of 
management can be used to address the network components that are directly connected 
to the satellite dish. The implementation of the Tactical Private Satellite Network within 
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the context of the CENETIX/TNT network would serve to provide a more robust 
communications environment and facilitate the test and evaluation of current and future 
applications and satellite communications-related research. 
Considering that the concept of the Tactical Private Satellite Network has been 
implemented, tested, and proven in laboratory environment, the following sections will 
examine the implementation and integration of the Tactical Private Satellite Network 
within different operational scenarios. The scenarios that will be examined are a maritime 
case, the operational implementation within the United States Marine Corps, specifically 
the SCMAGTF, within the context of a coalition environment, and, finally, how the 
Tactical Private Satellite Network facilitates Network Centric Operations will also 
explored. 
2. Analysis for Implementation and Application of Tactical Private 
Satellite Networks in the Maritime Domain 
One area that most benefited from the implementation of a Tactical Private 
Satellite Network is the maritime domain, where satellite communications is a widely 
used commonality. It would be trivial and out of the scope of this research to analyze the 
reasons behind using satellite communications aboard naval vessels operating all over the 
world. More or less, maritime units can resemble dispersed ground units or generally 
mobile nodes operating far away from their base. Back in 1959, Chief of Naval 
Operations, Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, had already recognized the value of satellite 
communications and wrote a memo to fleet commanders saying: "The use of satellites for 
naval purposes is going to come about in a few years: the necessity for close coordination 
of things pertaining to space with other naval functions will become increasingly 
important"(Burke). Today, with the shifting of the Navy to a net centric environment, 
Admiral Burke's direction is equally relevant. 
In such an increasingly complex environment as the one that Navy operates there 
is a great demand for speed of decision and precision together with persistence in action. 
Assured access to space capabilities will give decision-makers the advantages of speed 
and persistence to respond to the full range of military operations. For that reason, net 
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centric operations rely on satellites as the communication backbone to integrate huge 
volumes of data from widely dispersed decision makers. 
While there is wide usage of satellite capabilities in the global maritime domain in 
terms of communication and accurate positioning systems, there are even more in the 
Navy operational domain where space capabilities, such as satellite communications, 
ISR, Global Positioning System, and missile warnings are the backbone of the modern 
operational net centric environment. Especially for operations at sea, often SATCOM is 
the only way to provide reliable, global communications in a timely manner. Apart from 
the profound lack of terrestrial infrastructure and the highly mobile nature of naval 
operations, the rest of available means of communications have inherent limitations: high 
frequency radio lacks the reliability and the capacity required for military operations and 
line of sight radios have neither the range required nor the ability to operate in all 
topographical areas. To that direction, naval operations either independently, or as a part 
of Joint operations, have included the concept of being connected with the other assets — 
terrestrial, aerial, and maritime — through commercial or military satellites as depicted in 
Figures 35 and 36: 
    
Figure 35.   Satellite Communications in Joint Operations. 
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Figure 36.   Satellite Communications in Pure Maritime Environment. 
 
Especially in terms of using commercial satellites, naval operations and the whole 
maritime community have been provided with good communications links to ships at sea. 
Satellite communication systems, such as Inmarsat, Iridium, and Intelsat have been 
leasing their services by connecting their proprietary GEO or LEO satellites to the ships. 
Links, using their on-board compatible VSAT type devices, connect the ship to a land-
based point of presence to the respective nation’s telecommunications system. Figure 37 
depicts the topography of Challenge Athena. This is a project of Intelsat to provide 
communications to large ships having large antennas, large bandwidth, Internet/Sailor 
phones, and two-way communications: 
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Figure 37.   Challenge Athena Topography. 
 
Of course, in the above commercial-based implementations, the vessels 
participate in a Satellite Network without the capability to manage it. They cannot detect 
and repair potential failures or guarantee QoS. The sole users’ interaction with the 
network is the initial leasing of the required lines. Management functionalities remain on 
the contractor side that is responsible for the overall operation of the network. 
As in all the other military operations, the mobility and time constraints of the 
naval operations, along with the security implications, would require a more independent 
type of management for the network inside the allocated bandwidth framework from the 
contractor. To that direction, naval operations would benefit from the implementation of 
a Tactical Private Satellite Network for more optimum utilization and management of the 
satellites resources that would have been assigned for a specific mission. The following 
paragraph refers to a very generic — and by no means exclusive — scenario of naval 
operations where the merits of a Tactical Private Satellite Network are demonstrated 
when satellite communications are the only means of information dissemination among 
the vessels. The vessels conduct and the ground headquarters supervise and coordinate 
the specific mission. 
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a. Description of the Scenario: “Sailing Overseas”  
Naval vessels have often been characterized as a powerful means of 
diplomacy around the globe. This is especially true today: naval forces have been called 
to undertake missions in every sea corner of the world to enforce UN regulations for the 
peace and prosperity of all nations. Consequently, it is not unusual for large battle groups, 
formed by allied forces, to operate in areas where either there is no infrastructure in the 
mainland or it is not available. In these areas, the naval vessels are required to conduct a 
great number of — defensive or offensive — missions without having the luxury of 
nearby headquarters or land communication facilities to transmit, receive, and 
disseminate information that is critical to operational flexibility or to global awareness. 
Furthermore, for the sake of other operational areas, the saturation of military bandwidth 
may also deprive them of relying upon military secured and guaranteed proprietary 
satellite networks. For that purpose, the implementation of a commercial satellite to 
satisfy the communication needs of such a naval force is crucial. The overall capability of 
managing it can further benefit the conduction of the mission. 
A proposed scenario of the naval operation dictates that the battle group is 
deployed: to conduct MIO operations 20 miles away off the coastal line of X country 
with a very unstable government where civil war is taking place and the human rights of 
the citizens are being violated. The ultimate purpose of the mission is to forbid vessels 
with dangerous cargos (guns of any kind) to penetrate the sea line of surveillance and 
hand them to adversaries on either side; food supplies and medical provisions of any kind 
are to be directed to specific ports of a nearby country for accurate enumeration and 
proper dissemination to the UN representatives. 
As easily understood, an overt mission, such as the above, requires a great 
deal of information and knowledge flow from the battle group to the directive 
headquarters, and vice versa, to guarantee a clear operational picture of both sides. The 
headquarters needs an accurate naval picture of what “sails” in the assigned territory and 
what actions have been taken to divert vessels or to conduct boarding operations on them. 
Eventually, the headquarters needs an accurate picture of every vessel sailing in the area 
with its proper classification. On the other hand, the battle group commander needs real-
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time information for what to expect in the area. The commander also needs fast responses 
to his inquiries about the documentation of the Contacts of Interest (COI) which the ships 
challenge to identify them. 
Such dual directional lines of communications do not suffice with voice 
data. Pictures and documents need to be disseminated. There needs to be collaboration 
with other civilian authorities, such as port captains or companies’ representatives, to 
establish and deliver proper clarifications to all sides. For the UN and military 
participants, time means lives. For the companies that own the ships, time also means 
money. Implementing a robust satellite network, in the form of a Tactical Private Satellite 
Network with the capability of proper management, seems an ideal — if not the only — 
solution for the overall success of the operation. 
b. Depiction of the Application and Benefits of Implementing the 
Tactical Private Satellite Network within the Context of the MIO 
Environment 
Such an ad hoc and extremely mobile network can easily take on the 
definition of a Tactical Private Satellite Network. A mobile base station with control and 
management capabilities on the network can bridge the gap between the dispersed naval 
units and provide the global awareness, operational flexibility, and information exchange 
required. It can help in the procedure of taking real-time decisions and dynamically 
reposition the units on the sea terrain. It can further allow the unscheduled addition of 
terrestrial nodes, such as the nearby country’s station, in the network without degradation 
of the overall performance or problems in the authorization of the additional nodes. 
This empowered base station, which resembles the above M-SSEP, can act 
as a hub to the linked network. If this work gives the modularity of Barabasi (Barabasi,  
230) to this experiment’s battle group and cluster of nodes, then the hub (base station) 
can link this module with the rest of the communication world —in this case, potentially 
the GIG — and establish a well-connected network with scale-free topology attributes 
(Barabasi, 87). This CGW can be stationed either aboard the command ship or ashore at 
the nearest friendly country. 
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In the first case of being placed aboard the command ship, the satellite 
footprint can easily cover a large area — enough to include friendly territories where 
their terrestrial infrastructure can be used for further connection to the GIG. Depending 
on where the area of operations is, the footprint can also cover alliance’s major 
telecommunication centers which can complete the dissemination. 
In the second case, as mentioned above, because of the size of its satellite 
footprint, the coverage of the sea area of operations will not be a problem — even if the 
nearest land is 200 miles away. Thus, the mobile ground station (or CGW) will be able to 
operate and, simultaneously, be secure from adversaries’ hostilities. From there, the 
existing terrestrial infrastructure will undertake the burden of integrating the 
communication lines and completing the loops. 
In any of the above cases, and for the sake of survivability of that network, 
a secondary hub will be needed to guarantee the scale-free topology of the proposed 
network. Consequently, in the case of removing the primary hub, the linked network will 
not collapse. The role of a secondary hub can be undertaken by the ground station or the 
command ship when they do not have the role of the primary hub. Moreover, the major 
units — maritime or terrestrial — must be equipped with VSATs to complete the Tactical 
Private Satellite Network.  
The overall management of the network, though centralized from the base 
station, can further adopt a hybrid form by decentralizing sub modules and deploying 
smart agents to collect the data from the managed objects and report to the base stations. 
This simulates Remote Monitoring (RMON) functionality. 
The proposed connectivity without any technical specifications is depicted 
below in Figure 38. On the figure potential CGWs have been identified and noted and 
possible communication lines (satellite or not) have been drawn. The design is by no 
means exclusive; rather, it represents potential connections for the given scenario. 
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Figure 38.   Maritime MIO Scenario. 
 
Such self-dependent connectivity will bring a number of benefits to the 
mission through the abrupt communications lines among the participants. It will give the 
network the overall flexibility of self-managing and self-forming within the assigned 
boundaries of the allocated bandwidth. Inside these boundaries, the network manager can 
allocate the bandwidth to the individual units in accordance with their specific needs.  
Furthermore, collaborations tools will be deployed on a controlled basis so 
as not to consume valuable bandwidth during critical time windows. Faults inside the 
network can be tracked and repaired in a timelier manner rather than relying on a 
provider with multiple priorities. Managers and agents will be deployed in accordance 
with the specific needs of the network and aimed at specific components of QoS. 
As mentioned above, on the tactical level, because of fast and accurate 
exchange of information, timely decisions will be made. Knowledge from experts will be 
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recruited from other continents for the benefit of the mission. Headquarters and on-scene 
units will share the same tactical picture and acquire SA at all levels. 
In conclusion, the overall product will be a well-designed Net Centric 
flavor mission. It will not only send accurate pictures to headquarters, but it will properly 
distribute the power to the Edge (in this case, to the battle group commander). The 
robustness of the network will give him the assurance of connectivity with all levels. It 
will let him make decisions on an operational level free from any communication 
constraints. It will further assist him by pulling the proper information when needed 
rather than waiting for an abundance of data — relevant or not — to be pushed at him. 
3. Application of the Conceptual Framework of a Tactical Private 
Satellite Network in the Context of the United States Marine Corps 
Security Cooperation MAGTF 
The third operational implementation of the Tactical Private Satellite Network 
that will be examined is within the context of the newly established operational concept 
for the United States Marine Corps — the SC MAGTF. The concept of the SC MAGTF 
was brought forth by Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps in January 2008. According to 
this new doctrine, the Marine Corps’ new operational concept is focused toward the 
establishment of a global, persistent forward presence tailored to build and enhance 
security while adapting the existing force structure and creating new capabilities 
(Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps 6). The creation of this operating concept, and the 
genesis of the SC MAGTF, provides an excellent opportunity to overlay the architecture 
of the Tactical Private Satellite Network onto this new operational concept. The SC 
MAGTF will provide the regional Combatant Commander with a flexible expeditionary 
force that will serve to further augment existing Marine Corps capabilities (Headquarters, 
U.S. Marine Corps 18). Therefore, it is crucial to understand the operational concept and 
the support that the Tactical Private Satellite Network provides. 
For the purposes of this examination, the following scenario is illustrated. The SC 
MAGTF is deployed to varied locations on the African continent providing a forward 
presence and engaging in variety of mission profiles. Figure 39 illustrates the operational 
dispersion of the SC MAGTF. Specifically, the headquarters of the SC MAGTF  
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is located, with subordinate units, in Rota, Spain. For the purpose of this example  
these are located in Ghana, Nigeria, and Kenya.  
 
 
Figure 39.   Concept of SC MAGTF Employment (from http://www.marine-corps-
association.com/gazette/jun08_fighting_the_long_war.asp). 
 
One of the methods crucial for the success of SC MAGTF operations is that the 
elements of the SC MAGTF are globally connected. These forward operating Marine 
units that are operating in remote locations will require a robust information system that 
will transmit, receive, and disseminate information critical to global awareness and 
operational flexibility (Headquarter, U.S. Marine Corps, 32). The implementation of the 
Tactical Private Satellite Network can bridge the gap between the headquarters element 
and the dispersed units. It also can provide the global awareness, operational flexibility, 
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and information exchange required. The hub, or base station, for the Tactical Private 
Satellite Network would be located where the SC MAGTF headquarters is located. For 
this illustration in Rota, Spain, and the subordinate units deployed to Ghana, Nigeria, and 
Kenya (as outlined in the operational concept) employment would be compatible to 
VSAT terminals. A sample architecture that would support the SC MAGTF is illustrated 
in Figure 40: 
 
 
Figure 40.   Sample Network Architecture for Security Cooperation MAGTF. 
 
Within this operational concept, and in adherence to the technical and physical 
description of the Tactical Private Satellite Network that has been illustrated in previous 
chapters of this work, the headquarters element operating the network base station can 
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control the parameters of the network, such as bandwidth allocation between terminals. It 
can also have the ability to remotely manage network devices located at subordinate 
units. This network entry point would be providing access for each of the subordinate 
units to the satellite network as well as providing access to information services, such as 
C2 information (Common Operational Picture, logistics information, and on), electronic 
mail, web-based services (HTTP, HTTPS), and other types of information services that 
are required by the subordinate units. Therefore, with the implementation of this network, 
each of the subordinate units deployed to the various locales around the continent would 
have reliable network connectivity with the satellite network functioning as the 
transmission medium. Of course, the headquarters element and the subordinate units all 
must fall within the footprint of the same geostationary satellite. Should there be an 
operational scenario in which the headquarters and subordinate units do not fall within 
the footprint of the same satellite, then some hybrid network must be engineered to 
provide connectivity. An examination of this concept is outside the scope of this 
particular work. Access to the satellite link as a backbone can be achieved through the 
implementation of some wideband networking medium — either cable or through the use 
of the popular 802.16 WiMAX standard — to extend services even further down the 
command echelon. 
There are several benefits of implementing the Tactical Private Satellite Network 
within the context of the SC MAGTF. One of the main challenges of having small units 
dispersed over a large area is that information exchange becomes more difficult. This is 
because traditional communications, usually found at lower echelons, are relegated to 
man pack UHF tactical satellite or HF single channel radio — both of which are not able 
to provide broadband data connectivity. The Tactical Private Satellite Network can 
provide the required connectivity to address the increased information exchange 
requirements that would be necessary to facilitate the types of operations illustrated here. 
The access to biometric data, COP data, and other relevant information on a scale not 
seen before can enhance the operational effectiveness of company-level organizations. 
Another benefit of implementing this network is the ability to remotely manage network 
components. This is especially important because skilled network technicians are 
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relatively low density and found mostly at the headquarter level. Therefore, the ability to 
remotely manage the subordinate network devices reduces the impact on personnel 
structure while still providing reliable network connectivity and performance required. 
4. Analysis for Implementation and Application of Tactical Private 
Satellite Networks in the Coalition Environment  
a. Definition of a Coalition 
Coalition is defined as “a temporary alliance of distinct parties, persons, or 
states for joint action” (Merriam Webster’s, 237). According to this definition, the 
important characteristics of a coalition are the following (Zeber et al., 3): 
• Temporary: The coalition is formed for a finite time. After that it 
ceases to exist. The lifetime of the coalition depends on the nature of the action for which 
it was formed. 
• Distinct parties: The coalition members are independent parties who 
join the coalition voluntarily, but continue to maintain their individual autonomy. One of 
the parties, however, may act as the coalition leader by the mutual consent of the 
coalition members.  
• Joint action: The coalition is formed for a distinct purpose that 
presumably could not be achieved by individual action or is achieved more effectively by 
joint action. Autonomous members acting in concert to achieve a common objective 
implies that there is a need to share information to support the joint action. The nature of 
the information sharing will depend on the coalition and its purpose. 
The above characteristics can be mapped to the fundamental concepts of 
the Tactical Private Satellite Network. The tactical aspect goes well with the temporary 
nature of the coalition because the overall cooperation lasts only for a limited time and it 
is mission specific. On the other hand, the distinct parties that come together form a 
private network and the joint characteristic is the fundamental concept of network. They 
form a network to achieve their common goal and they are the only ones who participate 
in it. 
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A coalition need not be political or military. It could exist in any 
environment, such as a civil or commercial environment, as long as the above 
characteristics apply. But what really differentiates the coalitions that are intended for 
utilization is the dynamic nature of the Tactical Private Satellite Network. Such a 
coalition, whose membership changes over the lifetime of the coalition, is considered a 
dynamic coalition. A coalition may also be considered dynamic by including mobile 
infrastructure elements that reconfigure from time to time to meet new requirements. In 
general, a dynamic coalition is assumed to include both a dynamic membership and a 
dynamic configuration. Further classification for the sake of this research will be made to 
differentiate two kinds of dynamic coalitions with respect to their roles and participants: the 
strict military coalition and the one formed under the pressure of an emergency situation 
during peace time. 
A strict military coalition is a temporary alliance of nations. They contribute 
military forces to support a joint military operation. A typical multinational military coalition 
scenario involves the deployment of a multinational Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) 
comprising the land, sea, and air forces of the coalition member nations in a hostile region. 
Their mission is strictly military and involves only military personnel, or other relevantly 
classified and recruited, to achieve their mission. Their main difference from the above 
military examples is the plethora of different nations and branches that participate and 
sensors that can be utilized. Figure 41 depicts such a dynamic military coalition. 
The other type of dynamic coalition, to be examined in more detail, is the one 
formed when first responders to disasters usually need rapid deployment of military, police, 
fire, and medical units to disaster sites and the establishment of local command posts. Non-
government organizations can also participate for the benefit of the whole mission. 
Coordination is required among all of the deployed first responder units and the command 
posts, as well as with other civilian groups, such as industrial building owners, and 
government organizations, such as municipal utilities. Those different participants with their 
sensors, and their relationships among each other, form an ERN which must be implemented 
fast and managed accurately to maximize the results of the efforts of its participants — 
human lives.  
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If the lack of any friendly terrestrial infrastructure is added to the above 
characteristics of the two different situations, then the satellite communication channels seem 
the most — if not the only — reliable solution for the successive implementation of the ERN. 
 
 
Figure 41.   Dynamic Coalition Operational Scenario (from Zeber et al., 6). 
 
b. Analysis for Implementation of the Tactical Private Satellite 
Network in an ERN  
ERNs are formed in specific areas which suffered a major disaster to 
ensure public safety by addressing different emergencies. When a disaster or crisis 
situation occurs, communications are frequently incapacitated, non-existent, or 
completely destroyed. The disaster could cover a small geographic regions or a large one. 
Depending on the volume of the disaster, usually multiple countries offer their help to 
cover the area to maximize the outcome of the suffered country’s efforts. Generally, the 
first order of business after a disaster is to send relief workers into the affected region and 
to establish communications links for them to communicate with the central relief agency 
and between themselves. By keeping in mind the most probable degradation and 
destruction — or absence — of terrestrial infrastructure, satellites services, with their 
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wide geographic coverage (including oceans and seas), are reliable and offer quick 
deployment. They appear as ideal solutions for relief operations. The outcome, however, 
of all these different countries’ and agencies’ efforts that participate in that joint 
operation under the same footprint of a satellite create a great challenge for the network 
manager of that newborn ERN. 
Instead of creating an imaginary scenario, the ERN that was formed after 
the major tsunami disaster on December 2004, due an Indian Ocean earthquake with an 
epicenter off the West coast of Sumatra in Indonesia, will be used. This earthquake 
triggered a series of devastating tsunamis along the coasts of most landmasses bordering 
the Indian Ocean. More than 225,000 people in eleven countries were killed and it 
inundated coastal communities with waves up to 100 feet high (Wikipedia.) The need for 
humanitarian help was urgent, not only to provide medical care to the thousands of 
wounded persons, but also to the governmental services, such as public hygiene and 
transportation, to recover and reassume their duties to relieve the damaged areas. As 
mentioned above, the first to arrive in the area with the medical personnel were the relief 
workers to establish communication lines and to connect the different rescue teams 
among each other and with the rest of the world. 
Intelsat was one of the companies that arrived in the area and constructed 
a Tactical Satellite Network with successful results: it managed to quickly provide 
complete communication lines to the relief teams (Somji). Following his presentation, as 
a regional marketing manager of Asia Pacific Intelsat to UNESCAP, it can be seen that 
they engineered the whole situation. They divided the whole operation into three phases 
and evolved their Tactical Satellite Network accordingly. 
At the first stage the first wave of relief personnel arrived on site and 
operated in total uncertainties. For that reason, they were best served by personal mobile 
satellite (Thuraya, Inmarsat, etc.) while the company’s personnel were developing the 
tactical Satellite Network. 
Consequently, at the second stage, two to three weeks after the disaster, 
when small camps started to develop requiring ‘thin-route’ data/voice connectivity 
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64/128kbps with <1.8mtr antennas, the newborn Tactical Satellite Network was ready to 
accommodate their needs. Figure 42 depicts the initial shape of the network which was 
characterized as the transport phase: 
 
 
Figure 42.   UNHCR Tsunami Relief Network – Transport  
(From Intelsat Presentation to UNESCAP). 
 
As in any dynamically-formed network, that was not the final form. By 
continuously evolving the network, they moved to the third stage six to twelve weeks 
after disaster when larger, permanent relief camps and offices developed. At this stage, 
agencies, such as UNDP, UNICEF, etc. with larger staff, required bandwidth to satisfy 
applications (PeopleSoft, Telemedicine, Video Conf, and on) between 512k and 
2048kbps. For that reason, the network expanded in order to accommodate the growing 





Figure 43.   UN IBM Tsunami Relief Network – Application. 
 
The Overall management of the Satellite Network was conducted by the 
teleport in Germany. According to the company, the teleport acted as CGW and covered 
the specific satellite with no notable problems. Though a non-mobile base station and far 
away from the area of interest, this teleport was able to manage this ad hoc and dynamic 
network because of the large footprint of the satellite. It brought communication services 
into an area where the terrestrial infrastructure had almost completely been damaged.  
Looking outside the box of the specific company, most of the benefits of 
using such a Tactical Satellite Network for the developing of ERNs can be identified. The 
following are worth repeating: 
• Cost efficiency because of the company’s shared hubs and the 
scaleable space segment because the Service Providers (SP) bought the capacity they 
needed.  
• Flexibility to deploy multiple scalable networks leveraging company’s 
hubs and teleport facilities in C- and Ku-Bands. 
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• Rapid deployment because of the pre-configured hubs and rapidly 
deployable equipment.  
• Quality of Service and Reliability as defined by the SP and guaranteed 
by the company because of its global experience; the operated Hubs and Teleports with 
built-in redundancies and the complete 24/7 management & monitoring of the platform 
with Level 2, 3 Helpdesk support. 
The major difference that the above scenario demonstrates is, compared to 
previous ones, that the network management was executed by the provider of the satellite 
bandwidth. In a Tactical Private Satellite Network, however, the management will be 
executed by a coalitions’ designated network manager. As mentioned, the main reason 
behind a Private network is that keeping the network management “in house” allows 
better monitoring with more details and focus on the critical aspects specific to the 
operation. Although a major provider has the ability to conduct network management, 
this is not its only priority when its services are being shared among different companies 
with different interests. Network management can be the major task of a mobile base 
station, deployed by the coalition forces, which can be deployed in the same satellite 
coverage area with the coalition forces and oversees the proper operation of the different 
participants. Of course, managing such an ad hoc and dynamic network is challenging, 
but the end products of self managing specific aspects would compensate for the 
overhead of management. 
In summary, the central problem for any coalition — especially the 
dynamic ones — is sharing information and infrastructure services efficiently and 
securely. Control over a member’s infrastructure and information must be maintained by 
the member. Also, the information needed to support the coalition operation must be 
provided to other coalition members in a timely and secure manner (Zeber et al., 5). 
Coalition operations require the flexibility to rapidly and securely reconfigure networks 
and user nodes in real-time and according to its specific needs. Adopting the concept of a 
Tactical Private Satellite Network and deploying a base station which can conduct the 
above ad hoc management functions, network management can be more effective and 
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solve faster and more adequate connectivity problems that coalition’s forces may 
experience in such an “adverse” communications environment.  
Overall, it may be said that all the above scenarios demonstrated many common 
characteristics. For this reason, many of the benefits that a Tactical Private Satellite 
Network can bring are also applicable to all of them. Above all, ability to manage their 
own network through advanced control stations and remotely managed network 
components can guarantee reliable network connectivity and performance required for 
the conduct of the operations. These commonalities are also the fundamental reasons that 
the above scenarios can be considered as different flavors of the newly-born nature of 
operations; Network Centric Warfare. 
B. PRIVATE TACTICAL SATELLITE NETWORK AS AN ENABLER TO 
NET CENTRIC WARFARE 
Net Centric Warfare is characterized by the ability of geographically 
dispersed forces (consisting of entities) to create a high level of shared 
battlespace awareness that can be exploited via self-organization and other 
network centric operations to achieve commanders’ intent (Alberts et al., 
Network Centric Warfare, 88). 
The above statement is used more frequently today as the Information Age where 
the concept of Net Centric Warfare (NCW), or Net Centric Operations (NCO), has 
arrived. When NCO are applied to operations other than war, it is ubiquitous and 
provides a new conceptual framework with which to examine military missions, 
operations, and organizations. It is used in everyday life, either in DoD or in business 
operations, and is based on IT-enabled connection among different entities — static or 
on–the- move — in different places. It enables the collaboration among the participants 
and optimizes the results of the processes. All the examples in this chapter — military or 
civilian — are nothing more than net centric operations where the net, or the web, is 
made by the different participating entities (nodes) through the connecting 
communications lines (links). It is that connectivity which constitutes the physical 
domain of NCO — one of its fundamental characteristic: “All elements of the force are 
robustly networked achieving secure and seamless connectivity and interoperability”  
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(Alberts et al., Understanding Information Age Warfare, 57). Having assured networking 
in the physical domain, NCW can move to its informational and cognitive domains and 
unfold its virtues. 
Forming knowledgeable geographically-dispersed forces requires effective 
linking among the different entities. And this “effective linking” is the ultimate goal of 
the Tactical Private Satellite Network. By managing the network according to its specific 
needs, a robust, high-performance information infrastructure can be established that 
provides all elements of the warfighting enterprise — or the disaster response — with 
access to high quality information. The whole NCW concept is built around the concept 
of sharing information and assets which can be enabled only by efficient networking 
which links battlespace entities together to increase warfighting effectiveness. This 
allows commanders to get more use out of their entities (Alberts et al., Network Centric 
Warfare, 94). Consequently, it is the degree to which force entities are networked that 
determines the quality of information that is available to various forces and their ability to 
interact in the information domain. For that reason, the quality of networking is the basis 
of NCW’s infostructure and one of the tenets of NCW. It provides the basis of value 
chain stretching from a set of specific force capabilities to operational effectiveness and 
abilities (Alberts and Hayes, Power to the Edge, 100-1). 
The conceptual framework that employs these tenets is depicted in Figure 44. 
From the figure, it is derived that this quality of network determines crucial attributes of 
NCW and further enables operational characteristics, such as the degree of shared 
information or the quality of Interactions. Thus, without the proper quality of networking, 
the whole concept of NCW jeopardizes its existence and takes the mission back to the 
age of Industrial Revolution, when dispersed units remained dispersed and the 
commanders had to centralize the power, and their units, to drive successful mission. 
Without NCW, no decentralization can be achieved and no COP can be acquired among 
the different dispersed participants. 
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Figure 44.   Network Centric Warfare Conceptual Framework  
(From Alberts and Hayes, 100). 
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The whole conceptual framework for the Tactical Private Satellite Network is to 
enable NCW and NCO without having to rely on terrestrial infrastructure or 
intermediaries who manage the network without having specific interests in it. It 
envisions giving the power to the operating forces and the power to the edge to manage 
and optimize the network’s connectivity for the best mission. Its global coverage that can 
be achieved via the satellite needs no existing terrestrial infrastructure and its private 
nature (managed by the people who participate) aims to create robust communication 
lines among OTM-dispersed geographical units, between each other, and with their 
headquarters. This creates effective flow of the critical information that tactical networks 
handle. The empowered base stations could be the aggregated manager that orchestrates, 
through effective network management, the effective dissemination of multimedia 
information among the warfighters in a combat or a peace keeping scenario where 
coalition forces impose UN regulations or relief forces respond to in an emergency and 
disaster response situation. After all, “the source of the increased power in a net centric 
operation is derived in part from the increased content, quality, and timeliness of 
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V. TACTICAL PRIVATE SATELLITE NETWORK REMOTE 
NETWORK MANAGEMENT EXPERIMENTATION AND 
CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT 
Up to this point, the examination of the Tactical Private Satellite Network has 
included several aspects. The first area of this study concentrated on the current and 
future states and trends in the commercial and military satellite communications field. 
From there, the authors formulated the concept of and submitted a proposed definition for 
the Tactical Private Satellite Network. Additionally, the study included a treatment of 
networks that were characteristically similar to the proposed concept that are currently 
deployed in support of the military domain, various civil government agencies, and 
within the private sector. The last idea that was examined was the conceptual 
implementation of the Tactical Private Satellite Network within various operational 
domains of interest. This chapter will deal with aspects of management of the Tactical 
Private Satellite Network — specifically, remote network management, relevant 
experimentation of the illustrated concept, the results of the experimentation, and the 
formulation and proposal of a management construct to address the issues of managing 
this specific network. 
A. HYPOTHESIS AND PURPOSE OF EXPERIMENTATION 
One of the key principles put forth through the development of the concept of this 
Tactical Private Satellite Network is how the network, consisting of the network devices 
(routers, switches, wireless access points, and on) which connect end users and the 
satellite terminals that provide the actual transmission path, is managed as a single entity 
with the ultimate goal of providing robust services. It is suggested that this network, in its 
holistic form, can be managed from a single point within the network — specifically with 
the implementation of the base station/gateway concept that was defined in Chapter III. 
Thus, the gateway will facilitate the agent function in network management by serving as 
the advanced agent for actively managing the network. Also, there must be consideration 
given to the limiting distribution of trained networking personnel and to the possibility 
that participating members in the network may not have trained networking personnel 
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assigned to their operational facilities. Therefore, there is a need for a capability to 
conduct advanced network management from a remote location. The bandwidth provided 
by the satellite link can be used as a path for this functionality. The hypothesis behind the 
experiment is that the concept of remote network management can be illustrated: remote 
management of this holistic network is practical and can be executed within the 
architecture of the Tactical Private Satellite Network. This testing will also serve as a 
basis for further research and experimentation within this realm. To this end, an 
experiment is designed to test the feasibility and functionality of remote network 
management within the context of the Tactical Private Satellite Network. 
B. TESTING/EXPERIMENTATION SCENARIO 
The scenario used for this test and experimentation closely aligns with the 
operational implementation illustrated in Chapter IV section A3 of this thesis. 
Specifically, the scenario of interest is the SC MAGTF. The purpose of this experiment is 
to demonstrate the capability of remote network management at MCTSSA with regard to 
a portion of the bandwidth that can be used to perform management functionality or the 
entire satellite link that can be utilized as a network management control channel. For 
details on the operational aspect of the implementation, the reader may refer to the 
relevant section in Chapter IV. Theoretically, deployed units that have implemented the 
Tactical Private Satellite Network are able to effectively exchange information between 
higher headquarters and subordinate units and laterally between subordinate units. 
Essentially, communication is bi-directional in nature. An important aspect of the 
research associated with this operational concept and the conceptual framework for a 
Tactical Private Satellite Network is the ability to conduct network management 
remotely. Several assumptions have been generated to guide the experimental design. 
The suggested assumptions are as follows: 
• Security Cooperation MAGTF Company deployed beyond doctrinal 
distances and BLOS Radio Frequency capabilities. These units are forced 
to utilize BLOS or OTH technology for communications with higher, 
adjacent, and supporting units. 
• SATCOM coverage available in Area of Responsibility (AOR) 
(commercial or MILSATCOM). 
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• Swe-Dish IPT (satellite terminal device) technology fielded at Battalion 
(Bn)/Company (Co) Headquarters (HQ) as SATCOM link. 
To effectively test the concept of the Tactical Private Satellite Network within the 
context of the SC MAGTF, it is important to outline the information exchange 
requirements related to this operational implementation. There are sixteen specific events 
that involve an exchange of information from subordinate headquarters to higher 
headquarters. These events should be considered the minimum amount of traffic that will 
be passed over the SATCOM link. For the purposes of this experiment, all events are 
simulated and represent multiple different application protocols, such as chat messages, 
e-mail attachments, and e-mail main body. 
1. Experimental Architecture 
The architecture for the experiment is a representative network, similar to what 
would be deployed in to support the SC MAGTF. The operational concept was illustrated 
in Chapter IV. This test network is made up of two nodes: one represents a higher 
headquarters and one represents a subordinate headquarters. The latter is designed with 
the intent to replicate the packet-switched network that would be deployed to facilitate 
information exchange requirement in both directions — from higher headquarters to the 
subordinate headquarters and from subordinate headquarters to higher headquarters. The 
test network is a routable network that relies on a satellite link for connectivity. The 
nodes were connected via satellite point-to-point link using the Swe-Dish IPT suitcase 
terminals that are the property of the NPS CENETIX lab. The Swe-Dish IPTs are a 
representative transmission system because they are not currently fielded to operational 
units within the Marine Corps. For the purpose of the experiment, the Swe-Dish suitcases 
have similar capability as fielded systems. The satellite that was accessed during the 
experiment was the Telstar 7 (Galaxy 27) satellite that is in geostationary orbit with 
position location of 129 degrees west (http://www.n2yo.com/satellites/?c=10). Figure 45 
illustrates the position of the Telstar 7 satellite relative to the testing site. Satellite access 
and bandwidth, as well as testing facilities, were provided courtesy of the MCTSSA 
located in Camp Pendleton, California. 
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Figure 45.   Telstar 7 Satellite Location (from http://www.n2yo.com/?s=25922). 
 
The remainder of the test network topology consists of hosts, switches, and 
routers — all networking devices that would be found supporting deployed units. Figure 
46 details the network architecture utilized for the experiment. The satellite point-to-point 
link was engineered to initiate a router-to-router connection between the notional 
operating units. Since the routers have a direct connection through the satellite link to 
each other, this test/experimentation network closely replicates the proposed conceptual 
architecture of the Tactical Private Satellite Network. The hosts on the network were 
running Windows XP operating system. One host at the higher headquarters node 
functioned as the network management agent. This management agent was running the 
commercial software SolarWinds Engineering Edition as the network management 
application and was responsible for collecting data on network performance and was the 




Figure 46.   Experimental Network Architecture. 
 
In addition to running SolarWinds, the management host was also running the 
traffic analyzer WireShark. It was used to capture packets traversing from the 
management agent to the rest of the network. The management agent for the satellite 
transmission portion of the network was also located at the higher headquarters node. It 
was running the iSite software, a proprietary software package specifically used for the 
monitoring of the iDirect modems that are embedded in the Swe-Dish IPTs. Information 
exchange requirements between the nodes were determined prior to the experiment and, 
since those requirements were determined, data needed to be created to represent the flow 
on the network. To create data to flow over the network, the IX Chariot software was 
employed and resident on a host at the subordinate unit node. The purpose of the IX 
Chariot was to create and transmit messages using specific protocols to replicate 
operational traffic traversing the network. This data replication would serve to give some 
estimation as to the utilization of the satellite bandwidth while exchanging certain types 
of data across the satellite link. Specifics on types of data transmitted are detailed in a 
subsequent section of this chapter. 
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In addition to the diagram of the test network architecture shown, Table 7 is 
provided to illustrate the detailed router and switch configuration highlights and relevant 
IP addressing for the test network: 
 
Device/Interface IP Address Notes 




BN_ROUTER  Cisco 2800 series 
Loopback 192.168.1.56/32  
Gateway 192.168.1.2/30 Fast Ethernet Port 0/0 – connection from 
router to  
Satellite modem 
Network 192.168.1.64/27  
Interface 192.168.1.65 Fast Ethernet Port 0/1 – connection from 
router to switch 
BN_SWITCH  Cisco Catalyst 2950 Switch (24 port) 
Vlan 192.168.1.66  




CO_ROUTER  Cisco 2800 series 
Loopback 192.168.2.56/32  
Gateway 192.168.2.2/30 Fast Ethernet Port 0/0 – connection from 
router to Satellite modem 
Network 192.168.2.64/27  
Interface 192.168.2.65 Fast Ethernet Port 0/1 – connection from 
router to switch 
BN_SWITCH  Cisco Catalyst 2950 Switch (24 port) 
Vlan 192.168.2.66  
Table 7.   Detailed IP addressing Scheme for the Test Network. 
 
Although the test network depicted is representative of the Tactical Private 
Satellite Network, it is necessary to point out several differences, and the associated 
ramifications related to those differences, between the network that was used to test and 
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the conceptual model that was first defined in Chapter III. First, the transmission 
architecture for the test network is in a point-to-point configuration. The concept of the 
Tactical Private Satellite Network requires, for most operational implementations 
outlined in Chapter IV, a point-to-multipoint configuration (multicast). This is critical to 
note in that in the point-to-point configuration, only two nodes share finite satellite 
bandwidth; whereas, the point-to-multipoint model will dictate that at least two nodes — 
if not more — will be sharing the bandwidth. This will require that efforts, associated 
with acquiring commercial satellite bandwidth to support the Tactical Private Satellite 
Network, are undertaken with the knowledge and understanding that more nodes will 
require more resources from the satellite. The second difference is that there was no 
tactical network entry point/satellite base station that was associated with the test 
network. Again, as outlined in Chapter III, the essence of the Tactical Private Satellite 
Network is the employment of a base station/gateway that functions as the NECOS for 
the satellite transmission portion of the network. Therefore, without the employment of 
the base station during testing, the true management capability could not be evaluated. 
Due to the proprietary nature of the iDirect modems that are embedded in the Swe-Dish 
SATCOM terminals, no actual management of the modem could be accomplished. As 
with the MIO 08-2 experiment illustrated in Chapter IV, because no access to the satellite 
terminal modem could be acquired, the terminal operators were relegated to the role of 
monitor. This is a critical point in that to effectively manage the satellite network portion 
of the Tactical Private Satellite Network, and to view the network as a holistic network 
consisting of the satellite transmission piece and the networking devices, a base 
station/gateway NECOS with the capability to actively manage the performance of the 
satellite terminal modem needs to be employed. Finally, it is important to note that no 
encryption was utilized on the satellite transmission. Although encryption is required by 
the Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 8100.2, the satellite link for the 
experiment was commercial-based. Also, since the test network was closed (no other 
participants), it was decided that there was no urgent need to encrypt the experimental 
traffic. The Cisco 2800 series routers that were employed on the network were capable of 
employing Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) encryption. Because of time constraints 
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associated with the experiment, the AES encryption was not employed. Conjecture is that 
the employment of encryption on the network will affect the overall throughput of the 
satellite link; therefore, the actual performance of the link that was monitored and 
recorded during the test was artificially elevated. There are other elements of security and 
encryption, such as VPNs, and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), that are relevant, but they 
were not tested during this experiment. 
2. Metrics of Interest 
To test the legitimacy of the network configuration, the applicability of a satellite 
communications link and the ability to remotely manage network devices from a central 
location is necessary to collect information relevant to the experiment. The items that 
were to be investigated drove the selection of the metrics and the data collected. The 
following questions served as the basis of investigation during the 
testing/experimentation: 
• How does the satellite link perform with regard to information exchange? 
• How do networking components (routers and switches) perform through 
this particular link? 
• Does the use of network management protocols (ICMP, SNMP, and 
TELNET) work over the satellite link? 
• How much bandwidth, as a portion of the aggregate, does management-
related data consume? 
• Does the injection of network management-related traffic over the link 
adversely affect the flow of operational data? 
A determination was made as to what data should be collected and another was 
made as to what associated metrics would be useful to provide answers to the previously 
listed questions. Table 8 illustrates the data of interest, the metric, and the rationale 
behind the collection of that piece of data: 
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Metric Collection Method Rationale 
Packet Loss 
 
SolarWinds To note the performance of 
networking devices deployed 
Satellite Link Throughput iSite Illustrates the capability of the 
established satellite link 
Router performance 
(Minimum/maximum response time 
and packet loss) per interface 
SolarWinds Used to determine overall 
performance of the routers on 
the network 
Switch performance 
(Minimum/maximum response time 
and packet loss) per interface 
SolarWinds Used to determine overall 
performance of the switches 
on the network 
Transmission Speeds per node SolarWinds To determine the transmission 
rate per each node in the 
network 
Transmission of ICMP WireShark To illustrate the use of ICMP 
through the network 
Transmission of SNMP-related data WireShark To illustrate the path of the 
SNMP messages throughout 
the network topology 
Table 8.   Metric, Collection Method and Rationale. 
 
At this point, both the test architecture and the desired data to be collected have 
been determined. The next section illustrates the execution of the experimentation to 
include the methodology, the data collected, and the actual results ascertained from the 
collected data. 
C. EXPERIMENT EXECUTION 
The experiment was executed from 4 to 7 August 2008 at the Marine Corps 
Tactical Systems Support Activity in Camp Pendleton, California. MCTSSA furnished 
access to and use of the facilities in the SWAN lab. The nodes for the experiment were 
named Battalion, representing the higher headquarters, and Company, representing the 
subordinate headquarters. This naming convention is consistent with the test scenario 
illustrated earlier in this chapter. It is also consistent with the SC MAGTF operational 
implementation outlined earlier in this research. The two Swe-Dish IPT satellite terminals 
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were installed and configured for use in the point-to-point mode. Concurrent to the 
installation and activation of the satellite communications link, the network devices were 
installed and the routers and switches were configured to operate within the parameters of 
the network. Once the satellite link was established and all of the networking components 
were installed and tested, the network management agent conducted a discovery to 
establish the baseline of the network. To be more specific, the management agent 
conducted a discovery sweep of the network utilizing the Packet Internet Groper (PING) 
sweep utility included in the SolarWinds tools. Figure 47 is data that was collected as a 
result of the network discovery using PING Sweep. From the output provided, the PING 
sweep utility determined that the response time from hosts and network devices that were 
resident on the Company Node network had a response time of over 500 ms, which is 
consistent with response time associated with communications through a satellite at 
GEO: 
 
Figure 47.   PING Sweep Utility Results. 
 
In addition to the discovery of the packet switched network, a baseline of the 
actual performance of the satellite link was also obtained. Again, using the proprietary 
iSite software package, a baseline was taken of the satellite link used during the 
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experimentation. Figure 48 illustrates the baseline of the transmission path associated 
with this test. The ICMP and UDP traffic that is seen on the baseline is the result of the 
PING Sweep that was executed concurrently to the capture of the transmission baseline. 
Once the baseline configuration of the network was captured, the actual testing and 
experimentation had begun: 
 
 
Figure 48.   Baseline of Satellite Link. 
 
1. Methodology 
Simulated data relevant to the scenario outlined previously in this chapter was 
generated using the IX Chariot software application and transmitted across the satellite 
link from the Company Node to the Battalion Node. Network performance data was 
collected using commercially available network management software tools. The 
management agent was utilizing standard protocols to conduct management of the 
network. These protocols include the SNMP, the ICMP, and TELNET. These tools are 
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available to any network manager either through the command prompt terminal window 
or as they are employed within software applications, such as SolarWinds. In addition, a 
protocol analyzer was employed to capture packets traversing the network to allow for 
the analysis of data. Once the management agent was configured and the baseline of the 
network, both the devices and the satellite communications link were captured and the 
simulated data packages were transmitted. 
2. Test Plan Narrative 
There were three equally important goals with regard to the testing. The first was 
the overall performance of the satellite link; the second was the ability to capture and 
analyze network performance; and the third was the ability to remotely manage network 
devices. Therefore, to get test results that would verify the potential of the satellite link 
within the context of the test scenario, and to track and manage the performance of the 
networking devices that were deployed, a total of nineteen test runs were conducted. 
Each test run consisted of commonly used applications (Layer 5 of the Open Systems 
Interconnection (OSI) reference model) protocols, such as Simple Mail Transfer Protocol 
(SMTP) version 1, the File Transfer Protocol (FTP), and on to gauge network 
performance. As the testing progressed, multiple application protocols were run 
concurrently to stress the network and to determine the operating capability. In addition 
to the transfer of application protocols across the network, the management agent set a 
polling interval for SNMP data at 120 to 240 seconds. This frequent polling rate 
introduced an increased amount of data across the network. It aided to further understand 
network performance and accounts for the constant presence of ICMP and UDP data on 
the performance results. The amount of management data that was injected into the 
network was done to replicate active management of multiple stations or subnets across 
the network. For the sake of this study, five of the nineteen test runs were chosen to 
exhibit the performance of the network — both the satellite link and the networking 
devices. Those five simulated data samples represented information exchange 
requirements called for by the testing scenario illustrated previously. The five 
representative tests were: 
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• Internet scripts: SMTP to simulate the use of e-mail. 
• Internet scripts: FTP to simulate a file transfer from a server residing at 
the battalion node requested by a host on the company node. 
• Internet Relay Chat (IRC): a commonly used chat application. 
• Collaboration utilizing Microsoft NetMeeting (video and text chat) and 
the TELNET protocol: simulating a diverse amount of traffic concurrently 
traversing the network. 
• Collaboration utilizing Microsoft NetMeeting (video and text chat), file 
transfer, and desktop share: simulating concurrent diverse application 
utilization. 
3. Results 
Since there is no means to manage the network in its holistic form, the 
performance of the network is broken down into three sections. That is to say that 
separate management agents were required and used for the satellite link and for the other 
network devices. The first section will illustrate the performance of the Swe-Dish IPT 
satellite terminals during the experimentation as captured by the proprietary iSite 
software. The second section will illustrate the overall performance of the networking 
devices (the routers and switches) through the duration of the testing as captured by 
SolarWinds. The final section will illustrate that management related data, such as ICMP 
and SNMP traffic, was successfully sent over the network and was recorded by the traffic 
analyzer, WireShark. Once the performance results have been illustrated and explained, 
general conclusions will be drawn and delivered. 
a. Performance of Swe-Dish Satellite Terminals 
For the experiment, we were allocated a 1Mbps uplink and 1Mbps 
downlink. The performance of the Swe-Dish IPT satellite link was consistent in that no 
outages were recorded for the duration of the experiment. There were some issues 
associated with establishing the initial connection, but, after the connection was finally 
established, the satellite link remained solid. As expected, the performance of the satellite 
terminals seemed consistent with that which was noted during the MIO 08-2 
experimentation.  
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The first test that was performed was the simulated transfer of SMTP 
related data. This test was to simulate the use of electronic mail from the company node 
to the battalion node. This simulation was chosen because e-mail has become ubiquitous 
with regard to information dissemination and collaboration within the military. The data 
transfer was recorded and is illustrated in Figure 49. The preponderance of the traffic 
noted (the saw-tooth pattern) is the TCP connection and transfer between nodes. 
 
 
Figure 49.   Simulated SMTP. 
 
The second test sample consists of the performance during an FTP active 
mode session. Active mode FTP transfers data in a different way than passive FTP and 
also in a way that is counter-intuitive with regard to the TCP standard. This is because it 
does select port 20 as its source port (not a random high port that's greater than 1024) and 
connects back to the client on a random high port that has been pre-negotiated on the port 
21 control connection (http://www.crossftp.com/kb/entry/20/). Therefore, the client is 
initiating the control session as well as the data transfer session. In this example, the  
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company node is transferring a notional file from the battalion node. Figure 50 illustrates 
the FTP session. Like the SMTP sample, TCP traffic makes up the preponderance of the 
load on the link during this test: 
 
 
Figure 50.   Simulated FTP session. 
 
The third test of interest is a simulation of the popular collaborative tool, 
the IRC. Figure 51 illustrates the link performance during a simulated IRC session 
between nodes. An IRC session uses the TCP standard to make connections between 
clients and servers. Once the TCP connection is made, a UDP datagram containing the 
line of text chat is sent. As the graph shows, there is an increase in TCP traffic on both 
the send and receive sides of each node.  
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Figure 51.   Simulated IRC Session. 
 
So far the simulations have demonstrated one application protocol 
traversing the network at a time. The exception to this is the constant UDP and ICMP 
traffic automatically generated by the network management agent and purposely injected 
onto the network. The subsequent two tests illustrate the performance of the satellite link 
while multiple application protocols are being transmitted simultaneously. This is 
concurrent with the constant level of management-related data. A TELNET session was 
added to the subsequent tests and initiated at the management console (located on the 
battalion node) to the router located on the company node. Thus, the TELNET session 
had to traverse the satellite link — just as the other traffic — and the effects were 
captured within the context of link performance. 
The fourth test that is illustrated is a simulated collaborative session 
utilizing the Microsoft NetMeeting application. During this session, both video and text 
chat were used. Additionally, a TELNET session from the battalion node to the router on 
the company node was executed.  
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Figure 52 illustrates the performance of the link during this simulated data 
exchange. The majority of the data in this case is UDP.  This is because of the 
connection-less nature of the streaming video. Previous simulations have been more 
oriented towards TCP: 
 
 
Figure 52.   Simulated Multi-Application Exchange with TELNET Session. 
 
The final simulation was the most comprehensive, and was originally 
developed to stress the satellite link. This particular simulation, the last of the sample 
five, consists of multiple application protocols being transferred simultaneously — 
specifically a NetMeeting (video and text chat) session, a file transfer, and a desktop 
share. Figure 53 illustrates this particular test. As demonstrated in the graph, there are 
increased amounts across the application protocols (UDP, TCP, and HTTP). According to 
the Microsoft TechNet website, NetMeeting utilizes the TCP standard for data transport 
and call control and uses the UDP standard for secondary connections for sending and 
receiving audio and video (http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc767134.aspx). 
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The information available on the web resource is consistent with what was illustrated in 
the test results. As with the previous four samples, the presence of the ICMP and SNMP 
management data is purposely injected by the network management agent. In comparing 
this last sample with the previous, there is a marked increase in the receive/transmit 
kilobits per second (Kbps) on each of the two nodes. It is, therefore, suggested that this 
last sample test more closely represents the actual operational information exchange that 
would be present in a Tactical Private Satellite Network. 
 
 
Figure 53.   Simulation of Multiple Application Protocols Transmitted Simultaneously. 
 
In summary, the performance of the Swe-Dish IPT terminals connected 
through a commercial communications satellite in geostationary orbit met all 
expectations and matched the performance characteristics that were recorded during 
previous experimentation. Even though the allocated bandwidth from the commercial 
provider was 1Mbps for each uplink and downlink, at peak traffic only about 500 Kbps 
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was utilized. The reduction in bandwidth available is a limitation of using satellite 
terminals with small antennas (in this case, 0.9 meters) and, as such, these terminals are 
considered disadvantaged terminals. To compensate for the point-to-point topology 
between two disadvantaged terminals, more resources are required from the space 
segment to close the link. Thus, even though 1Mbps was leased, the resource 
requirements to close the link left only half of the bandwidth available for actual data 
transmission. As demonstrated by the collected data, the satellite link terminated by these 
particular terminals was capable of handling a wide assortment of simultaneously 
transmitted application protocols — in addition to network management-related data. As 
noted previously, the proprietary iSite software provided only the capability to monitor 
the performance of the iDirect modems. Due to the proprietary nature of the software, 
there is no management functionality included or authorized by the manufacturer. 
b. Performance of Network Components 
Not only was the performance of the satellite terminals of interest during this 
experimentation, but it is also crucial to examine the performance of the networking devices 
within the context of a satellite-based routable network. Considering that the devices were 
connected via a transmission path with well-known delay (geostationary satellite delay of 
roughly 500 ms), and since the Tactical Private Satellite Network will most likely use 
geostationary satellite as the primary means of connectivity to circumvent the limitations 
associated with LEO satellites’ constellation, such as low available throughput and need for 
ISL connections, the data gathered from this experiment would be germane to the conceptual 
network architecture. For the sake of gathering data and conducting analysis, the performance 
of these devices was compared with each other. For instance, the router at the battalion node 
was compared with the performance of the router at the company node. Likewise, a 
comparison was undertaken with regard to the switches that were employed. These side-by-
side comparisons are possible because each node had the same hardware with the same 
configuration as its counterpart on the distant end. This was done to eliminate any variance 
that might have been introduced by the difference in equipment and configurations. As noted 
previously, SolarWinds was used to capture relevant data on the performance of the devices 
in question during the experimentation. 
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Since, by definition, the network is routable, the first devices to be 
examined were the routers. The test network used Cisco 2800 series routers — one at 
each node. Both routers were furnished by MCTSSA for the duration of the experiment 
and each was configured on-site prior to the execution of the experiment. The purpose of 
each router was to function as the gateway between the network and the satellite terminal. 
Each interface on the routers was configured for the same purpose to maintain 
consistency. In terms of detailed configuration, the Fast Ethernet port 0/0 was configured 
as the gateway connection to the modem on the satellite terminal; the Fast Ethernet port 
0/1 was configured as the connection between the routers and the respective switches. 
The data collected was mostly concerned with those particular ports because all data must 
traverse through them to be either transmitted through the satellite link or routed and 
delivered to hosts on the subnet. Figures 54 and 55 demonstrate the MIN/MAX response 
time (in green) and packet loss for each of the routers in total. This provides a detailed 
picture of the overall router performance. Again, noting the response time of the 
Company Router as at least 500 ms, it is consistent with the characteristics of a 
geostationary satellite communications link. The response time for the Battalion router 
was relatively low because the performance data was captured locally at the Battalion 
node. With regard to the Fast Ethernet ports (Fa 0/0) on both routers, the performance in 
terms of the MIN/MAX bps received, MIN/MAX bps transmitted, and Average Receive 
bps, and the Average Transmit bps showed little variation in a side-by-side analysis. 
Figure 56 and 57 illustrate the performance characteristics of this interface for each 
router. This data demonstrates that the performance of this particular interface and the 
interface between the router and the satellite terminal were able to handle the simulated 
transmission load. Even though the capacity of the routers is roughly five orders of 
magnitude more than the satellite link, it was deemed necessary to the concept of remote 













Figure 56.   Battalion Router Fast Ethernet Interface 0/0 Performance. 
 
 
Figure 57.   Company Router Fast Ethernet Interface 0/0 Performance. 
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It is also relevant to note the performance of the Fast Ethernet interface 
0/1 (Fa 0/1). It serves as the connection from the router to the layer 2 network switch 
located at each node. Figures 58 and 59 illustrate the performance of the Fa 0/1 interfaces 
on the Battalion and Company routers, respectively. The performance of each of the 
interfaces is consistent with each other. There was no information that would indicate 
loss of packets between the router and the switch at each node. 
 
 




Figure 59.   Battalion Router Fast Ethernet Interface 0/1 Performance. 
 
In addition to the network routers, the performance of the network 
switches was also relevant. As mentioned with regard to the routers, the capability of the 
deployed switch was beyond that of the transmission system, but, for the purposes of 
illustrating the ability to perform remote management of network devices, the 
examination of the switches was germane to the experiment. The important data with 
regard to the switches was the MIN/MAX response time and packet loss. Figures 60 and 
61 illustrate the captured data. The significance of this information is that, as with each of 
the routers, there is negligible packet loss. The response time of the Battalion switch is 
consistent with the response time of the respective router. Again, this was because the 
data collected was done locally. As with the Company router, the response time for the 
Company switch is consistent with that of the router and with operating on a 
geostationary satellite link. 
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Figure 61.   Company Switch Response Time and Packet Loss.  
 
Since the performance of the networking components has been collected 
and illustrated, the next step in the testing was to utilize common network management 
protocols to actually conduct management on local devices as well as devices that are 
 158
deployed on the distant end of the link. SNMP allows management tools to not only 
collect data on performance, but also allows the manager to set variables through agents 
on managed devices in Internet Protocol networks (Hia, Midkiff 190). SolarWinds 
Engineering Edition allowed the network manager to automatically configure SNMP 
polling intervals and to automatically poll the devices in question. In the case of this 
experiment, a polling interval was set at 120 seconds and 240 seconds. Information on 
device status is relayed back, again using SNMP, to the network management console. 
The protocol analyzer, WireShark, was used to capture and display the SNMP packets 
that were transmitted during the experimentation. Figure 62 provides a sample of the 
SNMP traffic that was transferred during testing: 
  
 
Figure 62.   SNMP Sample Data Capture.  
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It is important to note that SNMP is a recognized standard and is 
implemented in most commercially available networking devices. There are some cases 
where the Management Information Base (MIB) is not accessible by automated 
management tools such as SolarWinds. The iDirect modem in the Swe-Dish IPT is an 
example of this issue. Access to the MIB for the modem is not permitted by the 
equipment manufacturer. This is a limitation of the equipment used during the 
experimentation. 
In addition to utilizing SNMP for management, the common ICMP was 
also utilized for management purposes. ICMP provides simple network discovery and 
troubleshooting tools that can be used for a variety of management purposes. The 
common use of ICMP is the PING command. As well as automatically polling for SNMP 
data, the management software used can automatically send a PING to various nodes on 
the network. The illustration below (Figure 63) demonstrates the ICMP messaging during 
the experimentation. As with the SNMP data, WireShark was used to capture and display 
the packets of interest. 
 
 
Figure 63.   ICMP Sample Data Capture. 
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4. Conclusions Drawn from the Experimentation 
There are several conclusions that can be drawn from the experiment. The first 
conclusion is that the Swe-Dish IPT, which was the only available resource for the specific 
experiment, candidate satellite terminals can provide the requisite capability to function as 
the primary transmission system for the Tactical Private Satellite Network. Considering, 
however, that a critical factor in the concept of the Tactical Private Satellite Network is a 
base station/gateway type system, the Swe-Dish IPT is not adequate for that purpose, but 
could adequately function as the transmission piece for a subordinate node on the network. 
The performance data collected during this test and during the MIO 08-2 experimentation 
emphasizes the capability of the Swe-Dish IPT and satellite communications in general. 
Overall, the satellite link provided by the Swe-Dish and the commercial satellite that 
bandwidth was provided remained reliable for the duration of the experiment. With regard to 
the terminal’s performance and in terms of the five test samples, there were no significant 
issues to report. There were significant operational issues associated with the Swe-Dish 
terminals that were overcome by perseverance on the part of the experimentation team in 
concert with technical personnel from the equipment manufacturer. 
The second conclusion is that during the course of the test and experimentation, the 
network manager was able to collect network baseline information for both networking 
devices and the satellite terminals. Although the baseline and performance data is relevant, it 
is necessary to consider that future testing should incorporate the induction of faults to test 
detection, isolation, and correction. Relevant data on critical networking devices was also 
collected track the performance of the devices and any adverse affects that would be 
introduced into the overall network performance should one of the devices have failed. The 
data was collected using commercially-available software management tools that use 
standard management protocols, such as ICMP and SNMP. In addition to the collection of 
data, the method of collection is critical. During the test, the network manager was able to 
remotely manage, in a very elemental way, network devices across the satellite link. This was 
done by using SNMP, ICMP, and TELNET to actively monitor, track, and manage network 
components. The concept of remote network management is a critical element to the 
implementation of the Tactical Private Satellite Network. 
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Third, deployed devices enabled the dissemination of data across the network 
with no significant loss of data or introduction of any latency other than that naturally 
occurring due to the characteristics of the geostationary satellite link. 
In summary, the test network that was implemented can be perceived as 
representative of the conceptual Tactical Private Satellite Network. Efforts have been 
made so as remote network management to be demonstrated through the experimentation 
at MCTSSA, either as a portion of the bandwidth that can be used to perform 
management functionality or as the entire satellite link that can be utilized as a network 
management control channel. There are noted differences, such as there was no base 
station/gateway device acting as the NECOS for the network and that there were only two 
nodes established, when in actuality there would be more than two. The ability to utilize 
satellite communications as the means for information exchange and the capability to 
remotely manage the network devices and monitor the satellite modem, without owing 
the space asset, is crucial to operational implementation. 
D. APPLICATION OF REMOTE NETWORK MANAGEMENT TO THE 
TACTICAL PRIVATE SATELLITE NETWORK 
The application of remote network management within the context of the Tactical 
Private Satellite Network requires more detailed analysis. The main management issue 
regarding the implementation of the Tactical Private Satellite Network is that the 
management of the satellite link and the management of the networking devices are 
segregated. Presently, as demonstrated through experimentation, the modems embedded 
with the satellite terminals are monitored, but not managed, through a proprietary 
software application. On the other hand, management of the networking components is 
managed by yet another application. To simplify managerial tasks, the Tactical Private 
Satellite Network must be viewed as a holistic network where the performance of one 
aspect, the satellite link and terminal, will directly affect the performance of the other, the 
networking devices in this example. 
With regard to the satellite terminals, there are unique challenges associated with 
the management of satellite terminals. However, satellite terminals are capable to carry 
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out multitude tasks, while on the same time a critical mission of the terminal segment is 
to support end user services (Totsline and Gopal 3). Within the construct of the Tactical 
Private Satellite Network, the base station/gateway would provide that support to the end-
user services. Specific to the management concept is that a common set of management 
functions must be applied to the satellite terminal portion of the network. These functions 
include the ability to view and modify satellite network assets (in the case of the Tactical 
Private Satellite Network, the user terminals), the ability to identify faults within 
deployed terminals, track overall performance and accounting metrics per terminal, and 
provide a platform for security management (Totsline and Gopal 3). To achieve this 
capability within the Tactical Private Satellite Network, a base station/gateway solution, 
empowered with all the above capabilities, must be employed to address all of the 
functionality listed. 
Another aspect of management is the segregation of communications 
control/network management data from operational-related C2 data within the aggregated 
satellite bandwidth. In this case, network management can be achieved through the 
implementation of a Network Management Control Channel. The idea of the control 
channel is to logically segregate a portion of the transmission bandwidth. In this case, 
there is a portion of the satellite link for the purpose of communications control and 
network management. This control channel could be established within the Tactical 
Private Satellite Network and utilized to conduct active management on networking 
components that are a part of the distant stations’ local networks utilizing the SNMP. 
This segregation would minimize the impact on the operational traffic that has to traverse 
the same channels of the transmission media. Should the creation of a separate channel 
dedicated to network management not be feasible, means must be addressed to limit the 
amount of bandwidth required to conduct active network management. In either case, the 
management protocol performance needs to be balanced against its overhead and the 
impact of adding network management to managed nodes must be minimal, reflecting a 
lowest common denominator.  
As demonstrated in the experiment, SNMP version 1, ICMP, and TELNET traffic 
did not have any significant adverse impact on the exchange of data between the two test 
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nodes. The artificiality, induced by the testing environment, limited the actual number of 
active nodes on the network to two active nodes. At each of these two nodes, there was 
one router, one switch, and three hosts. Therefore, it is possible to assume that with a 
larger network, more bandwidth will be consumed and there will be less available for 
management functionality. Methods need to be investigated to streamline the network 
management data and information exchange to not interfere with the transmission of 
other operationally related data. 
To summarize, the ability to remotely manage network resources is critical to the 
implementation of the Tactical Private Satellite Network. The employment of a base 
station that has the capability to actively manage various aspects of the deployed satellite 
terminals would greatly enhance network performance and management. As well, the 
creation of a network management control channel that rides a subset of the allocated 
satellite bandwidth with the express purpose of the transfer of network 
management/communications control information would greatly enhance management 
efforts — given that there will be no noticeable trade-off with the actual operational 
channel. Finally, any ways to streamline the flow of management data would greatly 




















VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND FUTURE WORK 
A. SUMMARY OF WORK 
With the growing need for information exchange within the context of military 
operations and the fact that military operations occur in more dispersed locations, 
generally where access to the terrestrial telecommunications infrastructure is limited or 
non-existent, providing broadband routable network access to military units deployed on 
land, at sea, or to participating heterogeneous units (military and civil authorities), 
providing humanitarian help in an area that has suffered a major disaster is critical. Since 
satellite communications is sometimes the only way for deployed units (ships and ground 
units) to communicate, considering that the MILSATCOM capacity is becoming more 
saturated, commercial satellite systems and infrastructure have filled the need not covered 
by either terrestrial systems or MILSATCOM. This has been demonstrated by the fact 
that the Defense Information Systems Agency has programs in place to contract for 
commercial satellite services and that an increasing amount of commercial-based satellite 
terminals are being deployed to military units. The need for a conceptual network that 
utilizes the commercial space segment, reaches deployed users either on land or at sea, 
and being managed by its users and not the entity that provides the service has been the 
focus of this research effort. During the course of research, this effort has covered 
numerous subjects all related and relevant to the formulation of a conceptual framework 
for a Tactical Private Satellite Network. This examination was done through an extensive 
review of relevant literature, the formulation and definition of the conceptual network, 
the application of this network concept within the context of several scenarios, and 
testing and experimentation on a live network to demonstrate certain capabilities. To 
provide an understanding of the concept as described, it was necessary to examine several 
issues that form the basis for the formulation of this conceptual network. 
The first issue examined dealt with the current state of MILSATCOM and the 
current state of the commercial satellite communications market. Second, a definition of 
the Tactical Private Satellite Network utilizing primarily the commercial space segment 
was formulated and a set of capabilities illustrated as to what kind of service this 
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conceptual network should be able to provide to the user. The most important aspect to 
the concept of the Tactical Private Satellite Network was to define the central node of the 
network: a gateway/base station type device that serves to control media access between 
subordinate terminals, thus, allocating finite satellite bandwidth between member stations 
of the network, providing the Net Control Station functionality, and serving as a central 
management agent. Additionally, an examination was conducted into the implementation 
of the Tactical Private Satellite Network into several use cases: the research environment, 
a maritime scenario, a scenario associated with the Marine Corps’ operational concept of 
the Security Cooperation Marine Air/Ground Task Force, and within a coalition 
environment. These scenarios provided additional insight as to the overall utility of this 
conceptual network for operational and research purposes. Finally, an understanding that 
the implementation of such a conceptual network within the context of the use cases 
listed relies upon the ability to conduct remote network management of not only the 
allocated satellite bandwidth, but also the deployed network devices was illustrated. The 
ability to conduct remote network management utilizing a portion of the satellite channel 
is required to deploy such a network and was also demonstrated during the course of the 
research effort. 
As a result, first, it was concluded that if satellite communications are necessary 
to support military operations across the spectrum of conflict and, if the MILSATCOM 
constellations are used to maximum capacity, then, commercially available satellite 
communications services could be and should be leveraged to support military 
operations. The Department of Defense has recognized that commercial satellite 
communications services can support military operations in two major ways. First, the 
Defense Information Systems Agency has procedures and plans in place to acquire 
commercial satellite communications services for the military. Second, terminal devices 
that are being fielded to the military that operate on the commercial space segment are 
proliferating. An example of this would be the U.S. Marine Corps’ SWAN program 
where commercial satellite terminals have been procured and fielded to augment fielded 
terminals that operate on the MILSATCOM constellation. Therefore, since the capacity 
on the commercial satellites is available for purchase, the terminals are becoming more 
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available and the MILSATCOM constellation has little residual capacity. Thus, the 
commercial space segment is a viable option to support military operations. The use of 
the commercial segment is an integral part of the conceptual definition and framework 
for the Tactical Private Satellite Network. 
Since it has been determined that commercially-available satellite 
communications services (access to satellites and bandwidth) is a viable alternative to 
MILSATCOM and, after the formulation and definition of the Tactical Private Satellite 
Network, the next step in the research was to look at a live implementation of this 
conceptual network to demonstrate that the Tactical Private Satellite Network can be 
implemented and that commercial satellite terminals are usable within the context of the 
network. The example that was used was taken from the MIO experimentation conducted 
in March 2008 in and around the San Francisco Bay area. To test the concept, a routable 
network was established using two commercially-available satellite terminals in a point-
to-point configuration to serve as a redundant communications link. Experiment-related 
traffic consisted of different types of application data. During the course of the 
experimentation, the primary link failed so all experiment-related traffic was transferred 
to the satellite link for transmission. The commercial satellite terminals were able to 
handle the traffic with no degradation in service. This particular case is similar to the 
provided definition of the Tactical Private Satellite Network in that there was no outside 
commercial base station providing MAC for the network. The limitation was that there 
were only two terminals and neither one had the capability to function as the Net Control 
Station by providing active management of the allocated bandwidth. This was a 
limitation introduced by the fact that the research entity has only two terminals and no 
base stations. Even though there were limitations, this live experimentation demonstrated 
that the Tactical Private Satellite Network could be implemented to support the exchange 
of information across a commercial satellite link, regardless of the type of application 
data that must traverse the network. Overall, experimentation inside the framework of 
MIO 08-2 demonstrated the concept of utilizing the Tactical Private Satellite Network as 
a method of direct delivery of data. 
 168
The concept of remote network management inside the given bandwidth 
framework from the commercial provider is critical to the implementation of the Tactical 
Private Satellite Network. Thus, the final conclusion that will be illustrated is the results 
from experimentation and testing of the concept of remote network management. In 
August 2008, testing and experimentation was conducted at the Marine Corps Tactical 
Systems Support Activity in Camp Pendleton, California to investigate this critical 
concept. The experiment was designed to simulate the transmission of application 
specific data from one node (functioned as a subordinate headquarters) to another node 
(functioned as the higher headquarters) via a routable network. Each node had an 
identical topology with regard to network devices (routers, switches, and hosts) and each 
node was serviced by a commercial satellite terminal using commercial communications 
satellite bandwidth in a point-to-point configuration. The point of the experiment was to 
establish a network management agent at the higher headquarters node and to try and 
actively manage the satellite terminals and network devices. Through the use of 
commercially-available network management software, the network management agent 
was able to actively manage network devices through the satellite link from a central 
location with little to no degradation in overall service. This remote management used 
common protocols, such as the SNMP version 1, the ICMP, and TELNET (although not 
advisable over a satellite link). There were several limitations regarding this experiment. 
First, there were only two terminals employed: in an operational implementation of a 
Tactical Private Satellite Network, there would be at least three, and most probably more, 
with one of the terminals functioning as the Net Control Station with resident gateway 
functionality. Second, the network was limited to three hosts per subnet; thus, the 
management responsibilities were scaled back. The third issue is that no encryption was 
used on the satellite link. The introduction of the encryption, it is assumed, would reduce 
the amount of throughput on the satellite link. As a result of the experimentation on a live 
network, it was determined that the current commercial satellite terminals and the 
associated modems could be monitored only. This was a result of the proprietary nature 
of the MIB and that the equipment developer would not grant access to the MIB for the 
purposes of managing the modem embedded in the satellite terminal. With regard to the 
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deployed network devices, there was no issue in conducting active management 
remotely. The network manager was able to use TELNET to access the configuration of 
the routers and switches deployed downstream, as well as the SNMP version 1, to 
conduct other management functions. Overall, the network manager was able to remotely 
manage aspects of this experimental routable network. This proven ability to remotely 
and actively manage satellite terminals and deployed network devices will serve to 
centralize personnel with network management and engineering skills and provide a 
management capability for the entire network. 
As noted, there were several topics that were examined during the course of this 
research to lay the foundation for the reader’s understanding of the conceptual Tactical 
Private Satellite Network. In subsequent sections, the conclusions that were drawn from 
the research will be illustrated and explained, followed by recommendations for future 
work that were originally outside the original scope of this work. 
B. CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM RESEARCH EFFORT 
The purpose of this research was to propose a framework for managing a tactical 
network by allocating the available bandwidth to the different users with respect to their 
needs and the quality of their applications. Commercial leased lines, whose bandwidth is 
going to be negotiated by the service level agreements between the provider and the 
consumer (military and governmental agencies), were examined as the means for 
achieving the connectivity, which was in contrast with the potentially saturated 
proprietary military satellite communications. The end product will be a tactical network 
operating inside the overall leased bandwidth’s boundaries, but with the capability to 
manage this network inside them. The term that aggregates these capabilities is the 
Tactical Private Satellite Network. 
The concept of Tactical Private Satellite Network was examined based on two 
approaches. First, the establishment of two different logical channels inside the physical 
one was proposed instead of an aggregated channel which serves logically and physically 
both requirements. By that a portion of the bandwidth is dedicated to the management 
data which are kept separate from the tactical ones. The proposed segregation needs to be 
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examined to take under consideration and adjust accordingly the impact on the 
operational traffic that has to traverse the same channels of the transmission media. 
Second, the concept of a private satellite network and its implementation was examined 
as a method for direct delivery of data. This private network will give the notion to its 
subscribers of security and availability for the provided connectivity. It is further 
enforced by the execution of network management by one or more base stations which 
will be operated by the participants and not by the provider of the satellite channels. 
The research effort and the formulation and definition of the conceptual Tactical 
Private Satellite Network lead to three major conclusions. These conclusions are that the 
use of commercial satellite communications are a viable alternative to MILSATCOM, the 
concept of this routable Tactical Private Satellite Network can be employed within the 
context of various use cases (and has been before during experimentation conducted by 
the CENETIX at the Naval Postgraduate School), and that remote network management 
over a satellite link is not only feasible, but practical and possible. 
To summarize, the conclusions that have been ascertained and demonstrated 
through the research effort have strengthened the case for the viability of the Tactical 
Private Satellite Network and its operational implementation. Since the use of 
commercial terminals and the commercial space segment is a viable alternative to 
military-only systems, the fact that a representative network was implemented and used 
successfully to transport live experimental data and the ability for a network manager to 
conduct active management from a remote location all support the concept of a Tactical 
Private Satellite Network. 
C. SUGGESTED FUTURE WORK 
Even though various critical aspects of the Tactical Private Satellite Network have 
been demonstrated throughout the course of research and, since the Tactical Private 
Satellite Network has been developed as a concept to this point, there are areas that are 




Each of the areas for future research will serve to increase the understanding of the 
operational implementation of this conceptual network, and broaden the overall utility of 
the network. 
The first aspect for future research deals with the actual implementation of the 
concepts defined with regard to the base station/gateway device. Since the concept of the 
Tactical Private Satellite Network requires the employment of a gateway device that will 
actually provide Media Access Control and modem management for all of the 
subordinate terminals on the network, the acquisition of such a system would further 
prove the concepts illustrated in this thesis. The solution may be a physical base station 
from the same manufacturer of the commercial terminals used by the research team or a 
modem type device that physically and logically connects to the satellite terminal to 
provide the functionality described. In addition to the physical solution, the investigation 
of logical solutions must also occur. This is to say that commercial satellite service 
providers may have some mechanism to provide a generic terminal connected to their 
network the capabilities outlined of the gateway/base station device. This device would, 
then, be able to actively manage all satellite modems and provide MAC for the network. 
Another area of future research is continued live testing of the concepts outlined 
in the body of this work. Continued testing within the experimental environment will 
serve to clarify concepts outlined, as well as discover new ways to implement not only 
the satellite terminals, but also implement a routable network using the terminals. The 
roadmap for such a campaign of experimentation to prove the significance of 
implementing a Tactical private Satellite Network will have to follow the triad discovery-
hypothesis-demonstration (Alberts and Hayes, Code of Best Practice Experimentation, 
19-24). At first, thorough discovery experiments need to be conducted to introduce the 
concept of managing a satellite network provided by a commercial entity. These 
experiments will be the foundation for more rigorous types of experiments. Then, 
hypotheses experiments need to recruit that will be subject to more rigorous assessment 
and refinement so as to build or advance the knowledge on the specific domain. Last, 
demonstration experiments will be conducted to display that knowledge and the overall 
necessity of the Tactical Private Satellite Network. These different kinds of experiments 
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serve to complement and build upon one another and, as the campaign unfolds, our 
conceptual model of the network will change and hopefully mature over time (Alberts 
and Hayes, Code of Best Practice: Campaigns of Experimentation, 71). 
With the varied testing that is conducted by the CENETIX — especially during 
the TNT MIO with its adaptive mesh topology and advanced command and control 
toolsets that could allow for the introduction of such a promising network —, the 
implementation of the Tactical Private Satellite Network will provide another vector for 
information and experiment-related data to be disseminated. In addition to implementing 
this conceptual network within the context of the research environment, it is also 
important to implement, under the guise of experimentation, the conceptual network in 
simulated operating environments, similar to the use cases that were outlined previously 
in Chapter III. Ultimately, this type of implementation will serve to prove whether or not 
the Tactical Private Satellite Network has any utility within these operational scenarios. 
Ideally, once all of the requisite hardware has been procured (base station and more 
terminals), the concept for the Tactical Private Satellite Network should be overlaid on 
top of operational forces for their ultimate evaluation of the concept and to determine the 
overall utility. Being that research has been conducted on this subject to this point has 
reinforced the derived concepts, no actual implementation of the defined Tactical Private 
Satellite Network can occur until the topology has been solidified and the equipment for 
implementation has become available. 
Within the implementation in the context of the experimental environment, as the 
level of confidence in the equipment and the concept increases, it is strongly 
recommended that the level of complexity and sophistication of the test networks 
increases as well. During experimentation, only limited amounts of representative 
application data was transmitted over the satellite link. The addition of different types of 
devices, such as biometric devices, pico-cell technology, the connection of various land 
mobile radio devices, VPN concentrator, live video feeds, audio, database pulls, and on 
will all aid in the evaluation of the Tactical Private Satellite Network concept. Also, 
ascertaining and evaluating the information exchange requirements of operational units 
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will aid in the determination of what application data actually needs to be passed over the 
satellite link. This will be based on priorities set by the operational unit. 
One area of complexity that crosses boundaries of operation and management of 
the Tactical Private Satellite Network and requires future research is the implementation 
and testing of this concept in a coalition environment. Coalition environments can be 
established in response to domestic natural disaster response (such as between the 
military and civil authorities) to those coalitions built to address a threat to collective 
security, such as the coalitions that have been built to support operations in Iraq. There 
are technical and managerial issues that are complex, but political issues could potentially 
exacerbate the pre-existing technical problems as well. Therefore, network operations and 
management within the context of the coalition environment is worthy of further study — 
not only within the context of the Tactical Private Satellite Network, but in general. The 
theoretical implementation of the Tactical Private Satellite Network, being 
technologically agnostic, into the coalition environment could have great benefit within 
this scenario. 
By not only having varied amounts of traffic traverse the network, it is just as 
critical to continually examine technologies, tactics, techniques, concepts, and procedures 
that deal directly with the management of this conceptual network. As mentioned 
previously, the basic ability to conduct active remote network management has been 
demonstrated, but further steps need to be taken. The experimentation in remote network 
management that was conducted was limited in scope. Further research in the area of 
remote management would be to introduce faults into the network, to evaluate the ability 
of management tools and personnel to identify and handle the faults, and to identify ways 
to increase overall network availability. 
Another very important area of suggested study within the realm of the Tactical 
Private Satellite Network is security. The live experimentation that was conducted 
focused primarily on the basic concepts required for the fundamental operation of the 
network. Because commercial satellite services used to transmit data had no classification 
associated with it, security requirements were considered, but not tested. Within the 
context of security, there are three areas that could be addressed either individually or 
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collectively. The first area is physical security. Physical security, in this instance, is not 
limited to making sure that the satellite terminal is not compromised (stolen, damaged, 
etc.), but securing the Physical (reference Layer 1 of the OSI model) Layer. This is done 
by implementing MAC. The concept of the Tactical Private Satellite Network calls for 
the employment of a base station device that would provide Media Access Control for the 
terminals on the network. Since the research team did not have access to such a device, 
that concept could not be demonstrated. It is suggested that the base station device would 
protect access to the media that was procured to support specific customers for a specific 
mission. Further study of this would require the acquisition of the base station and its 
employment in a use case. The second issue relating to security is addressing the 
Information Assurance triad of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability. There are 
various ways in which this can be examined within the context of the Tactical Private 
Satellite Network and it is recommended that this occur because operational traffic that 
traverses this conceptual network is worthy of protection. The final issue for 
consideration for future work is the use of the SNMP version 3 which provides for secure 
network management. Remote network management has been demonstrated with version 
1 of the SNMP, but, to provide a more secure management environment, the 
implementation of SNMP version 3 is required. 
Another possible area of investigation could be the implementation of the 
NECOS, and other critical nodes of advanced capabilities, as hyper nodes of the 8th layer 
which, with their own specialized NOC capability, could implement adaptive networking. 
These hyper-nodes could demonstrate capabilities, such as self-diagnosis, sub network 
view, end-to-end performance, QoS requirements response, and Service Level 
Agreements negotiation (Bordetsky and Hayes-Roth). The result of such a proper 
implementation could be the relieving of rigorous management for the central network 
station and, consequently, the creation of a more flexible model of efficient management 
of such an ad hoc dynamically-formed network and the releasing of additional bandwidth 
for strictly operational needs. 
 To summarize, there are numerous areas for future study that build upon the 
concept of the commercial satellite-based Tactical Private Satellite Network with the 
 175
ability to be managed by its users. Areas of future implementation, within the context of 
an experimental research environment, a simulated operational environment, as well as a 
real operational environment, to include coalitions, are all candidates for future work. 
Additionally, the security aspects of the Tactical Private Satellite Network need to be 
addressed before any operational implementation can be considered. 
In any case, further research should be conducted to examine more thoroughly the 
functionality and feasibility of the Tactical Private Satellite Network in laboratory and 
real situation conditions. From the whole research, networks formed under adverse and 
dynamic conditions, such as the case of Tactical Private Satellite Network, will provide 
great benefit because their network management will become more efficient, complete, 
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